If the US dollar is now a refuge, what is the yen?
The dollar rallied a bit last week, but nothing like the yen.
The Wall Street Journal’s Mark Whitehouse conflates – at least in my view — deleveraging with safe haven flows.
Deleveraging means that you borrowed dollars to buy something else and now need dollars to repay your debts. Folks who borrowed yen (and dollars) needed to buy yen (and dollars) to pay their creditors back. Safe haven flows by contrast imply that you own assets denominated in another currency and, in times of stress, would rather hold dollars.
I would interpret the dollar’s rally against most emerging currencies and the euro is a sign that the dollar was, along with the yen, a rather popular “funding” currency for a host of carry trades. The dollar was just in the rather strange position of being a destination currency for some yen carry trades even as it was a funding currency for a host of other trades.
The headline of the Journal’s story consequently seemed off to me. Saying “Foreign investors view the dollar as a refuge currency in times of stress” suggests that there was a surge in foreign demand for US assets from investors who hadn’t previously borrowed dollars to buy other assets. I am not sure that was the case.
The defining characteristic of the US credit market last week was that there simply wasn’t any demand – whether foreign or domestic – for a host of US dollar-denominated bonds (Treasuries are an obvious exception). That is why the Fed cut the discount rate, and why some hedge funds may give their funding banks bonds to exchange for cash at the discount window.
So where did the demand for dollars come from? My guesses would include:
- Investors who borrowed dollars and invested in higher yielding currencies were forced (or opted) to cut back on their bets.
- Investors with profits on their bets on emerging market equities wanted to either lock in their profits or raise cash – cash that they needed to cover losses elsewhere or to meet potential redemptions (see Jenny Anderson of the New York Times)
- European banks who had set up conduits and SIVs (think of them as minature credit hedge funds) couldn’t roll over their dollar denominated commercial paper, and had to borrow from their parents. If they borrowed in euros, they needed to trade those euros for dollars to repay their dollar denominated liabilities.
I wouldn’t characterize any of these flows as classic safe haven flows.
Indeed, with a host of US markets frozen, foreign investors who held dollar-denominated bonds likely found it rather difficult to sell their bonds for cash. That, in turn, likely made it hard to “flee” the US. Though I guess foreign investors stuck holding an illiquid CDO could still have hedged the currency risk …
I also wasn’t completely satisfied with the two theories Whitehouse introduces to explain the United States ability to finance its large deficit with relatively little trouble. Whitehouse writes:
“Economists offer at least two competing — and overlapping — explanations for the trend in the U.S. current account. Some put the emphasis on the profligate behavior of U.S. consumers and government, faulting America's appetite for foreign televisions and foreign wars for getting the country perilously deep into debt. Others see the U.S. as providing a necessary service to the rest of the world, offering the only financial markets large and resilient enough to safely absorb all the savings flowing in from countries such as Russia and China. As of 2005, the total value of the U.S. debt and equity markets stood at about $41 trillion, about twice the size of the comparable euro-area markets, according to the International Monetary Fund.
In the latter case, often called the "Bretton Woods II" view after the global system of fixed exchange rates that lasted from 1944 to 1971, the current-account deficit can be sustained as long as there are countries with excess savings to invest and as long as U.S. financial markets remain the best place to put the money. Recent worries over tighter accounting standards and the longer-term health of the U.S. economy have challenged the dominance of U.S. markets, but the latest market action suggests their reputation remains largely intact — and offers some support for Bretton Woods II. (Emphasis added)
The “profligate” US story is hard to square with (still) low global interest rates. “Profligacy” – as Dr. Bernanke suggested a while ago – implies that the US borrowing should put enough pressure on global savings to push up global interest rates. High rates in the US in turn suck in capital from the globe. That story fits the early 80s better than the past few years.
But the story that the US offers “the only financial markets” able to absorb Chinese and Russian savings – and particularly the argument that the US offers “the best place” for Chinese and Russian money” – also seems off. Private Chinese and Russian money is quite happy to be in China and Russia. It certainly isn’t financing the US deficit. The US deficit is financed by the Bank of Russia and the People’s Bank of China.
That point always needs to be emphasized. And they clearly aren’t financing the US because the US offers the best returns, or even the best risk-adjusted returns. Over the past few years, foreign equity markets have done better than US markets. And the dollar has slumped v most currencies …
The strange thing is that foreigners have been willing to finance the US even though it hasn’t offered very good (financial) returns – and doesn’t really offer attractive risk-adjusted returns going forward. In at least my view, foreign central banks finance the US because they peg to the dollar and want to support their export sector, not because they believe in US markets. Think “Vendor financing.” The service that the US has supplied the world is demand for their exports – not large financial markets that offer a good store of value for the emerging world's savings.
Whitehouse doesn’t ignore global reserve growth, but he also doesn’t emphasize the extent to which the United States recent slowdown has left the US incredibly dependent on central bank financing. If you want to explain why the US is (still) able to finance a large current account deficit, all you really need to do is to explain why foreign central banks added (my estimate) at least $600b to their reserves in the first half of 2007 …
Low returns certainly haven’t dented Mike Dooley’s faith in the dollar.
“The fact that the U.S. still produces by far the best assets in the world will, as things settle down, be very good for the U.S."
And, well, Mike Dooley’s 2005 forecast certainly looks better than mine. Back then, I doubted central banks willingness to finance large ongoing deficits. He didn’t. He was right.
I presume by best assets he means the assets central banks most want to buy. But even there, I have some doubts. Treasuries don’t offer returns large enough to compensate for the risk of dollar depreciation – that, presumably, is why recent troubles don’t seem to have dented China’s risk appetite.
The problem: the higher-yielding assets that the US financial system has produced recently currently don't look so good. Once things settle down, I personally suspect that it will be a bit harder to convince the rest of the world – even previously generous official creditors – to finance the US on quite the same terms.
UPDATE: I have thought about the Whitehouse aritcle a bit more, and I think it basically combines two puzzles in a way that, ultimately, confuses rather than clarifies.
The first puzzle is why the dollar rallied in the face of the subprime crisis. Personally I would put more emphasis on delevaging than safe haven flows, but it is a real puzzle. Certainly a crisis in the risky parts of the mortgage market didn't prompt a mad rush out of all US assets — while most emerging market crises are defined by a rush out of all the country's assets, not a rush from CDOs to Treasuries.
The second puzzle is why the US has been able to finance a large current account deficit at relatively low interest rates for a long period of time even though the dollar has slumped and returns on investment in the US have lagged returns on investments outside the US. That also is a real puzzle, but it puzzle is ongoing investor demand in a sinking dollar — not an unanticipated rise in the dollar. Bretton Woods 2, at least to me, is interesting because it offers an interesting explaination for why some investors (foreign central banks) have bought a lot of US dollar-denominated assets even though the US hasn't offered world-beating financial returns. Apart from 2005, even "safe" US assets generally have underperformed "safe" European assets.
I am not sure that it is possible to look into both puzzles effectively in a single short article; they are fundamentally different puzzles.
- Interesting thesis on unwinding of dollar as a funding currency. What sort of incoming data would you expect to support it?
- “Vendor financing” sounds a little like stimulating the appetite of “profligate U.S. consumers.
For many reasons, like safety, covering redemptions, cashing out, insecurity, ect, investors are going to cash, and that cash is in readily available USDs. That could all end when the Fed finally cuts rates and pushes the value of the USD lower. That, in turn, should push the yield of the 10-yr note up to where 30 year mortgages become expensive enough to become the final nail in the coffin of the US real estate market.
In our real estate market, the 1031 exchange is all but dead. Anyone who can cash out is cashing out. There seem to be no asset classes worth going long in.
re: The “profligate” US story is hard to square with (still) low global interest rates
“…For those who struggle to pay their bills, who watch their housing payments rise out of reach with their adjustable-rate mortgages, who lose a job or who fall victim to illness, losing one’s home can feel like hitting bottom. But one more financial indignity may await as the fallout from the great housing boom ripples across the United States…” http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/20/business/20taxes.html?ref=business
re: “savings” flowing in from countries such as Russia.
“…Borrowing has been especially intense recently. In the final quarter of 2006, foreign indebtedness of state-owned banks and other firms grew by $13.9 billion, nearly 19 percent. Capital inflows for 2006 reached a record $40 billion, a figure that was nearly equaled in the first five months of 2007 alone. Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin and other government officials have called for a slowdown in foreign borrowing, and they have pushed state firms embarking on IPOs to seek capital from the ruble-holding public instead of relying solely on new funds from abroad. Macroeconomic factors limit how much incoming investment Moscow can effectively absorb. The state must thus regard international financing as a scarce resource and take steps to ensure that it is directed in line with long-term development priorities. At the moment, however, state-owned enterprises are directing these scarce resources not to production projects, but to empire-building acquisitions, saddling themselves with large debt burdens that could be a barrier to their subsequent development…” http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2007/08/20/007.html
“…Russia may still be the Achilles’ heel of the global economy – even more than in 1998. If jitters in global financial markets endure for a few months and translate into slower global economic growth, it could implode again…” http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2007/08/20/006.html
re: China’s “risk appetite”:
“…”The difference between this downturn and the last one in 2000 and 2001 is that this time the buy-out groups are flush with cash,”… Moreover, private equity still benefits from many strategic advantages over public companies in that it is nimble and less bureaucratic…” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad93159a-4eb5-11dc-85e7-0000779fd2ac.html
re: why the Fed cut the discount rate
as you note, didn’t it have (at least) as much to do with the knock-on affects in global markets and assets. How far can ’safe haven’ yen buying go without creating bigger problems? if you can provide a clear definition of ‘US assets’, at least in your view…
Insofar as investor risk appetite will be impaired for some time, this presumably also means that private sector dollar funding trades will be less sizeable than in the past- i.e. European funds selling USD/BRL and USD/RMB- and as such, fewer ‘excess dollars’ for the CBs of those countries to buy.
I’m not sure if I believe that the damage to investor risk appetite will be impaired that long, though…it’s amazing what a few months of flat returns (which admittedly does not dexcribe the curent situation)does to risk appetite.
Guest — both the IMF and the BEA (in the US balance of payments data) already define US assets from a balance of payments point of view; I am a balance of payments geek and like their definition. It is a claim (debt or equity) on a US resident held by a non-resident. The link on Russia shows that private money is flowing into Russia — i.e. Russian firms are borrowing private savings from the rest of the world. that reinforces my thesis.
Macroman — agree. the huge scale of EM reserve growth reflects two things. Large current account surpluses in some countries (China, Russia, the oil exporters) and large private capital inflows. The current account surpluses won’t go away immediately (absent a big fall in oil) and those countries will continue to see strong reserve growth (barring a sudden private sector outlfow). But countries like Brazil where reserve growth has been driven by capital inflows may see a slowdown.
I posted a while ago, noticing everyone talks about government debt but that on the same Fed report page there’s also household debt which has a much more spectacular evolution:
“”"
GDP per capita PPP
1999:
US $37,572
France $27,643
Germany $27,264
UK $27,448
2006:
US $44,000 (+17%)
France $31,100 (+12.5%)
Germany $31,900 (+17%)
UK $31,800 (+16%)
If you look at the Fed Z1 report:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf
You’ll see than from 1999 to 2006 USA household debts went from 6.4 trillion to 12.8 trillions, a multiplication by two of household debt, and USA household debt is now about the same size as USA GDP.
6.4 trillions increase in debt in 7 years for 300 millions inhabitants that’s around 3000 dollars per inhabitant per year of household debt increase.
The USA per capita GDP increase is about 920 dollars per year over the same period, food for though.
“”"
I wonder where the 3000-900=2100 USD per year per capita went for those six years. Part of it in “bubble” house prices. But the rest?
I wonder if Brad data could be linked in some way to the above data.
I suspect almost all the increase is housing debt; housing prices soared, so new buyers took on a lot more debt in nominal terms (somewhat offset by lower interest rates). And, in turn, a lot of that housing debt was sold to investors around the world. The safe (guaranteed against credit risk by the agencies) housing debt was snapped up by central banks, and the more risky parts were snapped up by others. Tho it seems like the European banks doing some of the buying were only putting up equity capital (for the conduit/ SIV) while borrowing in dollars (s-term) to buy higher-yielding dollar assets –
if the European banks get out of this business, someone else will need to step up or total demand for longer dated US dollar debt will fall …
that is why the reports that china is still looking to invest in hedge funds are interesting — chinese funds so far haven’t been leveraged. they are real money inflows, and real money flows to safe assets. Gear up a bit of CIC money (i.e. use it as equity capital for a credit hedge fund) and, well, the CIC’s funds could serve the same purpose as European bank capital. IS US short-rates fall and the yields on various bits of us housing debt rise, it might even be a better bet than a lot of European banks made. a lot depends on the entry point.
As far as I’m concerned I agree with Jim Rogers who says sell the dollar. A government that prints money like there’s no tomorrow and like a banana republic to fuel or bail out crises. China and Japan holding 2 to 3 trillion.
Can any one say what the real deficits of the U.S. are ?
Can the U.S. accurately gauge its finances? I do not wish to see the U.S. dollar devalued but a change in government is absolutely necessary to save the currency as well as the country.
Might the lift in the dollar have more to do with yen unwinds with other carry trade currencies rather than a shift in demand for dollars ?
-self
The dollar is doomed to fall, not even treasuries or bills that totalize 4b compared to 144b in financial assets all around the world can be taken as a safe haven. Besides year over year inflation seems to be contained like subprime!! , taking official statistics as valid, but inflation rates for the quarter august-october of last year was negative 0,7%, so if inflation follows its course this year inflation will be above 4%, so i dont think that treasuries will be considered safe. Sooner more than later usa will have serious difficulties to finance its current acocunt deficit unless foreigners can buy american assets something very improbable given the proteccionism arising. There are bubbles in all kind of assets but the fed is betwwen a rock and a hard place ,but allow the banks to continue this ponzi scheme by signaling a cut rate that will be fruitless.
1. Given over to dissipation; dissolute.
2. Recklessly wasteful; wildly extravagant.
3. Excessive or imprudent expenditure
Profiglacy in the first two senses is a rather loaded and elicits denial. The third merely suggests you are spending too much, perhaps more than you are earning.
Who has been doing this? Apparently not the government, nor non financial corporations. Laurent GUERBY points out the increasing private indebtedness, a seemingly constant proportion of private wealth.
“…In 2006, the main investors in the Russian economy were from Cyprus (22%), the Netherlands (16.4%), Luxemburg (16%), Germany (8.6%), the UK (8.2%) and the USA (5.4%)…” http://www.aebrus.ru/files/File/CommitteeFiles/AEB%20Position%20Paper%202007_Finance%20and%20Investment.pdf
re: household debt – why we aren’t paying more attention to other nations: “…Young homebuyers are loading themselves up with expensive personal loans and overdrafts to pay monthly bills – with dire consequences for their long term finances, a leading debt charity said yesterday…” http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,2152221,00.html
and how would “a change in government… save the currency”?
the market response to profligacy is higher rates, and more expensive credit –
no one doubts that the us has been spending more than it earns (in aggregate) or that households have gone from being net suppliers of funds to the rest of the economy to being net borrowers (no savings, investing in real estate …). the question is why this hasn’t — until recently — pushed up us interest rates? and even now rates on treasuries are lower (tho credit spreads are higher), which doesn’t suggest a full on funding strike …
“…The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences just reported the household debt to disposable income ratio at 155% for Shanghai, 122% for Beijing, 95% for Qingdao, 91% for Hangzhou, 85% for Shenzhen, 79% for Ningbo, and 44% for Tianjin. Five years ago, household debt was virtually zero. China’s household debt has experienced the most rapid rise the world has ever seen,” according to Morgan’s Andy Xie…” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FK12Ad05.html
“…Bank of America, the country’s second-largest bank, “has quietly begun offering credit cards to customers without Social Security numbers – typically illegal immigrants,” according to the Wall Street Journal. Customers can qualify for a credit card if they have had a checking account at the bank for at least three months. They are required to leave a deposit and pay a relatively high interest rate…” http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2007/02/bank_of_america.html
A government that is truly conservative with expenditures. Politicians that do not believe the Federal Reserve is their playground. A distancing from monetarism. Contrary to what is the case right now.
The U.S. acts like a banana republic printing money all over the place thinking they better buy our bonds or they can’t sell to our consumers. They applaud that imports are cheaper abroad like saying I’m nice and thin, too bad I’m dying of aids. A mockery of conservative values. Let’s not even mention the PENTAGON
A loan rate is the “market” rate plus a spread based on risk of non repayment mitigated by asset value.
Asset value doubts should have pushed spreads much higher for those housing loans but I don’t see why it would have pushed the “market” rate higher because there are plenty of real world investment that would have taken plenty of money, like solar or wind power plants that make plenty of sense, are relatively low risk and in need of big loans of long duration.
For reference USA electricity thermal power (coal/oil/gas – non renewable) installed is around 300 GigaWatt (for a total continuous use of around 400 GW) and one installed Watt of renewable power currently costs from 5 to 30 USD depending on the technology and location. That’s a few trillions USD to invest. Data source:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat1p1.html
Why haven’t the housing spreads widened, I don’t know. We’ll see who holds the 4-8 housing overvaluation trillion potato, data courtesy of Dean Baker:
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/meltdown_2007_08.pdf
And so who is the reason why the spreads didn’t widen at some point in this crisis.
spreads have widened now — tho higher spreads can be offset to a degree by lower rates. the question is why both spreads and rates were so long for so long …
” In at least my view, foreign central banks finance the US because they peg to the dollar and want to support their export sector, not because they believe in US markets ”
They finance the US because they need a place to put the dollars they’ve bought once they’ve decided to buy them. Makes sense to combine a core level of investment in the source currency risk free asset (treasuries), with some diversification into other currencies and higher risk assets. The question is always the asset mix – whether they have too much in treasuries, not enough in other currencies or higher risk assets, etc. etc. Given what started the ball rolling and its momentum, makes sense to maintain a fairly substantial base of their assets in US treasuries – after all, the US is the source location and source currency of most of the global current account deficit. I wonder what portfolio theory would say about the ideal diversification strategy?
Yes, as you I meant the housing spreads should have widened well before today, may be just out of the stock bubble in 2001-2003 when housing prices where already out of historical bounds by 20-40%.
But we had alan Greenspan saying at the time where some regulator-led spanking was most needed:
[...] But regulation is not only unnecessary in these markets, it is potentially damaging, because regulation presupposes disclosure and forced disclosure of proprietary information can undercut innovations in financial markets just as it would in real estate markets. [...]
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2002/200209252/default.htm
Throw oil on fire as the old saying says.
bsetser,
Everything makes sense if you model the BWII CBs as a single actor, with the usual political motivations of all central banks.
Ascribing economic motivations to central banks is not useful. Their political goal is to keep the global economy from either “crashing” or “overheating.” These concepts may not be meaningful economically, but they are meaningful politically. “Crashing” means mobs of unemployed navvies. “Overheating” means baguette-price riots. These images are burned into the minds of generations of enarques. No employee of any CB anywhere wants to see any of these things, ever, in any country. So, despite inevitable international tensions, motivations are generally aligned.
Perhaps this actor needs a name. The point is that Dumbledore (the Fed) and Voldemort (the foreign CBs) are one. Call him Dumblemort. Dumblemort is behind everything. If the question is a question, “Dumblemort” is the answer.
Now and for the indefinite future, the entire yield curve is controlled by Dumblemort. As are all currency cross rates. Dumblemort can issue any currency, can guarantee the present price of any security, and so on. As yet he has ventured only tentatively into the final frontier of freedom, the equity market, but even here his hand is beginning to be felt.
Actually, Dumblemort hates all this. He loves free markets. He understands them perfectly, and in a sort of theoretical sense he wishes he could cease to exist, allowing the yield curves of the world to simply reflect reality. Dumblemort is certainly not in any way evil. He is not even misguided. His job is a dirty job, he knows it and he detests it, and he wishes someone didn’t have to do it.
But Dumblemort has to live with the reality of the situation, which is that he is very old. And so is his bad habit of managing credit markets. Because his operations tend to raise the price of debt, over the last 100 years his world has built up a pretty big pile of the stuff. If Dumblemort suddenly walked off the job, this pile would fall down, and a lot of people would be crushed.
One of the ugliest parts of Dumblemort’s job is that he cannot even maintain a stable yield curve. Dumblemort does not want the market to either crash or overheat, but his only way of preventing it from crashing or overheating is to feint in one direction when the market starts to move in the other.
He has no policy tool that allows him to damp these oscillations. If he commits himself to any fixed yield curve, the amount of outstanding debt will go instantly to infinity, because the market will borrow money to buy any asset, leveraging infinitely against collateral whose price is bid up to infinity, and so on. Fortunately for Dumblemort, any such strategy leaves the market infinitely exposed to any hint that the yield curve might revert to its precipitous, Dumblemortless shape. The more the hedgies overextend themselves, the more they consign their family jewels to Dumblemort’s cold hands. The slightest squeeze and they know who’s boss.
So what of spreads? Spreads have blown out because a yield curve oscillation affected the price of many collateral assets (such as houses), and thus of debt collateralized by these assets. Investors bought this debt not because they were stupid and didn’t think short dollar rates would rise, but because they had institutional guarantees and regulatory directives. In other words, the difference between a pension fund required to buy AAA-rated bonds, and a sovereign wealth fund, is a difference of degree. The answer, once again, is Dumblemort.
Dumblemort personally buys only the simplest and most secure of instruments. But financial institutions who are regulated by Dumblemort, and to whom in many cases Dumblemort provides insurance explicit or implicit, are not so picky. These quasiofficial entities have been driving down spreads. And their behavior has been exacerbated by nonofficial entities who believe they can rely on Dumblemort’s implicit guarantee – the “Bernanke Put,” whose virginity is no longer debatable.
Without occasional punishment, these players will drive debt to infinity. With too much punishment, the growth of debt will stop or even reverse, a disastrous result in an economy profoundly and irreversibly hooked on asset-price inflation. The entire system is, of course, insane, but it exhibits no incremental path to sanity, and it exists within a political process committed to incrementalism.
And as for why the dollar has risen versus some other goods, such as the euro, it is an inevitable consequence of the market’s brief glimpse of the terrifying, uberdeflationary yield curve that Dumblemort shields us all from.
In this abyss, the exchange ratio between debt of any nontrivial maturity and cash is very different from that exchange ratio as it exists in the world today. Because, obviously, interest rates are higher. Much higher. Volckeresque doesn’t even begin to describe it.
Last week the market looked into the abyss, and the abyss looked back. To the extent that its cold and ancient stare was colder and more ancient in the dollarsphere than in the eurosphere, reasonable considering the relative debt mountains, we would expect to see the dollar rise against the euro. As we did.
Then Dumblemort rose up, shouted a great oath, and kicked the door closed. Leaving only a swirl of cool wind, the memory of infinite fear, and a slight scent of sulfur. We love you, Dumblemort! We are more devoted than before.
August 20 2007
13-WEEK BILLS
CUSIP:912795B34
(amounts in Mns)
Tender Type Tendered Accepted
Primary Dealer $ 26,235 $16,459
Direct Bidder $ 205 $ 180
Indirect Bidder $ 2,170 $ 2,157
Total Compet $ 28,610 $ 18,796
Rate = 2.850
26-WEEK BILLS
CUSIP:912795C82
(amounts in Mns)
Tender Type Tendered Accepted
Primary Dealer $ 24,070 $ 12,438
Direct Bidder $ 83 $ 83
Indirect Bidder $ 2,038 $ 2,026
Total Compet $ 26,191 $14,548
Rate = 3.950
August 13 2007
13-WEEK BILLS
CUSIP:912795B26
(amounts in Mns)
Tender Type Tendered Accepted
Primary Dealer $ 41,749 $ 14,640
Direct Bidder $ 275 $ 253
Indirect Bidder $ 3,808 $ 3,760
Total Compet $ 45,832 $ 18,654
Rate= 4.630
26-WEEK BILLS
CUSIP:912795C74
(amounts in Mns)
Tender Type Tendered Accepted
Primary Dealer $ 32,205 $ 8,454
Direct Bidder $ 2,100 $ 2,093
Indirect Bidder $ 4,179 $ 4,068
Total Compet $ 38,484 $ 14,616
Rate = 4.710
August 6 2007
13-WEEK BILLS
CUSIP:912795A92
(amounts in Mns)
Tender Type Tendered Accepted
Primary Dealer $ 36,460 $ 13,469
Direct Bidder $ 170 $ 170
Indirect Bidder $ 5,737 $ 5,237
Total Compet $ 42,367 $ 18,876
Rate = 4.770
26-WEEK BILLS
CUSIP:912795C66
(amounts in Mns)
Tender Type Tendered Accepted
Primary Dealer $ 30,001 $ 9,234
Direct Bidder $ 2,330 $ 2,330
Indirect Bidder $ 4,366 $ 4,229
Total Compet $ 36,697 $ 15,793
Rate = 4.730
1:35 PM
dumblemort is dead,
long live voldedore…
bravo moldbug, bravo.
mold exists outside of time