Let me start our online discussion/debate with a quick word of thanks to our esteemed group of analysts. I am grateful that you are willing to take time out of your busy schedules to help me and the Council in our efforts to both influence policy and educate the public about the Middle East—a region that will likely remain a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the next administration and beyond.

Our topic this week is: What shouldn’t a McCain or Obama administration do in the region?

It is tempting to suggest an ABB—anything but Bush—approach to the region. Full stop. QED. The Bush record provides a road map (sorry for the term) for what NOT to do in the Middle East. After all, the challenges of the Middle East are demonstrably more complex and dangerous than they were on the occasion of the President’s 1st inaugural. To be sure, there was the radical disjuncture of 9/11 that supposedly “changed everything” and a series of global structural changes that altered the geo-strategic landscape, but the wreckage of the Bush era—Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, the Palestinian areas—is a testament to the faulty assumptions, miscalculations, over-confidence, and wishful thinking of a bunch of very smart people. It is easy to say that the Bush folks, despite their obvious abilities, failed to grasp the history, politics, and culture of the Middle East and that is why Washington finds itself in a rather difficult regional position with much diminished resources. Then again, how many past administrations have met with success—on any issue—in the Middle East? I can think of sort of maybe one, but I won’t name it because I’ll be accused of sycophancy. (Big enough hint?)

Certainly, the Bush administration made grievous errors, but I wonder whether the problem has more to do with the prevailing set of assumptions about the Middle East that American officials bring to the table. Consider, for example, the issue of public opinion. Some observers claim that public opinion in the Arab world does not matter because the regimes in the region are non-democratic. Others argue that Middle Eastern leaders are afraid of their citizens, implying, of course, that public opinion in the Arab world is meaningful. The result is wild swings in American foreign policy from shutting down most avenues of communication to the belief that better public diplomacy is Washington’s salvation.

Similarly, there has been much myth-making about Islam and its relationship to politics. There is an influential body of thought suggesting that Islam is an important factor in many of the problems associated with Arab political systems. More recently, analysts have claimed that Islam (or specifically, moderate Islam) is a primary component of the solution to much that ails Middle Eastern polities. Both streams of thought have had an impact on American foreign policy.

In addition, while no American president will decide to use force lightly, there tends to be an assumption that Arabs will be compliant when confronted with an overwhelming demonstration of force. According to James Lindsay and Ivo Daalder’s authoritative account in America Unbound, upon authorizing plans for the toppling of the Taliban, the President reportedly told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Let’s hit them hard. We want to signal that this is a change from the past. We want to cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their views.” In the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2002, the idea that regime change in Iraq would enhance American power and credibility as well as intimidate would-be adversaries after the blow of 9/11 influenced the thinking of, among others, the secretary of defense and the vice president. Yet with all the simplicity and persuasiveness of this argument, almost totally lost in the debate about Iraq in 2002 was the possibility that at least some Iraqis might fight back.

Finally, it has become accepted wisdom that the Middle East is unstable. There is, of course, reason to believe that this is the case. Surveying the region, there seems to be volatility everywhere. At the same time, however, Arab governments have demonstrated remarkable resilience. The Egyptian regime that the Free Officers established in the 1950s remains largely intact, despite a humiliating military defeat, political assassination, and a history of economic underperformance. The monarchy in Jordan has withstood the infamous Black September (1970) uprising, widespread riots in 1989, and the threat of violence engulfing its own large Palestinian population through two intifadas. Algeria experienced a decade of civil insurrection during the 1990s that left an estimated 100,000 dead. Iraq has been unstable, but that is a recent feature of American policy. Prior to “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” the Iraqi regime was quite stable. I am not making a value judgment about stability. Rather, I am merely observing that the objective reality of the region does not conform to our assumptions about instability.

So perhaps what the next administration should NOT do in the Middle East is pay heed to traditional assumptions about the region.