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	<title>Comments on: Ut-oh</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/</link>
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		<title>By: RebelEconomist</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111675</link>
		<dc:creator>RebelEconomist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 15:10:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111675</guid>
		<description>Rien Huizer,

Never heard of that myth.....please explain.  I think that people&#039;s behaviour is a rational response to the incentives they are given.  The problem is that the incentives, which amount to macro moral hazard, are not sustainable.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rien Huizer,</p>
<p>Never heard of that myth&#8230;..please explain.  I think that people&#8217;s behaviour is a rational response to the incentives they are given.  The problem is that the incentives, which amount to macro moral hazard, are not sustainable.</p>
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		<title>By: bsetser</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111674</link>
		<dc:creator>bsetser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 14:56:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111674</guid>
		<description>flow is important.  the stock of agencies outstanding wasn&#039;t growing for a while (b/c of the accounting issue/ concerns about unfair competition with private &quot;MBS&quot; issuers) while CB holdings were rising, so Americans were selling some existing agency bonds to foreigners, getting cash that needed to be redeployed elsewhere.

the US v foreign flow spreakdown on spread products would be interesting, but it will also be distorted by all the SIV activity/ hedge fund activity offshore.   There was a huge surge in foreign demand for spread product from the UK from 03- mid 07, but it looks to me to have been artificial, meaning that entities in the uk borrowed from the us (via the money market) to buy long-term us debt, and were only offshore in the tax and legal sense.  they weren&#039;t intermediating foreign savings.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>flow is important.  the stock of agencies outstanding wasn&#8217;t growing for a while (b/c of the accounting issue/ concerns about unfair competition with private &#8220;MBS&#8221; issuers) while CB holdings were rising, so Americans were selling some existing agency bonds to foreigners, getting cash that needed to be redeployed elsewhere.</p>
<p>the US v foreign flow spreakdown on spread products would be interesting, but it will also be distorted by all the SIV activity/ hedge fund activity offshore.   There was a huge surge in foreign demand for spread product from the UK from 03- mid 07, but it looks to me to have been artificial, meaning that entities in the uk borrowed from the us (via the money market) to buy long-term us debt, and were only offshore in the tax and legal sense.  they weren&#8217;t intermediating foreign savings.</p>
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		<title>By: ZFC</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111673</link>
		<dc:creator>ZFC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 14:31:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111673</guid>
		<description>Rebel: &quot;From the beginning of 2003 to mid-2007 when the credit crisis struck, global dollar foreign exchange reserves grew by about $2tn, whereas US non-government debt grew by about $8tn.&quot; 

When I noted that Americans hold a lot more Agencies than foreigners, Brad pointed out that flow was more important. I&#039;m glad to see the US/foreign flow breakdown on spread product.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rebel: &#8220;From the beginning of 2003 to mid-2007 when the credit crisis struck, global dollar foreign exchange reserves grew by about $2tn, whereas US non-government debt grew by about $8tn.&#8221; </p>
<p>When I noted that Americans hold a lot more Agencies than foreigners, Brad pointed out that flow was more important. I&#8217;m glad to see the US/foreign flow breakdown on spread product.</p>
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		<title>By: Rien Huizer</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111672</link>
		<dc:creator>Rien Huizer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 14:29:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111672</guid>
		<description>Rebel,

Sound like the myth of the irrational voter to me. You know the guy is not irrational, right?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rebel,</p>
<p>Sound like the myth of the irrational voter to me. You know the guy is not irrational, right?</p>
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		<title>By: RebelEconomist</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111670</link>
		<dc:creator>RebelEconomist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 11:35:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111670</guid>
		<description>Rien Huizer,

I agree that people are not stupid.  On the contrary, they have learned that if enough other people are taking the same financial risks as them, their downside will be limited by the political imperative to bail them out.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rien Huizer,</p>
<p>I agree that people are not stupid.  On the contrary, they have learned that if enough other people are taking the same financial risks as them, their downside will be limited by the political imperative to bail them out.</p>
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		<title>By: unokai</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111669</link>
		<dc:creator>unokai</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 11:26:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111669</guid>
		<description>I think Russia will sell all its GSE portfolio in coming months. The problem is getting the public attention - almost every day on TV I can see the reports conserning russian investments in american mortgage papers. The absurdity of situation is coming clear - US tries to humiliate Russia, calls it &quot;argessor&quot;, uses double standards in international relations and in the same time waits for &quot;help&quot; ie buing the Agencies and Treasuries. That is ridiculous! 

The meltdown of Agencies is only the begining, the Treasuries will be next.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think Russia will sell all its GSE portfolio in coming months. The problem is getting the public attention &#8211; almost every day on TV I can see the reports conserning russian investments in american mortgage papers. The absurdity of situation is coming clear &#8211; US tries to humiliate Russia, calls it &#8220;argessor&#8221;, uses double standards in international relations and in the same time waits for &#8220;help&#8221; ie buing the Agencies and Treasuries. That is ridiculous! </p>
<p>The meltdown of Agencies is only the begining, the Treasuries will be next.</p>
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		<title>By: RebelEconomist</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111668</link>
		<dc:creator>RebelEconomist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 11:13:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111668</guid>
		<description>Brad,

Come to think of it, the idea of displacement inspires another argument against the theory that central banks played an active role (as opposed to a passive role through their currency pegs) in creating the US debt bubble.  That is that the volume of spread product created exceeds the growth of foreign exchange reserves.  From the beginning of 2003 to mid-2007 when the credit crisis struck, global dollar foreign exchange reserves grew by about $2tn, whereas US non-government debt grew by about $8tn.  The outstanding stock of CDOs alone grew from very little to about $2tn in the same period.

Perhaps dollar-pegging central banks can be blamed for not raising the level of the overflow outlet as they entered the bath, but the US borrower kept the taps fully open.

In my view, the facts are more consistent with a story in which the irresistible force of a US credit boom ran into the immovable object of dollar currency pegs.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brad,</p>
<p>Come to think of it, the idea of displacement inspires another argument against the theory that central banks played an active role (as opposed to a passive role through their currency pegs) in creating the US debt bubble.  That is that the volume of spread product created exceeds the growth of foreign exchange reserves.  From the beginning of 2003 to mid-2007 when the credit crisis struck, global dollar foreign exchange reserves grew by about $2tn, whereas US non-government debt grew by about $8tn.  The outstanding stock of CDOs alone grew from very little to about $2tn in the same period.</p>
<p>Perhaps dollar-pegging central banks can be blamed for not raising the level of the overflow outlet as they entered the bath, but the US borrower kept the taps fully open.</p>
<p>In my view, the facts are more consistent with a story in which the irresistible force of a US credit boom ran into the immovable object of dollar currency pegs.</p>
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		<title>By: Rien Huizer</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111666</link>
		<dc:creator>Rien Huizer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 07:43:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111666</guid>
		<description>Rebeleconomist,

Your second para hits the nail right on the head. But why are people so stupid to believe all those snake oil salesmen offering low borrowing costs and high investment yields? Because they do not believe, realize, have not been taught, etc that lunches have to be paid by someone. I do not think people a stupid, they are just optimistic about their own ability to avoid paying. They expect that everyone else (the community that pays tax) will pay.
And they are right up to a point. I believe that the US taxpayer should be not too concerned about bail-outs (there is of course the moral issue that reckless equity investors and crooked managers took on risks voluntarily that were so transparent that they do not deserve a bail-out. But Joe taxpayer might expect that next to warfare, the gvt may also spend a little on his more specific welfare. And over time, that is what has happened, and then bracket creep bailed out the government, and even more lately, an even less painful process took care of things, greater fools from abroad.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rebeleconomist,</p>
<p>Your second para hits the nail right on the head. But why are people so stupid to believe all those snake oil salesmen offering low borrowing costs and high investment yields? Because they do not believe, realize, have not been taught, etc that lunches have to be paid by someone. I do not think people a stupid, they are just optimistic about their own ability to avoid paying. They expect that everyone else (the community that pays tax) will pay.<br />
And they are right up to a point. I believe that the US taxpayer should be not too concerned about bail-outs (there is of course the moral issue that reckless equity investors and crooked managers took on risks voluntarily that were so transparent that they do not deserve a bail-out. But Joe taxpayer might expect that next to warfare, the gvt may also spend a little on his more specific welfare. And over time, that is what has happened, and then bracket creep bailed out the government, and even more lately, an even less painful process took care of things, greater fools from abroad.</p>
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		<title>By: ndk</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111664</link>
		<dc:creator>ndk</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 06:39:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111664</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;Usually when a bubble bursts, prices end up falling too far. Lots of people who bought houses during the bubble and lost their life savings will not likely take the plunge again. I’m betting that housing prices will decline much farther than 30%, even if easy credit is available.&lt;/i&gt;

I think our only disagreement is how broad my &quot;market conditions&quot; clause was.  No question, this is a possibility and perhaps a probability.

Thanks for flagging the tax change.  I&#039;m luckily too young to have been financially aware back then.  It&#039;s a serious mistake -- amongst many made -- that would&#039;ve been even more consequential if our IRS were sufficiently staffed to even do its job.  The more I learn about history and the world, the more inspired and awed I am that we&#039;ve made such amazing progress despite ourselves.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>Usually when a bubble bursts, prices end up falling too far. Lots of people who bought houses during the bubble and lost their life savings will not likely take the plunge again. I’m betting that housing prices will decline much farther than 30%, even if easy credit is available.</i></p>
<p>I think our only disagreement is how broad my &#8220;market conditions&#8221; clause was.  No question, this is a possibility and perhaps a probability.</p>
<p>Thanks for flagging the tax change.  I&#8217;m luckily too young to have been financially aware back then.  It&#8217;s a serious mistake &#8212; amongst many made &#8212; that would&#8217;ve been even more consequential if our IRS were sufficiently staffed to even do its job.  The more I learn about history and the world, the more inspired and awed I am that we&#8217;ve made such amazing progress despite ourselves.</p>
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		<title>By: Howard Richman</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111663</link>
		<dc:creator>Howard Richman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 04:13:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/08/18/ut-oh/#comment-111663</guid>
		<description>ndk wrote, &quot;there are plenty of fundamental reasons to believe the decline should stop around [30%]. The price to median income ratio and rental yields are two extremely important metrics that would return to sane levels with a drop of that magnitude.&quot;

But, ndk is missing the psychological component.  Usually when a bubble bursts, prices end up falling too far. Lots of people who bought houses during the bubble and lost their life savings will not likely take the plunge again. I&#039;m betting that housing prices will decline much farther than 30%, even if easy credit is available.

And let&#039;s not forget that it was President Clinton&#039;s 1997 change in the capital gains tax treatment for housing that may have gotten this bubble started. Bad economics policies can be extremely destructive.

Clinton replaced President Truman&#039;s sensible capital gains deferment when homeowners sell one home to buy another with a new treatment that encouraged speculation. See our Enter Stage Right commentary: ( http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0808/0808ecgrowth.htm ) or our blog posting about the congressional attempt to finally close the barn door that Clinton opened ( http://tradeandtaxes.blogspot.com/2008/08/clintons-1997-tax-cut-contributed-to.html )

Howard Richman</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>ndk wrote, &#8220;there are plenty of fundamental reasons to believe the decline should stop around [30%]. The price to median income ratio and rental yields are two extremely important metrics that would return to sane levels with a drop of that magnitude.&#8221;</p>
<p>But, ndk is missing the psychological component.  Usually when a bubble bursts, prices end up falling too far. Lots of people who bought houses during the bubble and lost their life savings will not likely take the plunge again. I&#8217;m betting that housing prices will decline much farther than 30%, even if easy credit is available.</p>
<p>And let&#8217;s not forget that it was President Clinton&#8217;s 1997 change in the capital gains tax treatment for housing that may have gotten this bubble started. Bad economics policies can be extremely destructive.</p>
<p>Clinton replaced President Truman&#8217;s sensible capital gains deferment when homeowners sell one home to buy another with a new treatment that encouraged speculation. See our Enter Stage Right commentary: ( <a href="http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0808/0808ecgrowth.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0808/0808ecgrowth.htm</a> ) or our blog posting about the congressional attempt to finally close the barn door that Clinton opened ( <a href="http://tradeandtaxes.blogspot.com/2008/08/clintons-1997-tax-cut-contributed-to.html" rel="nofollow">http://tradeandtaxes.blogspot.com/2008/08/clintons-1997-tax-cut-contributed-to.html</a> )</p>
<p>Howard Richman</p>
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