Interesting presentation.

Thanks, as said, many moving parts: certainly less near term available supply of crude of the right kind (and far too little refining capacity, and not enough product tankers, etc) but several million bpd (perhaps as much as Saudi now) locked up in well-explred areas in Iran and Iraq. Visited the peak oil site and have a strong snse of deja vue (been around for a long time. The truth is: nobody knows, but big areas have been unavailable for exploration (US especially), oil production in the middle east ouside GCC declined for political reasons (war, de facto boycott Iran). Lots of current exporters are not nterested in icrasing production beyound current levels even if they can, etc
Then there is the option to turn NG (reatively plentiful) into variuos forms of synthetic liquids (succsfull plant in Bintulu Malaysia makes superclean fuels, technology now stable) and methanol. So there is a little bit to say about peak oil but it is inherently impossible to make accurate predictions. Nobody knows enough about long term oil/substitutes availability and demand response to higher prices .I think even a layman like myself could make a convincing case about peak oil being at least ten more years into the future based on the same data.. But, we know, thanks to graph 2 above) at least that in the past, sharp increases in net oil exports share in world GDP have hardly pierced the noise floor in the GDP data, and have generally ben followed by equally fast declines. That makes oil look like a pretty normal good to me. Markets in the past had apparently better information than the many speculating theorists

So why don’t they do that?

Answer: Because it works only short-term. That is also why the graph of oil income in relation to GDP is interesting. It is VERY easy for it to rise SHORT-TERM, but very difficult/impossible long-term. Thus it will fall back.

A number of mechanisms will ensure that oil’s relative value to other goods and services stays comparatively stable.