Posted on Monday, November 3rd, 2008
By Aaron David Miller
The question of what the next administration should not do in the Middle East turns on one basic issue: before you change the hardware (the actual policies) try to get the software (the approach) right. For 16 years America has been failing: eight years of botched peacemaking under Bill Clinton; eight years of botched war making under George w. Bush. So for starters the software must borrow the diplomatic equivalent of the Hippocratic oath. Above all do no harm but beyond that avoid failure. Because of our flawed conceptions, we are neither admired, respected, let alone feared in a part of the world increasingly critical to our national interests.
So what are the elements of the new software? First see the world as it is not the way we want it to be. It’s not a land of diplomatic opportunity; it’s an investment trap in an angry and dysfunctional Middle East. We can’t fix it or run away from it. Let’s get real about what we can really do. If we’re lucky and tough, fair, and smart, we’ll have what America has had in the past – moments of success. We need to avoid over engaging because we think we know how the region behaves. Bill Clinton had no business going for a make or break deal at Camp David in July 2000; neither Arafat, Barak, let alone America were ready for it; and George w. bush had no business launching a war of choice without knowing what he was doing, without sufficient forces, or a proper assessment of the most likely reactions of the Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds, let alone their neighbors. We are now trying to extricate ourselves from a trillion dollar social science project called Iraq. Maybe Iraq will emerge as a democratic polity; I hope so. But that’s really not the question. The issue is what will or has it cost us.
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Posted on Monday, November 3rd, 2008
By Chris Toensing
Perhaps this advice applies equally to both presidential candidates: Don’t persist in the Bush administration’s quest for a bilateral security framework agreement with the Maliki government in Iraq. Instead, seek a brief extension of the present UN mandate, and then immediately commence work on a greatly expanded UN mandate for Iraq premised upon a full US withdrawal.
Why is the Bush approach no good? First of all, as Oona Hathaway and Bruce Ackerman have argued, there is no constitutional basis for concluding such an agreement without Congressional approval. Such approval is hardly likely now; with the Democrats poised to increase the size of their caucuses in the elections, it would be even less likely in the new legislature. Of course, the lame duck Bush administration, should it succeed in inking an accord before the next president takes office, does not intend to ask for anyone’s OK. In that case, the next president would be justified in considering the agreement null and void.
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Posted on Monday, November 3rd, 2008
By Steven Cook, Senior Fellow
Let me start our online discussion/debate with a quick word of thanks to our esteemed group of analysts. I am grateful that you are willing to take time out of your busy schedules to help me and the Council in our efforts to both influence policy and educate the public about the Middle East—a region that will likely remain a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the next administration and beyond.
Our topic this week is: What shouldn’t a McCain or Obama administration do in the region?
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Posted on Wednesday, October 29th, 2008
By Gary Samore, Vice President and Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Thanks to all the members of the group for your active participation. I’d like to extend our discussion, but I encourage you to continue to respond to Jim Walsh and Henry Sokolski’s recent posts below.
I think we’ve done a good job of kicking around the diplomatic options to significantly delay or limit Iran’s further development of an enrichment capacity. Clearly, we can’t know beforehand whether a new diplomatic initiative will succeed (I tend to be on the skeptical side), but we need to give it our best shot because the alternatives are clearly inferior. At the same time, it’s worth thinking about our options in the event that the diplomatic options we’ve discussed fail to bear fruit.
If the carrot and stick approach is unable to constrain Iran’s enrichment program in a meaningful way, is it possible to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold – from actually producing HEU and making nuclear weapons once it has completed an enrichment facility capable of producing significant quantities of HEU in a short period? What diplomatic and military policies could be applied to deter Iran from taking the risk of either nuclear break out or nuclear sneak out? In other words, is it plausible that Iran could be convinced to live with a latent nuclear weapons capacity or is it inevitable that Iran will not rest until it has a nuclear arsenal?
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Posted on Monday, October 27th, 2008
By Jim Walsh
As most everyone on this online exchange knows, I support the concept of limited enrichment on Iranian soil under multi-national or multi-lateral supervision. In a later comment/post, I will take a crack at Henry’s concerns about this alternative, but for now, I wanted to offer some general remarks about the views offered by the skeptics. To spice things up a little, I adopt a less measured and careful style of expression. I know most everyone on the list and consider them a friend, so I’m hoping this means I can get away with more.
The Wishful Thinkers
Many of the skeptics’ arguments seem to fall into two categories. One is the view that the zero centrifuge option is viable. Advocates of this position seem to be saying, well, “we are just not trying hard enough (or we tried the wrong way), and now a new president will be able to do what the US government has been unable to do for 8 years, even as our relationship with one of the key players (Russia) has significantly deteriorated. If we really, really, truly, super sincerely tried a carrots and sticks strategy, they say, then Iran would give in. (This is also what both the pres candidates say.) I take this view to be the school of wishful thinking.
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