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	<title>Comments on: On the precipice</title>
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		<title>By: Twofish</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115121</link>
		<dc:creator>Twofish</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 19:43:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115121</guid>
		<description>London Banker: By doubling the average margin required from hedge funds from 15 percent to 30-35 percent in parallel with a period of high redemptions, they knew they would crash global markets in equities, bonds and commodities. Then they use the cash which is given to them as margin, along with whatever they get from TARP, to buy a lot of quality assets at deep discount.

I don&#039;t think so.  The big prime brokers tend to have positions that are market neutral so that whether the market rises or falls doesn&#039;t affect their valuation.  I don&#039;t think this would have been possible without my having hear about it, and I didn&#039;t get a &quot;let&#039;s crash global markets&quot; memo.  I did get a &quot;given that things are falling apart, let&#039;s be conservative who we lend to&quot; memo.

The big banks *did* increase margin requirements on hedge funds last week, but that was because a lot of cash is going to change hands this and next week to cover the fallout of the Lehman bankruptcy, and no one wanted to be in a situation where they ended up losing lots of money if a hedge fund goes under because of this.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>London Banker: By doubling the average margin required from hedge funds from 15 percent to 30-35 percent in parallel with a period of high redemptions, they knew they would crash global markets in equities, bonds and commodities. Then they use the cash which is given to them as margin, along with whatever they get from TARP, to buy a lot of quality assets at deep discount.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t think so.  The big prime brokers tend to have positions that are market neutral so that whether the market rises or falls doesn&#8217;t affect their valuation.  I don&#8217;t think this would have been possible without my having hear about it, and I didn&#8217;t get a &#8220;let&#8217;s crash global markets&#8221; memo.  I did get a &#8220;given that things are falling apart, let&#8217;s be conservative who we lend to&#8221; memo.</p>
<p>The big banks *did* increase margin requirements on hedge funds last week, but that was because a lot of cash is going to change hands this and next week to cover the fallout of the Lehman bankruptcy, and no one wanted to be in a situation where they ended up losing lots of money if a hedge fund goes under because of this.</p>
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		<title>By: LB</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115117</link>
		<dc:creator>LB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 19:21:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115117</guid>
		<description>@LBnkr

re: LEH -- ok, now it&#039;s beginning to make more sense, especially in light of the HK post above.  

if this is true, then:

it would make proper sense that UST decided not to bail them out, as that would be rewarding possibly soon-to-be explicit criminal behavior 

(Mr. Fuld and pals weren&#039;t too good in covering their tracks were they?  perhaps we should start a new acronym -- TSNTF -- Too Sloppy Not To Fail?)

and JPM would have been acting properly in their fiduciary capacity as LEH&#039;s clearing agent to freeze their liquid accounts of $17B, the straw that broke LEH to file chap 11 3 days later.

okay, but &#039;properly&#039; also importantly depends on WHEN DID JPM discover what LEH was doing and how long it did it take them after their discovery to alert the UST, and then how long it took the UST to act.

everyone will have their own personal opinion of what constitutes a &#039;proper&#039; duration but given the gravity of the situation and the eventual repercussions would it be proper to say that Monday of LEH&#039;s last week would be construed as proper, giving them a comfortable 5 days for everyone to decide how to act?

(perhaps i&#039;m being too generous given the time Congress was allowed to pass TARP/EESA/PWFU, but i&#039;m in a generous mood today)

it would be interesting to see a timeline of those events you outlined above.

it will also be interesting to see how far this lawsuit goes, because that seems to be the only way to ever answer the above question:

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/lehman-creditors-allege-jp-morgan-role.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@LBnkr</p>
<p>re: LEH &#8212; ok, now it&#8217;s beginning to make more sense, especially in light of the HK post above.  </p>
<p>if this is true, then:</p>
<p>it would make proper sense that UST decided not to bail them out, as that would be rewarding possibly soon-to-be explicit criminal behavior </p>
<p>(Mr. Fuld and pals weren&#8217;t too good in covering their tracks were they?  perhaps we should start a new acronym &#8212; TSNTF &#8212; Too Sloppy Not To Fail?)</p>
<p>and JPM would have been acting properly in their fiduciary capacity as LEH&#8217;s clearing agent to freeze their liquid accounts of $17B, the straw that broke LEH to file chap 11 3 days later.</p>
<p>okay, but &#8216;properly&#8217; also importantly depends on WHEN DID JPM discover what LEH was doing and how long it did it take them after their discovery to alert the UST, and then how long it took the UST to act.</p>
<p>everyone will have their own personal opinion of what constitutes a &#8216;proper&#8217; duration but given the gravity of the situation and the eventual repercussions would it be proper to say that Monday of LEH&#8217;s last week would be construed as proper, giving them a comfortable 5 days for everyone to decide how to act?</p>
<p>(perhaps i&#8217;m being too generous given the time Congress was allowed to pass TARP/EESA/PWFU, but i&#8217;m in a generous mood today)</p>
<p>it would be interesting to see a timeline of those events you outlined above.</p>
<p>it will also be interesting to see how far this lawsuit goes, because that seems to be the only way to ever answer the above question:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/lehman-creditors-allege-jp-morgan-role.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/lehman-creditors-allege-jp-morgan-role.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: London Banker</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115108</link>
		<dc:creator>London Banker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:21:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115108</guid>
		<description>@ LB
With respect to Lehman, I understand the following to be the case.  The SEC has been sitting inside of Lehman since March, getting things in order so that SIPC wouldn&#039;t take a hit if it failed (e.g., replacing anything missing from nominee holdings or client funds).  Then in the run up to the Chapter 11, Lehman liquidated huge holdings globally, preciptating the collapse of Asian, Russian and Eastern European markets.  Lehman repatriated over $22 billion in cash proceeds to its New York operations.  Lehman also looted the prime brokerage custody accounts of all the hedge funds serviced in London, using repo and lending agreements to stream all the assets to third party creditors or the New York operation.  The management team paid themselves huge remuneration.

Then and only then did they file Chapter 11.  And the timimg was a bit of a Reichstag Fire as it set up the Congressmen keen to get home to campaign for a quick panic passage of the biggest appropriation with the least oversight in US history.

Go figure.  Sounds like looting to me.

I suggested on Brad&#039;s thread some two or so years ago that the Fed would export inflation, then export deflation.  You want to see what exported deflation looks like, examine Lehman or the massive margin call liquidation of the past ten trading days.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ LB<br />
With respect to Lehman, I understand the following to be the case.  The SEC has been sitting inside of Lehman since March, getting things in order so that SIPC wouldn&#8217;t take a hit if it failed (e.g., replacing anything missing from nominee holdings or client funds).  Then in the run up to the Chapter 11, Lehman liquidated huge holdings globally, preciptating the collapse of Asian, Russian and Eastern European markets.  Lehman repatriated over $22 billion in cash proceeds to its New York operations.  Lehman also looted the prime brokerage custody accounts of all the hedge funds serviced in London, using repo and lending agreements to stream all the assets to third party creditors or the New York operation.  The management team paid themselves huge remuneration.</p>
<p>Then and only then did they file Chapter 11.  And the timimg was a bit of a Reichstag Fire as it set up the Congressmen keen to get home to campaign for a quick panic passage of the biggest appropriation with the least oversight in US history.</p>
<p>Go figure.  Sounds like looting to me.</p>
<p>I suggested on Brad&#8217;s thread some two or so years ago that the Fed would export inflation, then export deflation.  You want to see what exported deflation looks like, examine Lehman or the massive margin call liquidation of the past ten trading days.</p>
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		<title>By: bsetser</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115107</link>
		<dc:creator>bsetser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:12:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Estagon -- I had to learn about the mechanics a couple of weeks ago myself.   The Fed receives foreign currency as collateral, and the market value of that collateral is what is reported as an asset on the Fed&#039;s balance sheet.  If there are large exchange rate moves, i think the ECB has to supply more collateral.

I am still thinking through the issue of sterilization -- if the Fed lends dollars to a european central banks that lends the money to a european bank that then pays cash to an American money market fund, there would be an effective increase in the money supply.   But if the funds in the money market are invested back into Treasuries, nothing much happens.  And i think the latter is the best way of thinking about this.

But i am not sure ... 

I though fairly confident in the analysis of Dr. Hamilton -- namely that in the face of a huge collapse of confidence and the hoarding of dollar liquidity, this isn&#039;t likely to be inflationary.   The money the fed is lending out isn&#039;t being spent ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Estagon &#8212; I had to learn about the mechanics a couple of weeks ago myself.   The Fed receives foreign currency as collateral, and the market value of that collateral is what is reported as an asset on the Fed&#8217;s balance sheet.  If there are large exchange rate moves, i think the ECB has to supply more collateral.</p>
<p>I am still thinking through the issue of sterilization &#8212; if the Fed lends dollars to a european central banks that lends the money to a european bank that then pays cash to an American money market fund, there would be an effective increase in the money supply.   But if the funds in the money market are invested back into Treasuries, nothing much happens.  And i think the latter is the best way of thinking about this.</p>
<p>But i am not sure &#8230; </p>
<p>I though fairly confident in the analysis of Dr. Hamilton &#8212; namely that in the face of a huge collapse of confidence and the hoarding of dollar liquidity, this isn&#8217;t likely to be inflationary.   The money the fed is lending out isn&#8217;t being spent &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: LB</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115106</link>
		<dc:creator>LB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:06:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>London Banker: 2 LB&#039;s think alike...

though it&#039;s hard to not to think this way when it&#039;s staring us right in the face.

notice who went up in the late-hour rally on friday -- the usual suspects.

re: LEH -- if we agree that LEH was the straw, that begs the questions...

why was LEH allowed to fall in the 1st place?

why did JPM freeze their cash accounts on a Friday night?

was this just an climax of a longrunning BSD contest between the IB big boys in the sandbox or was there something deeper going on there?

and after the bankruptcy filing, why did LEH request to the court that special creditor status be given to the company (JPM) who pulled their plug?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>London Banker: 2 LB&#8217;s think alike&#8230;</p>
<p>though it&#8217;s hard to not to think this way when it&#8217;s staring us right in the face.</p>
<p>notice who went up in the late-hour rally on friday &#8212; the usual suspects.</p>
<p>re: LEH &#8212; if we agree that LEH was the straw, that begs the questions&#8230;</p>
<p>why was LEH allowed to fall in the 1st place?</p>
<p>why did JPM freeze their cash accounts on a Friday night?</p>
<p>was this just an climax of a longrunning BSD contest between the IB big boys in the sandbox or was there something deeper going on there?</p>
<p>and after the bankruptcy filing, why did LEH request to the court that special creditor status be given to the company (JPM) who pulled their plug?</p>
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		<title>By: doc holiday</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115103</link>
		<dc:creator>doc holiday</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 16:22:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115103</guid>
		<description>Re:  &quot;Watching Dik Fuld tell Congress that he “will wonder until the day they put me in the ground” why Lehman was allowed to fail&quot;

&gt;&gt;  Fuld also will wonder on that great day, why he was unable to make more dough.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Re:  &#8220;Watching Dik Fuld tell Congress that he “will wonder until the day they put me in the ground” why Lehman was allowed to fail&#8221;</p>
<p>&gt;&gt;  Fuld also will wonder on that great day, why he was unable to make more dough.</p>
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		<title>By: Estragon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115100</link>
		<dc:creator>Estragon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 16:18:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115100</guid>
		<description>Forgive the dumb question, but could anyone help me understand the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&amp;sid=aZdo6tVs0hhI&amp;refer=home&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt; fx swaps &lt;/a&gt;announced today?

I get the part about (eg) the fed swapping USD for EUR and an agreement to unwind at term (eg. 28 days hence).  A couple of questions though:

1.  Does the ECB actually deposit EUR at the fed, or is it really a USD loan collateralized by ECB EUR holdings?

2.  Is the net effect of the operation an increase in the supply of USD for the term? In other words, is there an offset (sterilization) needed to mop up USD, and if so, how can we tell if and to what extent it&#039;s actually being done.

Thanks in advance.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Forgive the dumb question, but could anyone help me understand the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&amp;sid=aZdo6tVs0hhI&amp;refer=home" rel="nofollow"> fx swaps </a>announced today?</p>
<p>I get the part about (eg) the fed swapping USD for EUR and an agreement to unwind at term (eg. 28 days hence).  A couple of questions though:</p>
<p>1.  Does the ECB actually deposit EUR at the fed, or is it really a USD loan collateralized by ECB EUR holdings?</p>
<p>2.  Is the net effect of the operation an increase in the supply of USD for the term? In other words, is there an offset (sterilization) needed to mop up USD, and if so, how can we tell if and to what extent it&#8217;s actually being done.</p>
<p>Thanks in advance.</p>
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		<title>By: London Banker</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115099</link>
		<dc:creator>London Banker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 15:21:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115099</guid>
		<description>@ Brad
I guess I&#039;m asserting a coordinated manipulation of global markets to crash them by the big prime brokers.  They know better than anyone how tight capital is, and how fragile market confidence.  By doubling the average margin required from hedge funds from 15 percent to 30-35 percent in parallel with a period of high redemptions, they knew they would crash global markets in equities, bonds and commodities.  Then they use the cash which is given to them as margin, along with whatever they get from TARP, to buy a lot of quality assets at deep discount.

We can expect to see equities shoot up in a nice bear rally over the next two weeks into the election, and then oil and gold will shoot up again after the election.

I think we are witnessing coordinated market manipulation on a grander scale than Goldman Sachs ever dreamed before it had access to the US Treasury&#039;s limitless leverage.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Brad<br />
I guess I&#8217;m asserting a coordinated manipulation of global markets to crash them by the big prime brokers.  They know better than anyone how tight capital is, and how fragile market confidence.  By doubling the average margin required from hedge funds from 15 percent to 30-35 percent in parallel with a period of high redemptions, they knew they would crash global markets in equities, bonds and commodities.  Then they use the cash which is given to them as margin, along with whatever they get from TARP, to buy a lot of quality assets at deep discount.</p>
<p>We can expect to see equities shoot up in a nice bear rally over the next two weeks into the election, and then oil and gold will shoot up again after the election.</p>
<p>I think we are witnessing coordinated market manipulation on a grander scale than Goldman Sachs ever dreamed before it had access to the US Treasury&#8217;s limitless leverage.</p>
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		<title>By: bsetser</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115098</link>
		<dc:creator>bsetser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 14:40:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Why did the TARP produce a global margin call?   Doesn&#039;t that confuse cause and effect?    The absence of capital + falling markets led to both the TARP and margin calls?

LEH&#039;s bankruptcy may also have had an impact, as some hedge funds found their funds in LEH frozen and they consequently shifted out of other stand alone brokers ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why did the TARP produce a global margin call?   Doesn&#8217;t that confuse cause and effect?    The absence of capital + falling markets led to both the TARP and margin calls?</p>
<p>LEH&#8217;s bankruptcy may also have had an impact, as some hedge funds found their funds in LEH frozen and they consequently shifted out of other stand alone brokers &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Murph</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115096</link>
		<dc:creator>Murph</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 13:11:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/12/on-the-precipice/#comment-115096</guid>
		<description>Brad - &quot;Emergency Economic Stabilization Act&quot; is TARP&#039;s new name.  We need more letters for our financial Scrabble boards.. I lost count at TSLF, TAF, etc., etc...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brad &#8211; &#8220;Emergency Economic Stabilization Act&#8221; is TARP&#8217;s new name.  We need more letters for our financial Scrabble boards.. I lost count at TSLF, TAF, etc., etc&#8230;</p>
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