Don’t Extend the U.S. Stay in Iraq
Perhaps this advice applies equally to both presidential candidates: Don’t persist in the Bush administration’s quest for a bilateral security framework agreement with the Maliki government in Iraq. Instead, seek a brief extension of the present UN mandate, and then immediately commence work on a greatly expanded UN mandate for Iraq premised upon a full US withdrawal.
Why is the Bush approach no good? First of all, as Oona Hathaway and Bruce Ackerman have argued, there is no constitutional basis for concluding such an agreement without Congressional approval. Such approval is hardly likely now; with the Democrats poised to increase the size of their caucuses in the elections, it would be even less likely in the new legislature. Of course, the lame duck Bush administration, should it succeed in inking an accord before the next president takes office, does not intend to ask for anyone’s OK. In that case, the next president would be justified in considering the agreement null and void.
Second, the proposed agreement is deeply unpopular in Iraq. A firmer timetable for withdrawal, Iraqi jurisdiction over crimes committed by US troops, Iraqi inspection of US arms shipments—these are all important issues. But the bottom line is that no Iraqi politician outside of Kurdistan wants to be seen signing off on an extension of a foreign military presence on Iraqi soil. If there is to be a government in Baghdad that commands broad-based popular support, it will be composed of the people who can take credit for engineering US withdrawal. This is a reality that the Maliki government appreciates; Washington should as well. Say the Maliki government is coyly resisting an agreement it really does want, whether to make a show of nationalism or to wring further concessions out of the US. That would be a sign of weakness, evidence that, while there may be no single center of political gravity in Iraq, it certainly is not the prime minister and his cabinet.
Still another possibility—maybe the most likely—is that Maliki hopes to get a more “marketable” agreement out of the next White House, one that can pass the Iraqi parliament, but that also leaves US soldiers in Iraq long enough for the factions he represents to defeat their political opponents and consolidate their rule. To conclude a bilateral agreement with the Maliki government is to lock in US strategic backing for the factions that compose it. Or so, at least, will be the perception among many in Iraq. Daawa figure Haidar Abadi said as much back in November 2007, when Bush and Maliki signed the declaration of principles for the prospective security framework agreement: “This sends the signal to our enemies: There is no going back to square one.” It would be one thing if the Bush-Maliki talks were proceeding alongside a real national reconciliation process, but that is not the case.
Real national reconciliation in Iraq will happen only when the US begins withdrawing militarily and ceases playing favorites politically. The short-term extension of the UN mandate that looks to be coming, whether Bush and Maliki like it or not, should only be the prelude to a far-ranging rethinking of US and international Iraq policy, one that puts the UN at the center. The possible contours of such a policy are laid out in the June report of the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq. Eventually, the US will need the help of Iraq’s neighbors and the international community to exit Iraq responsibly. The next president should not postpone the inevitable by lengthening the US occupation of Iraq into 2011.
