Back in 2000, the European Central Bank’s first president, Wim Duisenberg, explained how he knew the Bank’s operational framework for implementing monetary policy was working well.  It was, he said, successfully “steering short-term market interest rates” where the Bank wanted them to go.  Prior to the financial crisis, that was indeed the case: the ECB’s policy rate was tightly connected to important short-term interest rates, such as the 3-month government borrowing rate.  In a growing swath of the eurozone, however, this is no longer the case.  As the figures above show, the correlation between the ECB’s policy rate and actual government borrowing rates in Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Portugal has plummeted since the ECB began its debt-buying program.  The market’s view of default risk on eurozone government debt has increasingly come to dominate these rates, which themselves strongly influence borrowing rates in the private sector.  By Duisenberg’s criterion, monetary policy in the eurozone is becoming less and less effective.  The only thing that will reverse this trend is a resolution of Europe’s growing bank and government debt crisis.  Yet by continually insisting that debt restructuring is out of the question, the ECB is only delaying such a resolution – and almost surely making it more costly.

Read more »

The difference between Greek and German government bond yields can be used to estimate the market’s view of the likelihood of a Greek default. The chart above shows these probabilities over different time frames on three different dates. On April 30th, no European plan was yet in place to address the ballooning Greek debt, and default was considered a real possibility in the short term. On May 11th, just after the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) was announced, markets sharply cut their view on the odds of default across all time horizons. However, the market’s analysis of the ESM has become much more nuanced since then. On September 1st, the market’s view of the probability of default within two years was lower than before the ESM was announced, but higher over longer time frames. Read more »

The U.S. and IMF bailout of Mexico in 1994 is often cited as a textbook example of a successful financial rescue. The economy stabilized allowing Mexico to pay back most of its loans in less than 2 years. In response to the current crisis the Fed took on the role of global dollar lender of last resort by lending to foreign, primarily European, central banks. These loans were paid back more quickly than Mexico’s. Read more »

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with Japan, China, and South Korea says it will launch a $120bn reserve fund, increasing the foreign exchange reserves that the region can draw on in times of turmoil. Japan has offered an additional $60bn via a swap line. Can regional funds provide an Asian alternative to the IMF? Read more »

Mexico, Poland and Colombia have approached the IMF seeking access to the new Flexible Credit Line. If all these lines are drawn, the increase in lending during the current crisis would far exceed the increase during the 95 Mexican crisis, the 97-98 Asian crisis, and the 2001 Argentine crisis. Read more »