Interesting. The posts thus far revolve around a central theme: Should the United States stay or go in the Middle East? On Arab-Israeli conflict, Aaron is making the point that a resolution to the issue is so far out of the realm that we need to reboot, take a fresh look, understand the limitation of the parties, reconfigure our underlying assumptions, and pursue an approach that has the greatest chance of doing the least amount of harm. Rachel seems to be suggesting otherwise, i.e., the very process of diplomatic activity will, regardless of its effectiveness, have a salutary effect on the region and our standing there. There is an obvious tension between these two positions that will need to be carefully considered as the Obama team tries to figure out what to do on Arab-Israeli conflict.

On Iran, Michael—not surprisingly—argues that the idea of engagement is a fool’s errand. Michael is making a more nuanced “inside-out” argument. The configuration of Iranian politics is such that any engagement with Tehran will result in another hostage crisis of sorts as different factions in Iran use (or abuse) the relationship with the United States to advance their own parochial political interests. Under such circumstances, the policy recommendation is don’t talk to the Iranians until the clerical regime is swept away. I wonder, given our strategic position in the region, whether this is a luxury we can afford.

On the other critical issue in the region, Chris suggests a far quicker timeframe for withdrawal from Iraq than most are expecting. It seems to me, however, that Chris’s contention that real national reconciliation can only happen the sooner the U.S. withdraws is as much an analytic leap as suggesting that the surge has “worked.” Both assertions gloss over the deep fissures within Iraq that could once again undo what U.S. and Iraqi forces have gained. Ultimately, I am sympathetic to a withdrawal and Chris’s recommendation that Washington stop playing favorites—we cannot micromanage Iraq’s political trajectory—but we need to be clear that withdrawal is no panacea and may result in both familiar and new problems in Iraq.