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	<title>Comments on: Hey big spender (or why conservation is perhaps a bit more than just a personal virtue) &#8230;.</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/</link>
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	<pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2009 23:31:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94562</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2007 01:04:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94562</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;History tells us that one of the most unstable political combinations is a country - like the United States today - that tries to be a domestic democracy and a foreign imperialist.&lt;/i&gt;

Ah yes.  Like the hugely unstable British Empire, and the flash-in-the-pan Roman Empire.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>History tells us that one of the most unstable political combinations is a country - like the United States today - that tries to be a domestic democracy and a foreign imperialist.</i></p>
<p>Ah yes.  Like the hugely unstable British Empire, and the flash-in-the-pan Roman Empire.</p>
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		<title>By: bsetser</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94561</link>
		<dc:creator>bsetser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2007 06:24:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94561</guid>
		<description>recently, the slight sweet stuff seems to trade at about a $5 a b premium to the actual price many big exporters get for their heavier, more sour grades.  but -- and this makes sense given what mr. bill has said about various oil contracts being indexed off of the one month forward price -- both the US import price and the oil exporters average export prices broadly do track moves in the one month forward ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>recently, the slight sweet stuff seems to trade at about a $5 a b premium to the actual price many big exporters get for their heavier, more sour grades.  but &#8212; and this makes sense given what mr. bill has said about various oil contracts being indexed off of the one month forward price &#8212; both the US import price and the oil exporters average export prices broadly do track moves in the one month forward &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: MrBill</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94560</link>
		<dc:creator>MrBill</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2007 03:23:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94560</guid>
		<description>""Mr. Bill -- thanks. do you know if most oil is sold at spot? my sense is that the average contract is for the delivery of X barrels of oil, at the prevailing market price. I.e. the Saudis have committed to supply China with 1 mbd in 2010, but at the going spot price. ""

Most physical deals would be struck at a fixed basis spread over the futures month.  For example, $1 + LCOc1 CIF ARA, to mean $1 over the nearest Brent futures month cost of insurance and freight to Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antworp, for example, for a physical destination.

Therefore, the basis spread remains unchanged during the length of the contract, but the final price changes with the futures price.  Then both producer and end user can hedge themselves against flat price risk by buying to selling futures.

Any over or under delivery on the physical contract within tolerances is then also accomplished by swapping an equivalent number of futures contracts.  For example if the tolerance is +/- 1% that is still a large cash amount if the contract is big.

In this sense the grade of the underlying contract whether sweet &#038; light or heavy &#038; sour does not matter 'a great' deal because that grade discount or premium is reflected in the basis spread not in the futures contract.

Of course, a contract for ME crude supplied to an Asian buyer could be adversely affected by a short squeeze in NY Harbor delivery, but that price risk by basing the contract on the wrong underlying future contract is avoidable.

Where it might skew calculations of the value of imports and export receipts is if one took the headline price for a benchmark light &#038; sweet grade like WTI and then multiplied global supply and world wide demand by that headline price.  That would overstate the true size of the crude oil market versus using lower quality blends.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;&#8221;Mr. Bill &#8212; thanks. do you know if most oil is sold at spot? my sense is that the average contract is for the delivery of X barrels of oil, at the prevailing market price. I.e. the Saudis have committed to supply China with 1 mbd in 2010, but at the going spot price. &#8220;&#8221;</p>
<p>Most physical deals would be struck at a fixed basis spread over the futures month.  For example, $1 + LCOc1 CIF ARA, to mean $1 over the nearest Brent futures month cost of insurance and freight to Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antworp, for example, for a physical destination.</p>
<p>Therefore, the basis spread remains unchanged during the length of the contract, but the final price changes with the futures price.  Then both producer and end user can hedge themselves against flat price risk by buying to selling futures.</p>
<p>Any over or under delivery on the physical contract within tolerances is then also accomplished by swapping an equivalent number of futures contracts.  For example if the tolerance is +/- 1% that is still a large cash amount if the contract is big.</p>
<p>In this sense the grade of the underlying contract whether sweet &#038; light or heavy &#038; sour does not matter &#8216;a great&#8217; deal because that grade discount or premium is reflected in the basis spread not in the futures contract.</p>
<p>Of course, a contract for ME crude supplied to an Asian buyer could be adversely affected by a short squeeze in NY Harbor delivery, but that price risk by basing the contract on the wrong underlying future contract is avoidable.</p>
<p>Where it might skew calculations of the value of imports and export receipts is if one took the headline price for a benchmark light &#038; sweet grade like WTI and then multiplied global supply and world wide demand by that headline price.  That would overstate the true size of the crude oil market versus using lower quality blends.</p>
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		<title>By: Guest</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94559</link>
		<dc:creator>Guest</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 15:10:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94559</guid>
		<description>Let's assume that most trading in physical crude oil is done by means of term contracts, and that the contract price is expressed as an adjusted benchmark price. If we assume that there are a large number of such contracts, the relationship between the relevant benchmark crude price and the actual prices paid can be defined by (a) how close the benchmark price is to the mean (perhaps volume-weighted mean) price of crude being traded and (b) the dispersion of prices around the mean. If the relevant benchmark price is close to the mean of contract prices and dispersion is small, then it is reasonable to take the benchmark price as a good approximation of "the price of crude oil". But the further the benchmark price departs from the mean, and the wider the dispersion of prices paid, the less is this possible. What therefore seems important is to find out where the benchmark price lies with respect to the mean of contract prices, and the dispersion of these prices.

If West Texas Intermediate and Brent are lighter, sweeter crudes than the majority of crude actually traded, and if grade has a significant impact on price, that is reason to believe that these benchmarks might depart significantly from the real volume-weighted mean price of  the world's crude. But by how much, and what the dispersion is - anybody? Anybody at all?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let&#8217;s assume that most trading in physical crude oil is done by means of term contracts, and that the contract price is expressed as an adjusted benchmark price. If we assume that there are a large number of such contracts, the relationship between the relevant benchmark crude price and the actual prices paid can be defined by (a) how close the benchmark price is to the mean (perhaps volume-weighted mean) price of crude being traded and (b) the dispersion of prices around the mean. If the relevant benchmark price is close to the mean of contract prices and dispersion is small, then it is reasonable to take the benchmark price as a good approximation of &#8220;the price of crude oil&#8221;. But the further the benchmark price departs from the mean, and the wider the dispersion of prices paid, the less is this possible. What therefore seems important is to find out where the benchmark price lies with respect to the mean of contract prices, and the dispersion of these prices.</p>
<p>If West Texas Intermediate and Brent are lighter, sweeter crudes than the majority of crude actually traded, and if grade has a significant impact on price, that is reason to believe that these benchmarks might depart significantly from the real volume-weighted mean price of  the world&#8217;s crude. But by how much, and what the dispersion is - anybody? Anybody at all?</p>
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		<title>By: bsetser</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94558</link>
		<dc:creator>bsetser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 12:41:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94558</guid>
		<description>Old Vet -- it is more or less correct. remember imports here is meant in a broad sense -- remittances sent home by imported labor count, and so on.   Saudi oil exports generated @$195b.  The current account surplus was @$95b.  that leaves $100b in imports -- about 5K per Saudi.  That actually seems right to me ...   And it implies roughly a 50/50 split between spending and savings with an average sweet light oil price of around $65 a barrel for the year ... or imports equal to about $35 a barrel.

I should note that we did all the calculations in terms of the price of sweet light - not national crude.  but given how we did the calcultions, we effectively adjusted production downward to reflect countries that don't produce just sweet light.  so it should work out -- and it makes comparison easier.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Old Vet &#8212; it is more or less correct. remember imports here is meant in a broad sense &#8212; remittances sent home by imported labor count, and so on.   Saudi oil exports generated @$195b.  The current account surplus was @$95b.  that leaves $100b in imports &#8212; about 5K per Saudi.  That actually seems right to me &#8230;   And it implies roughly a 50/50 split between spending and savings with an average sweet light oil price of around $65 a barrel for the year &#8230; or imports equal to about $35 a barrel.</p>
<p>I should note that we did all the calculations in terms of the price of sweet light - not national crude.  but given how we did the calcultions, we effectively adjusted production downward to reflect countries that don&#8217;t produce just sweet light.  so it should work out &#8212; and it makes comparison easier.</p>
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		<title>By: OldVet</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94557</link>
		<dc:creator>OldVet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 11:08:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94557</guid>
		<description>Brad, I'm astonished at the implied import bill of the Saudi economy.  That's a huge amount of imports for a very small population.  Can it be correct?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brad, I&#8217;m astonished at the implied import bill of the Saudi economy.  That&#8217;s a huge amount of imports for a very small population.  Can it be correct?</p>
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		<title>By: Dave Chiang</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94556</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave Chiang</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 09:49:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94556</guid>
		<description>India, China and Russia utilize the state-driven capitalism economic model. For instance, the Sudan oil production is only 60% owned by state-owned PetroChina, the remaining 40% ownership is retained by a state-owned Indian corporation. What is most interesting is the increasing Chinese state-ownership of Canadian and Australian resources in various joint ventures. Chinese CNOOC has partial ownership of Australian offshore gas fields, and China Sinopec has huge investments in Canada's tar sands in Alberta. Likewise, Russian state-owned companies are investing in Chinese downstream refineries and retail gas stations, in exchange for Chinese investment in Russian upsteam oil production assets. The new world order is based on mutual state driven co-development and cooperation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>India, China and Russia utilize the state-driven capitalism economic model. For instance, the Sudan oil production is only 60% owned by state-owned PetroChina, the remaining 40% ownership is retained by a state-owned Indian corporation. What is most interesting is the increasing Chinese state-ownership of Canadian and Australian resources in various joint ventures. Chinese CNOOC has partial ownership of Australian offshore gas fields, and China Sinopec has huge investments in Canada&#8217;s tar sands in Alberta. Likewise, Russian state-owned companies are investing in Chinese downstream refineries and retail gas stations, in exchange for Chinese investment in Russian upsteam oil production assets. The new world order is based on mutual state driven co-development and cooperation.</p>
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		<title>By: Guest</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94555</link>
		<dc:creator>Guest</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 09:44:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94555</guid>
		<description>- and very, very different positions in terms of their own economies and energy economics.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>- and very, very different positions in terms of their own economies and energy economics.</p>
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		<title>By: Guest</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94554</link>
		<dc:creator>Guest</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 09:29:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94554</guid>
		<description>just had a very quick look at the article provided by Guest on 2007-01-31 09:26:21 and have to question:  "India and China have no problems with Putin's model of energy security based on Russian state control over resources and pipelines..."  as all three have very different approaches.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>just had a very quick look at the article provided by Guest on 2007-01-31 09:26:21 and have to question:  &#8220;India and China have no problems with Putin&#8217;s model of energy security based on Russian state control over resources and pipelines&#8230;&#8221;  as all three have very different approaches.</p>
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		<title>By: Dave Chiang</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94553</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave Chiang</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:32:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/01/30/hey-big-spender-or-why-conservation-is-perhaps-a-bit/#comment-94553</guid>
		<description>Economic Bankruptcy for US Global Hegemony Agenda
By Chalmers Johnson
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/IB01Aa01.html

" History tells us that one of the most unstable political combinations is a country - like the United States today - that tries to be a domestic democracy and a foreign imperialist.

These operations have included the clandestine overthrow of governments various US administrations did not like, the training of foreign militaries in the techniques of state terrorism, the rigging of elections in foreign countries, and interference with the economic viability of countries that seemed to threaten the interests of influential US corporations, as well as the torture or assassination of selected foreigners.

Whatever future developments may prove to be, my best guess is that the US will continue to maintain a facade of constitutional government and drift along until financial bankruptcy overtakes it.

Certainly, such a bankruptcy would mean a drastic lowering of Americans' standard of living, a further loss of control over international affairs, a sudden need to adjust to the rise of other powers, including China and India, and a further discrediting of the notion that the United States is somehow exceptional compared with other nations. We will have to learn what it means to be a far poorer country - and the attitudes and manners that go with it. "

- Chalmers Johnson
Japan Policy Reseach Institute</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Economic Bankruptcy for US Global Hegemony Agenda<br />
By Chalmers Johnson<br />
<a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/IB01Aa01.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/IB01Aa01.html</a></p>
<p>&#8221; History tells us that one of the most unstable political combinations is a country - like the United States today - that tries to be a domestic democracy and a foreign imperialist.</p>
<p>These operations have included the clandestine overthrow of governments various US administrations did not like, the training of foreign militaries in the techniques of state terrorism, the rigging of elections in foreign countries, and interference with the economic viability of countries that seemed to threaten the interests of influential US corporations, as well as the torture or assassination of selected foreigners.</p>
<p>Whatever future developments may prove to be, my best guess is that the US will continue to maintain a facade of constitutional government and drift along until financial bankruptcy overtakes it.</p>
<p>Certainly, such a bankruptcy would mean a drastic lowering of Americans&#8217; standard of living, a further loss of control over international affairs, a sudden need to adjust to the rise of other powers, including China and India, and a further discrediting of the notion that the United States is somehow exceptional compared with other nations. We will have to learn what it means to be a far poorer country - and the attitudes and manners that go with it. &#8221;</p>
<p>- Chalmers Johnson<br />
Japan Policy Reseach Institute</p>
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