You make a compelling case and everything you say about the hardliners seems correct, but is there really no chance that having an official U.S. presence in Iran of this nature will over time help undermine the hardliners and thus work well to our benefit over the years? It is precisely to understand and exploit the complex political scene in Iran –which by all accounts includes no small number of young Iranians eager to learn more about the United States, meet Americans, and visit our country– that the U.S. should proceed with this idea. Tangible demonstrations (as opposed to rhetoric) that the U.S. respects Iranian society and culture, has no problem with the Iranian people, and is sincere about engaging with them are likely to be met with enthusiasm by many Iranians –something that can only give us a diplomatic advantage. Also, in a very modest way, such a presence can help us better understand the dynamics of Iranian society and how Iranians see us and themselves. By all accounts, our knowledge of contemporary Iranian society is woefully–and dangerously–lacking. And at this stage of Iran’s political development, making the U.S. more open to Iranians–especially younger Iranians–can only help U.S. interests in the long term by expanding knowledge on both sides, and our relations with Iran are nothing if not a long term issue. If the proposed interests section is refused, or if it opens and is subsequently rendered untenable by the acts of hardliners, it will be very clear where the problem lies and why it didn’t work. While the new administration may be well-advised to wait until after the Iranian presidential elections to proceed with this initiative, since as you suggest the run-up to these elections will be tumultuous, letting it drop completely would probably do more harm than good.