It was at this point that the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the usually mild-mannered Army General Martin Dempsey, spoke up, loudly. According to several sources, Dempsey threw a series of brushback pitches at Kerry, demanding to know just exactly what the post-strike plan would be and pointing out that the State Department didn’t fully grasp the complexity of such an operation.

Dempsey informed Kerry that the Air Force could not simply drop a few bombs, or fire a few missiles, at targets inside Syria: To be safe, the U.S. would have to neutralize Syria’s integrated air-defense system, an operation that would require 700 or more sorties. At a time when the U.S. military is exhausted, and when sequestration is ripping into the Pentagon budget, Dempsey is said to have argued that a demand by the State Department for precipitous military action in a murky civil war wasn’t welcome.

While the overall architect of American policy is of course the President, this position by Dempsey is significant–significant because it is nonsensical. If our Secretary of Defense was at this meeting, or our National Security Advisor, this statement should have embarrassed and angered them.

Why?

Because the “700 sortie” argument is an old Pentagon line, updated for this particular argument about Syria, that can be translated simply as “I don’t want to.” As Goldberg noted, it is impossible to believe that Israel can do three air strikes in Syria (apparently stand-off strikes from beyond Syria’s borders) but the U.S. Air Force cannot do one–until it makes 700 sorties to take down Syrian air defenses. Israel lacks our stealth bombers; Israel does not have the mix of ground to ground or air to ground missiles that we do; Israel lacks the naval strength we have in the Sixth Fleet. For our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to argue that it is simply too dangerous for us to do anything, anything at all, strikes me as shocking.

This is not a policy argument, and one might conclude that despite our great capabilities we should not do what Kerry is said to have recommended (though I agree with Kerry). But that’s not what Dempsey did; he added to his policy argument a ridiculous military argument that should have been shot down with alacrity. In a better administration, the SecDef would have told him to knock off the policy arguments disguised as military advice, or the National Security Advisor would. Meanwhile those officials, or the President, ought to be seeking less biased and more realistic military advice–an action that would itself teach the current military leadership not to repeat the “700 sorties” line of argument.

In 2007, when President Bush considered whether to bomb the North-Korean-built nuclear reactor in Syria, he asked CJCS Pace about the military issues. Pace told him we could do it, period. The President decided not to, for other policy reasons–and those policy arguments were advanced by the Secretaries of State and Defense, not the uniformed military. That’s the way the system ought to work. But that’s not the way it appears to be working now.

Here’s the opening:

Zombies, the dictionary tells us, are “animated corpses revived by mystical means, such as magic or witchcraft”. This is how their many enemies have often regarded neoconservative foreign policy ideas and those who propagate them. Foreign Policy magazine once happily concluded that neoconservative ideas “lie buried in the sands of Iraq”, but back they came, dominating the 2012 Republican Party presidential campaign and dominating the party still. Can this be explained — except by black magic?

What do neocons believe in? I suggest that it’s an amalgam, of:

patriotism, American exceptionalism, a belief in the goodness of America and in the benefits of American power and of its use, and a conviction that democracy is the best system of government and should be spread whenever that is practical. It should not be shocking that such views win wide popularity in the United States, though perhaps that last idea — spreading democracy — is the most controversial. The continuing relevance, indeed power, of these ideas is clear, and it is equally clear that they are not held only by a small coterie of intellectuals in Washington.

The full article can be read here.

An Egyptian court on Tuesday convicted 43 nonprofit workers, including at least 16 Americans, of illegally using foreign funds to foment unrest in the country and sentenced them to up to five years in prison. Most of the Americans were sentenced in absentia because they had long left the country, including Sam LaHood, son of the U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. He received a five-year jail term….

The verdict, read out by judge Makram Awad, also ordered the closure of the offices and seizure of the assets in Egypt belonging to the U.S. nonprofit groups as well as one German organization for which the defendants worked. These are the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, a center for training journalists, and Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

So: Americans convicted, organizations closed, assets seized. And what was the American reaction to this outrageous judgment? We’re “deeply concerned.”

Here is Secretary Kerry’s statement in full:

The United States is deeply concerned by the guilty verdicts and sentences, including the suspended sentences, handed down by an Egyptian court today against 43 NGO representatives in what was a politically-motivated trial. This decision runs contrary to the universal principle of freedom of association and is incompatible with the transition to democracy. Moreover, the decision to close these organizations’ offices and seize their assets contradicts the Government of Egypt’s commitments to support the role of civil society as a fundamental actor in a democracy and contributor to development, especially at this critical stage in the Egyptian people’s democratic transition. Civic groups and international NGOs play a legitimate role in any democracy and are critical to advancing freedoms, supporting universal human rights, giving voice to citizens’ views, and acting as appropriate checks on the government. I urge the Government of Egypt to work with civic groups as they respond to the Egyptian people’s aspirations for democracy as guaranteed in Egypt’s new constitution.

 

That’s a weak and inadequate statement and it will have little impact in Cairo or anywhere else–except perhaps to encourage other regimes to do the same.

“Deeply concerned?” Why do we not condemn this assault on democracy? Some of the most distinguished American NGOs have had assets seized and personnel sentenced to prison–in absentia, to be sure, except in one case where the individual is in Egypt and is sentenced to two years. Kerry’s message is that we don’t much care: he urges the Egyptian government that just took this step to “work with civic groups!”  That would be laughable–if it were not dangerous for democracy and human rights in Egypt.

Secretary Kerry is compounding previous errors in Egypt by letting the Muslim Brotherhood government know that it will pay no price for this step, and letting Egyptians fighting for democracy know that the United States does not have their back. If we will not even protect Americans who work for human rights and for freedom in Egypt, think what we will do for Egyptians. The apparent answer is, sadly, that we will do nothing except issue a statement saying we are “deeply concerned.”

The leader of the powerful Lebanese militant group Hezbollah decisively committed his followers on Saturday to an all-out battle in Syria to defeat the rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad. He said the organization, founded to defend Lebanon and fight Israel, was entering “a completely new phase,” sending troops abroad to protect its interests.

Hezbollah is willing to fight to protect its interests; here is my sense of their view:

We cannot afford to lose this one. A Sunni government in Syria would align with Turkey or the Gulf Arabs or the West, or some combination of them, against us. The bridge between Iran and Hezbollah would be lost. Hezbollah would be badly weakened, thus weakening our ability to threaten Israel. Israel would be more likely to attack our nuclear sites for this very reason—because it would think Hezbollah and Iran are weaker. Our influence in Iraq would fall too. People would say the rise of Iranian and Shia influence in the region was now over. Hezbollah’s enemies in Lebanon, the Sunnis above all, would be energized. People would realize Russia is no match for the Americans. So we must win, and we will dedicate to winning any resources that are needed. As to the humanitarian toll, we don’t care about Sunnis in Syria, or about weakening Turkey or especially Jordan; in fact, those would be nice side benefits from the struggle in Syria. There is only one point here: Do we win or do we lose? We have decided to win.”

The key question now is whether we are willing to accept a Khamenei Doctrine, whereby no state that is part of the Iran/Hezbollah security system is permitted to leave it. Of course, the Brezhnev Doctrine was that of a global superpower armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons; the Khamenei Doctrine is that of a third world state, Iran, of only 75 million people and so far without a nuclear arsenal. And this is what makes the American   position to date so incomprehensible, and so dangerous. Nasrallah and Khamenei are taking a gamble based on their assessment of us–that we will do nothing even in the face of their sending expeditionary forces to Syria. So far they have been proved right. Will we really accept this action on their part, with its consequences throughout the Middle East?

Put another way, Nasrallah and Khamenei have decided to win. They understand the costs of losing, and the benefits of winning, and have made their decision. The United States has made no such decision and appears content to lose. In my article in the Standard I discuss the likely response to this argument–that “winning and losing have no meaning” in the context of Syria. That facile conclusion is an excuse for inaction while foreign troops, from Lebanon and Iran, bring victory for the Assad regime. If the United States allows this to happen, allows Hezbollah and Iran to win, our own credibility will have been shredded–with significant consequences throughout the world. It can only be hoped that Nasrallah’s clarity and his contempt for us will somehow awaken in the Obama administration an understanding of American interests and the need to defend them.

Both Mohsen Rezai and Ali Akbar Velayati are thought to have been involved in planning and approving 1994 attack on the Jewish community’s headquarters in Buenos Aires, an act of terror that killed 85 people. Rezai was the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard at the time of the attack and Velayati was Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is actually an Interpol warrant, a “Red Notice,” out for Rezai.

A July 20, 2009 Congressional resolution, H. Con. Res 156, notes that:

Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina, an office created by the Government of Argentina, concluded that the AMIA bombing was ‘decided and organized by the highest leaders of the former government of * * * Iran, whom, at the same time, entrusted its execution to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah’;

Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina concluded that the AMIA bombing had been approved in advance by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, Iran’s then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran’s then-Minister of Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan…

It’s worth adding that another leading candidate, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, has boasted of his role in the violent suppression of internal dissent:

I was the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force at the time. Photographs of me are available showing me on back of a motor bike, with Hossein Khaleqi, beating them [the protestors] with wooden sticks….I was among those carrying out beatings on the street level and I am proud of that. I didn’t care I was a high ranking commander.

Then there is Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator since 2007, and whom the Washington Post describes as inflexible, ideological, and anti-American.

Those who believe that this election will lead to reforms inside Iran, or to a weakening of the regime’s nuclear weapons program or its support for terror, are substituting hope for evidence.

There are many ways to measure the success of American foreign policy, and popularity is not necessarily the best one.

But when an administration and a president start out as Mr. Obama did, in essence reviling his predecessor’ policies in the Arab world and assuring Arabs that he had a new and better way, it is striking if the product is less popularity.

And that is the case in Egypt. A new Pew poll says that while Bush’s popularity in Egypt in his last year in office, 2008, was 22 percent, today Obama’s rating has fallen even lower–to 16 percent.

The same poll contains much interesting data. For example, only 39 percent of Egyptians think things are better now than when Mubarak ruled the country; only 29 percent expect that their economy will improve in the coming year. These numbers should keep President Morsi up at night.

The numbers on democracy are somewhat cheering. As the Pew narrative notes, “Two-in-three Egyptians [66%] believe democracy is the best form of government, while just 21% think that in some circumstances a non-democratic form of government can be preferable.” Asked whether democracy or a strong leader is more important, democracy wins 60 to 36 percent. Moreover “by a slender margin, Egyptians tend to prioritize democracy over stability. About half (51%) say it is more important for Egypt to have a democratic government, even if there is some risk of political instability. Slightly fewer (43%) believe it is more important to have a stable government, even if there is some risk it will not be fully democratic. However, the percentage who prioritize stability has increased since 2011, when just 32% held this view.” I would have expected higher numbers prizing stability, given Egypt’s history in the last few years.

When asked what their highest priorities are, 83 percent of Egyptians say improved economic conditions– but 81 percent say a fair judiciary, 60 percent say uncensored media, and 51 percent say freedom of speech. Interestingly, 32 percent say freedom of religion for minorities is “very important” and an additional 49 percent say it is “somewhat important.” In a country that is only 10-15 percent Coptic (and some would say lower), those are impressive numbers. They suggest that the government could attain wide public support for defending the Copts from violence, which it has largely been unwilling to do. The very recent State Department report on religious freedom in Egypt says this: “the government generally failed to prevent, investigate, or prosecute crimes against members of religious minority groups, especially Coptic Christians, which fostered a climate of impunity. In some cases, government authorities reacted slowly or with insufficient resolve while mobs attacked Christians and their property, or encouraged Christians to leave their homes.” President Morsi could do more; the failure is one of leadership.

As the “Arab Spring” swept the fake republics of North Africa–Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt–Algeria seemed immune. Media reports dwelled on its stability (see this 2011 BBC and this 2012 Deutsche Welle story).

The question now is whether that perception is correct.

There was one burst of violence this year, the January 16 terrorist seizure of a natural gas facility that ultimately left at least 38 civilians and 29 terrorists dead after a four-day siege. But now there is more trouble: President Bouteflika appears to have had a stroke and has not been seen in public in over a month. The government claims he is recovering well, but there is no evidence to support that claim. As France 24 put it, “When he was appointed foreign minister in 1963 after Algeria won its independence from France, the 26-year-old Bouteflika cut a dashing, energetic picture as the world’s youngest foreign minister. Half-a-century later, the Algerian president is in frail health as he enters the final year of his third consecutive term in office.”

The country has long been run by the opaque group of military and intelligence officials known as “le pouvoir,” but can that system really hold? The nation is rich due to gas revenues, but the people are poor: foreign reserves are said to be $200 billion, but there is widespread rural poverty and high unemployment.

A persuasive analysis just published by the Atlantic Council is entitled “Algeria: A Powder Keg Ready To Explode?” Karim Mezran, the author and a senior fellow at the Council, says this:

Algeria may be teetering on the brink of a crisis, with the three pillars of the regime’s stability—its powerful military, abundant revenues from hydrocarbons, and the façade of a democratic political system—beginning to crumble.

First, the terrorist and security challenge is greater than it has been in years, as Algeria’s border with Mali reminds us. Second, “From a socioeconomic point of view, despite Algeria’s enormous wealth in oil and gas, the population suffers from poverty, unemployment, and citizen discontent.” Then comes “a political crisis at the top of the state apparatus. The illness of Abdulaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria since 1999, makes it highly unlikely that he will be able to run for another term with upcoming presidential elections in 2014. No clear procedure exists for the appointment of his successor, which leaves a vacuum at the pinnacle of political authority.”

As Mezran notes, “It is hard to predict the outcome of the myriad of tensions that are boiling in the country. It is possible that the Algerian people, still fatigued from the bloody civil war of the 1990′s and conscious of the repressive power of the state choose not to confront the regime in any sustained or systematic way.” Right–perhaps. As we’ve seen across the region, things are often far less stable than they appear. A recent Carnegie study notes this:

At first glance, Algeria gives the impression of a country that has succeeded in bypassing the turmoil of the Arab Awakening that has rocked the Middle East over the last two years. Social unrest appears to be largely under control. The country is enjoying a large current account surplus, a limited budget deficit, and very low external debt. Recent parliamentary elections were conducted without interruption and were officially open to participation by all political parties. But despite this reassuring veneer, many of the social, economic, and political challenges that triggered uprisings in neighboring North African countries fester just beneath the surface in Algeria.

The author, Lahcen Achy, concludes starkly that:

The clock is ticking. If the regime does not start down the road of managed political and economic reform soon, while it retains the cushion of high hydrocarbon rents, it will quickly become too late. Algeria is faced with a stark choice: reform now or collapse later.

But Le Pouvoir has never been inclined toward such reforms, especially not at a moment of political uncertainty–Bouteflika apparently quite sick, and an election next year without him on the ballot for the first time since 1999. So Algeria is worth more attention than it is getting. Its immunity to change may be wearing thin.

This is strange kind of “moderation,” for Rafsanjani’s presidency (1989-1997) includes the following acts of terror:

1. 1992 Israeli embassy bombing in Argentina, 29 killed and 242 injured
2. 1994 bombing of the AMIA, the Jewish community center building in Buenos Aires, 85 killed and approximately 300 injured. In 1996, an Argentine issued an arrest warrant for Rafsanjani due to his personal role in approving this attack.
3. 1992 assassination of 4 Kurdish dissidents in a restaurant Berlin, which German prosecutors said Rafsanjani has personally approved.

That’s a partial list of acts of international terrorism, and Rafsanjani’s personal role has been noted by prosecutors and courts.

At home, Rafsanjani was president for most of the so-called “chain murders” or “serial murders” of 80 Iranian intellectuals and dissidents from 1988 to 1998. (See a full list here.) As president, Rafsanjani kept in office the officials committing these crimes. Indeed, the fact that some were removed by his successor, Mohammed Khatami, shows once again that Rafsanjani could have acted to stop the terror–but instead acted to enlarge it.

So, the media are adopting a definition of pragmatism and moderation that is indefensible. When he was president of Iran Rafsanjani presided over some of the worst acts of terror ever committed by the Islamic Republic.

Much has been written about whether the instability in Iraq, the warfare in Syria and the crises this causes for Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, the Kurdish drive for autonomy (at least) in Iraq and Turkey, will at some point combine to unravel the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and England in 1916. Put another way, the question is whether the borders established in the context of the First World War will stick.

Here is one answer: they are effectively gone already, whether as a legal matter they disappear or remain. After all, when Iran can send any amount of arms through Syria and Iraq to its allies and proxies in Lebanon–ignoring the Lebanese government and Lebanese border–what is left of borders? Iran has in effect an open space running from the Afghan border to the Mediterranean, where it can place arms and soldiers almost at will. We know that Iranian IRGC forces are in Syria, and we know that Hezbollah forces from Lebanon are fighting there too. We know that just as jihadis from all over the world crossed from Syria into Iraq, ignoring that border to fight the Americans, today they are arriving across borders into Syria, now to fight the Assad regime.

Other examples can be cited. The border between Gaza and Egyptian Sinai is breached and mocked by hundreds of smuggling tunnels. The huge flow of Syrian refugees, now probably 1.5 million, moves across borders to seek safety. In fact it seems the only real, stable borders still existing are those of Israel. And that is in good part because Israel has built elaborate security barriers north, east, and most recently south, to demarcate and defend them. Israel’s borders exist on the ground, and the great irony is of course that they are the only boundaries in the region that do not exist on maps and are viewed as temporary until a peace agreement with Syria and with the Palestinians is achieved.

Most of the lines Sykes and Picot marked on maps still remain, but they have less and less reality. Changing national borders formally, with the approval of all parties and the United Nations as well, seems nearly impossible. But ignoring them, breaching them, and erasing them on the ground, where actual human beings live, seek refuge, make war, survive, or die–well, that has already happened to a very striking degree.

The newest polls tells us that President Mohamed Morsi’s popularity continues to decline. Today 47 percent of Egyptians say they are dissatisfied with his performance while 46 percent approve of it. Only 30 percent would today vote for him for president.

Meanwhile, Tom Carothers of Carnegie has written a persuasive essay reminding us to take a second look at the “dismal opposition.” As Carothers wrote,

Overly harsh views of the Egyptian opposition—combined with a lack of recognition that many once-weak opposition actors in countries emerging from authoritarian rule have gone on to win elections—fuel the unhelpful idea that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only political force likely to hold power in Egypt for the foreseeable future. And that idea in turn encourages the problematic belief evident in U.S. policy in the past year that no alternative to the Brotherhood is likely to be viable for many years and the resultant tendency to downplay the Brotherhood’s significant political flaws.

Carothers rightly says we should not be supporting the opposition, but we should be supporting democracy and human rights in Egypt far more actively than we have been. Permanent Muslim Brotherhood control of Egypt and a steady decline in respect for civil liberties are not inevitable, but we help make them so if we abandon our role in supporting the principles of liberal democracy.