The dynamic could change, and Iran could show hints of being willing to negotiate price, if the counterparts conceded away the suspension demand and instead accepted some level of enrichment in Iran and sought to negotiate over the conditions under which enrichment would occur and the level of pay-off Iran would demand for various conditions. Thus far the Europeans (supported by the U.S.) have refused to concede this point and negotiate over conditions of enrichment. I support this resistance not because I think Iran will agree to a long-term suspension, but because I think the demand is reasonable as long as Iran has not resolved all outstanding issues with the IAEA, built international confidence in the peacefulness of its nuclear activities, and demonstrated an actual need for indigenously produced reactor fuel. Once Iran has mastered the enrichment process, I don’t see the value in paying Iran large inducements to keep enriching but at limited volumes or under exceptionally close supervision (which I don’t think Iran will agree to anyway). The pay offs have been offered because suspending enrichment is worth quite a lot. Legitimating Iran’s violation of IAEA requirements and resolutions, and binding UNSC resolutions, and its economically unjustifiable enrichment activities would be unhelpful. Paying big inducements in the process makes even less sense. Moreover, many discussions of deals allowing Iranian enrichment do not require Iran to take steps to alleviate the security threats which Israel, Arab states and others perceive in the combination of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and foreign policies. How would it improve international security to accept Iranian enrichment with no moves by Iran to reassure the world that its aims are defensive, that it would not use additional power to facilitate or encourage increased violence in the region?

If Iran is determined to continue enrichment and not to negotiate over even short-term suspension, then its negotiating counterparts, including the U.S., should recognize THIS reality and stop negotiating with themselves. They should concentrate on imposing costs for defying reasonable IAEA and UNSC demands, and withdraw incentives on offer. They should hold Iran to its insistence that it has no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, and agree amongst themselves on steps they would take if Iran did withdraw from the NPT or otherwise took new steps to weaponize.

Concerning the first area, the United States and all states that support the objective of stopping nuclear proliferation have a responsibility to enforce compliance with safeguards agreements. Iran has been found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement on its nuclear program. Iran has yet to provide needed assurances to clear up compliance problems. While Tehran asserts that it has done so on past safeguards problems (this is debatable), it still has a requirement to clearly indicate what are its intentions about its program especially in light of the facts that it does not have a fuel fabrication facility for Bushehr, it has an agreement with Russia for fuel for that reactor, and it does not have an adequate supply of indigenous uranium for making sufficient fuel for even a modestly sized nuclear power program. Perhaps Iran would purchase natural uranium from other states and add value by enriching this material. But the economic justification for this enrichment service by Iran is weak (for example, see the report by Wood et al. in the Nonproliferation Review, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/141wood.pdf).

What types of enforcement of safeguards are justified? The United States faces the dilemma that application of enforcement via sanctions, threats of military force, or actually use of military force can play into the hands of Iranian hardliners who thrive on the confrontation with the United States but lack of enforcement can signal loss of U.S. resolve to deal with the challenge to the nonproliferation regime. This dilemma is connected to the second issue area of the security of the Middle East. Growing Iranian nuclear capability can increase Iranian confidence in projecting its power. This increasing Iranian influence will likely drive other states in the region to counter this power through developing their own nuclear as well as asymmetric capabilities. Should the United States offer security assurances to Iran depending on Iran’s curtailing its nuclear program? It is far from clear whether Iran is interested in these assurances or would believe them to be credible. Should the United States also consider security assurances to Arab Gulf states?

Charles Ferguson