Inbox: Deterring Russia in Georgia
Former U.S. Ambassador to Georgia William Courtney writes:
On August 14 in addressing the crisis in Georgia, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said he did not see “any prospect for the use of military force by the United States in this situation.” This remark, he clarified, was made “in the context of the current situation” in which the Russians “appear to be withdrawing their forces back toward Abkhazia and to the zone of conflict toward South Ossetia.” He added, “Getting the Russians back inside the zone of conflict and then back inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it seems to me, is the first objective.” Gates is likely right that in securing this first objective US force will not be required, although Russia will want to retain more capable forces in the separatist regions and possibly beyond than it had before.
The threat posed by Russia, however, goes well beyond protecting Georgian separatists. As Gates described it, the Russians sought to “punish Georgia for daring to try to integrate with the West economically and politically and in security arrangements … the Russians’ further message was to all of the parts of the former Soviet Union, as a signal about trying to integrate with the West and move outside of the long-time Russian sphere of influence.”
If Secretary Gates is right about Moscow’s wider motives, how over the longer term how should the US and Europe address the threat of Russian aggression in Georgia?
A U.S. and European consensus appears to be developing that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should offer unarmed OSCE monitors to help verify compliance with arrangements reached to end the current conflict and monitor future activity in the separatist areas of Georgia. Hopefully Russia will not use its veto in the OSCE to oppose this stabilizing initiative.
Consensus will hopefully emerge as well to offer armed Western peacekeepers to augment or replace Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This step should have been taken long ago, as far back as the early 1990s. Then the US and Europe lacked the political will, partly because Russia seemed to be evolving toward greater pluralism at home and cooperation abroad. Today Russia is more authoritarian. On August 14 Secretary Gates expressed a view which might, however, impede prospects for offering Western peacekeepers. He said, “I think it would be unlikely for the United States to participate in the peacekeeping operations with our own troops,” although he allowed that the US could “provide support and be enablers.”
More fundamentally, greater Western military presence in Georgia and the region will be required to achieve stable deterrence against Russian aggression. Unarmed OSCE monitors and even armed Western peacekeepers will do little to protect against Russian air and naval threats to Georgia’s energy transportation infrastructure or sovereignty. For months Russian combat aircraft have flown over Georgian territory and fired weapons. Russia has now destroyed Georgian patrol craft in the Black Sea. As the Wall Street Journal showed graphically on August 14, the Russians sought to bomb the intersection of two key oil pipelines in Georgia — pipelines built by Western energy companies with strong support from their governments.
Russian motives for invading Georgia surely have a strong energy component. Moscow has long and bitterly opposed the shipment of Caspian oil and gas through the South Caucasus to world markets, avoiding the Russian pipeline monopoly. Russian actions in Georgia may not be unrelated to the effort to monopolize control of oil and gas assets at home, including the recent pressure against British Petroleum’s huge investment.
As the Russian aggression has tragically shown, a vacuum of military power in Georgia is dangerous. It will lead to prolonged instability unless reversed. Russia will retain the power to threaten energy infrastructure in Georgia at will. Having done so successfully in Georgia, Russia may be tempted to do intimidate or threaten Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, or Turkmenistan if they refuse to submit to its energy ambitions. Customers of Caspian energy will be discouraged from relying on it if they worry that Russia may interrupt flows.
Even if Russian forces were to return to the status quo ante in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their combat aircraft based in southern Russia would retain the ability to threaten energy pipelines and critical pumping stations in Georgia. Along with Russian warships they would have unchallenged power to threaten the oil export facilities at the Georgian ports of Supsa and Batumi, and tankers which load there and ply the Black Sea.
This could discourage or freeze further Western investment in Caspian energy development and transportation, calling into serious question the credibility of the West’s strong support for these activities. Leaving Georgia helpless against continuing Russian threats would also reduce the value or quality of participation by South Caucasus and Central Asian nations in NATO’s Partnership for Peace.
The U.S. and NATO should urgently begin considering how to address the vacuum of military power in Georgia and the region. Finding ways to strengthen air defenses, tank defenses, and shore defenses ought to be among the issues weighed. Building indigenous capacity is most important, such as training forces in the protection of energy infrastructure.
This will not be enough, however, in light of the enormous imbalance of military power and Russia’s newly aggressive posture. U.S. and NATO military presence on the ground will be required for stable deterrence. Russia would be very reluctant to confront well trained and capable U.S. and NATO forces, which could operate some defensive weaponry in addition to carrying out an extensive training program. Poland’s decision to accept the missile defense installation and the US decision to augment Poland’s air defenses show the value of reassuring worried allies and building their capacity. The same logic applies in Georgia, even more so. The military power vacuum and existential threat posed by Russia are much greater there than in Poland.
– William Courtney, former U.S. Ambassador to Georgia
