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U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel (L) and his Chinese counterpart Chang Wanquan (R) listen to the Chinese national anthem during a welcoming ceremony at the Chinese Defense Ministry headquarters, prior to their meeting in Beijing April 8, 2014. (Alex Wong/Courtesy Reuters)
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Engage or isolate? This is the national security question that will drive the United States’ response to near-peer competitors like China and Russia, destabilizing middle powers like Iran and North Korea, and even the relatively powerless Cuba. Consistent engagement, even with adversary states, is beneficial. It can help avoid miscalculations, improve U.S. ability to clarify intentions, and decipher ambiguous signals. It also can increase understanding of adversary motivations and interests, which facilitates negotiation and potential development of conflict off-ramps. Conversely, isolation can limit adversaries’ options, negatively feed their fears, and wound their pride—obstructing alternative, preferred paths.
When it comes to China, some in Congress appear to be wary of engagement. Recently, Senator John McCain urged the Department of Defense not to send an aircraft carrier to China. He is concerned that a high profile port call would raise doubts among our Pacific allies, show excess respect to China and its navy, and send a mixed message about China’s continued aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Congressman Randy Forbes (R-VA 4) sent a letter in December to then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel raising concerns about U.S.–China military-to-military engagement. Representative Forbes expressed displeasure that past and current engagements were not successful in modifying China’s aggressive behavior and were focused on operational rather than strategic issues. Congressman Forbes wisely requested a comprehensive engagement strategy review and a more explicit policy framework. However, his desire to focus on the most challenging aspects of the U.S.–China relationship (nuclear forces, offensive cyber, escalation control, etc.) appears to minimize more foundational aspects of mil-mil engagement. These are establishing personal credibility, developing relationships, and establishing lines of communication between the two militaries that can prove valuable in avoiding inadvertent escalation.
Throughout the Cold War, despite significant periods of strain between the Soviet Union and the United States, U.S.–Soviet military-to-military engagement remained surprisingly consistent and healthy. It is doubtful that any of this engagement altered the world view, actions, or intent of the Soviet Union. However, it did build long-term relationships and increased personal credibility. This contributed to a combined ability to avoid miscalculation and clarify intentions during periods of international strain. Additionally, when the Soviet Union collapsed, these personal relationships were leveraged to help both militaries transition into the post-Cold War world. That was a low-cost, long-term investment that paid big returns.
The Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy are advocating for a similar consistency in U.S.–China military-to-military engagement. This is a wide-eyed approach that combines persistent engagement with focused and strengthened alliances and preparation for the most challenging threats. Through investment, communication, and collaboration with our Pacific allies, they will not see U.S.–China military-to-military engagement as a concerning mixed message. Rather, they will see it as a balanced and beneficial approach, just as NATO understood Cold War engagement with the Soviet Union. Additionally, as the U.S. Navy deploys 60 percent of the fleet to the Pacific and places the majority of its newest and most advanced ships in the region, the Pacific rebalance will bolster our allies and could affect the calculations of regional aggressors. Furthermore, the Navy’s focus on addressing the challenges of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) through both concept development and capital investment is preparing to counter challenges that threaten access to the global commons. It is not an either/or choice; the U.S. can chose persistent engagement along with deterrence and preparation to fight should deterrence fail.
It is concerning that our national security decisions appear to be presented in an increasingly binary fashion—on or off; “good nation” or “bad nation;” with us or against us. It is largely true that belligerence should be met with deterrence and strength, and that there should be a cost imposed for international aggression. However, when other nations make bad decisions, take aggressive actions, or head down a dark path—when things go wrong—do our national security decisions and actions help them go right or increase path dependence in the wrong direction? While strength and deterrence are useful and necessary, used as the only means of influence they can contribute to escalation and spiraling conflict. Off-ramps are created through dialogue buttressed by relationships and credibility. While there has been recent emphasis on the credibility of our threats and our strength of arms and will—which are important—the credibility or our intentions for stability and peace must also be established in the minds of those we hope to persuade to choose a better path.
Thucydides, the Greek historian of the Peloponnesian Wars, offered three reasons why nations go to war: interest, fear, and pride. While strength and deterrence affect the cost-benefit calculus of national interests they also can feed the motivations of fear and pride that often fuel international aggression and belligerence. Engagement, on any and every front, can help the United States better understand the motivations of fear and pride that might be driving China and Russia and offer insight into U.S. and allied actions that create off-ramps to their current destabilizing paths. Just as during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, consistent military-to-military (and nonmilitary) engagement will not equate to endorsement of belligerent actions or acquiescence to their grand strategy. It will, however, offer in-roads to avoid miscalculation, increase understanding, and build off-ramps from places none of us wants to go. Whenever possible, the United States should maintain military-to-military engagement with potential adversaries. Insight gained through engagement may help prevent conflict and—if conflict is unavoidable—it will serve to help us better understand our adversaries.
Captain Robert A. Newson is a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer who spent twenty-two months in command of Special Operations Command (SOC)—Forward Yemen. He recently led strategy and concept development for the Naval Special Warfare Command. Previously, he served as director of the Joint Interagency Task Force—Counter Terrorism. Newson is a graduate of the University of Kansas and the Naval Postgraduate School (with distinction.) He is a PhD candidate at the University of San Diego. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government.
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Yes, by all means, let us have engagement. Russia has recently resumed long range bomber missions to the shores of North America. These bombers now carry new weapons against which the United States has no defense once they are allowed within a certain range: ie, hypersonic cruise missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads. Recently, those bombers have been allowed within range of US cities.
Russia is supplying the Assad regime and Hezbollah in Syria, using the Bosporus. Hezbollah now has 100K missiles pointed at Israel.
Russian artillery has just created carnage in the Ukrainian col mine town of Debatlseva.
A nuclear armed Russian Bear bomber recently flew down the English Channel.
Last year, the Adm. Kuznetsov anchored within site of land off the coast of Scotland, then went to the Mediterranean, where it sent a fighter-bomber to within 1000 yards of the coast of Turkey.
It is reported that Russia is embarked on a defense buildup premised on the likelihood of was in Europe within six years.
In light of these facts, how would you propose that the United States engage Russia ?
Engage simply for the reason that engagement deters conflict. Even if nations aren’t allies, some dialogue and engagement will prevent conflict more then no dialogue and isolationism. Engage as well for the interest of your nation. History has proven that isolated nations lose to nations that engage each other. The proposed China-U.S. military engagement program is a productive idea to keep relations stable between a rising power and the status quo (I’ll add, the reason why China is a rising power today is because of their isolationist policies of the past). I’ve contemplated a similar idea in the past with the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Sure, two members don’t agree with the other three, generally, but by engaging each other on security cooperation operations say against terrorism (something they all can agree on) it strengthens cool relations between global powers that have different views of the global order.
Tyler, to start I would recommend officer (both senior and mid-grade) and senior enlisted exchanges and meetings to cross-level concerns and better understand each others perspectives.
No doubt Russia is on a bad path and they are increasingly belligerent, however, why can’t we engage AND take stronger deterrent action? Is it a binary choice where it is one or the other? If we don’t engage how do we get on a better path?
Did the Soviet Union not take some very belligerent action during the Cold War? Almost the same litany of actions you list above. Yet we consistently maintained military to military engagement. Why not do the same now?
General Phil Sheridan went to Germany to observe the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. He learned something from the experience. Suppose we propose to the Kremlin that NATO observers be sent to Russia to observe the war in Ukraine from their side of the border ? I bet that would lead to greater understanding. But obviously, there is no point in entertaining such a possibility in light of current Russian hostility.
I am a firm believer in reaching out to one’s competitors and potential adversaries. I went to the Soviet Union in 1971 with my college singing group courtesy of Averill Harriman.
In the case of China, the sorts of exchanges you suggest make very good sense. But as you must know, all such things, military or otherwise, have been discontinued in respect to Russia. And it should be noted that Russia, not the US, has been mostly responsible. The process started a long time ago, when Putin kicked USAID out. Then came the persecution of the NGO’s. And now, as I said, we have Bear bombers off our coast once again.
There is a big difference between these flights occurring now, and those that occurred in 1971. We had SAC and the USSR did not have cruise missiles.
By all means, talk to the Russians, if you can. (I can’t.) Talking can lessen hostilities and misunderstandings. It can sometimes avoid conflicts. But as we have recently seen in the case of the failed ceasefire in Ukraine, sometimes a desire to avoid conflict (Merkel and Hollande’s initiative) does nothing more than embolden an adversary, and hasten it along.
The current Kremlin regime does not believe in “constructive engagement” on any level. How could it be led to discover an appreciation for it, I wonder ?
Under the circumstances, may I suggest that we not place undue reliance on “conflict avoidance”. When you have a self-declared adversary which is just spoiling for a fight, perhaps a small lesson in the art of military engagement is just the sort of thing that is needed to clear the air, foster greater understanding and promote peace. I have one in mind.
R/s, TPH