Having been a “Palestinian firster” for most of my years working on the Arab-Israeli negotiations, I remained compelled by the centrality of this issue to securing a durable Arab-Israeli peace. The Israeli-Palestinian situation also has an urgency and a moral dimension that defines both its tragedy and the imperative for a solution.

It’s just that a conflict-ending solution (and I choose my words carefully here) that resolves Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and security, is simply not feasible now (or maybe at all). The complexity of the issues (no, Israelis and Palestinians have never been “this close to an agreement”) and the dysfunctional politics on the Palestinian and Israeli side make a conflict-ending agreement which ends all irredenta and resolves all ends all claims is almost unimaginable during the next administration’s tenure. The Palestinian national movement is broken, divided, and dysfunctional. It lacks what any polity that aspires to be credible to its own constituencies or its neighbors must have: a monopoly over the forces of violence within Palestinian society. Without a central authority defined by one gun and one negotiating position, it seems almost impossible to envision a sustainable two-state solution.

At the same time, the Israeli house is also characterized by its own unique dysfunction. A transition is under way from the founding generation, which had produced leaders of moral authority, legitimacy, and competency, to a younger generation of Israeli Prime Ministers who have already demonstrated (Netanyahu, Barak, and Olmert) that they’re not quite up to the job. If this weren’t difficult enough, Israel’s settlement enterprise, hopelessly mixed with the nation’s security concerns, has created an enterprise of systemic control in which Israel still occupies the entire West Bank, Jerusalem, and in the cruelest paradox of all, despite disengagement, still maintains a measure of responsibility for Gaza, now under Hamas’ authority.

Four elements define successful negotiation and a sustainable agreement: leadership, urgency, a doable deal, and an effective third-party mediator. At the moment, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations lack all of them. A new American President, compelled by the importance of Arab-Israeli negotiations, may be tempted to take on this impossible challenge. But given the need to avoid another high wire failure, he may well decide to steer clear of anything on the Israeli-Palestinian track, other than a more energetic management strategy, than his predecessor.

There is a compelling argument, however to be made for the doability of another negotiation, an Israeli-Syrian agreement. Much work has been done here, the gaps are clear, and probably bridgeable. Two states, rather than a state and a dysfunctional national movement would be at the table; limited numbers of Israeli settlers occupy the Golan Heights; and while emotional, there are no “Jerusalem” mega-ton issues that would seemingly blow up this track. In fact, the stability here is quite remarkable. Since June 1, 1974, when Henry Kissinger negotiated the Israeli-Syrian disengagement, that space has probably been the Middle East’s quietest. Finally, for a new president, concerned about America’s regional and strategic position in the Middle East, an Israeli-Syrian deal would offer the following benefits: weakening of Syria’s connection to Hamas and Hezbollah, and over time, if America were patient, and prepared to work with the Europeans and the Arab states to buck up economic and political support for Syria, the weakening of the Syrian-Iranian relationship. In fact, a Syrian-Israeli agreement would pose serious choices for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.

None of this will come easy and a new president should not even begin to get into an Israeli-Syrian negotiating process unless he’s prepared to be tough, smart and fair about what it will cost America and what price Israel and Syria must pay to consummate a peace treaty. At all costs, we must avoid the mistakes of the Clinton years in which we didn’t know what was required to close an agreement, weren’t prepared to be honest with the Israelis and the Syrians about what that cost was, let alone how to bring an agreement into fruition. But there is a deal here none-the-less, and as tragic, sad, and as profoundly negative as the consequences of an unresolved Israeli-Palestinian negotiation would be, an Israeli-Syrian agreement would represent a major historic success; and the next administration should go for it.