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	<title>Comments on: Very true &#8212; &#8220;The globalization of the credit crunch&#8221; has produced a series of currency crises in the emerging world</title>
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		<title>By: JSharap</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-119501</link>
		<dc:creator>JSharap</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 22:19:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-119501</guid>
		<description>Brad,

There is a rumor that China is planning to devalue the Yuan by as much as 30% within days!

Source:

http://www.tickerforum.org/cgi-ticker/akcs-www?post=74052&amp;findnew#new</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brad,</p>
<p>There is a rumor that China is planning to devalue the Yuan by as much as 30% within days!</p>
<p>Source:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tickerforum.org/cgi-ticker/akcs-www?post=74052&amp;findnew#new" rel="nofollow">http://www.tickerforum.org/cgi-ticker/akcs-www?post=74052&amp;findnew#new</a></p>
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		<title>By: df</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116384</link>
		<dc:creator>df</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 10:03:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116384</guid>
		<description>It s hard for me to be surprised when everything is happening as it has in the past and as it should. 
All this was expected, it may be happening a bit faster then expected, but hey ... We ve been waiting so long for imbalances to be fixed for market to come back to reality ... It s no surprise adjustment goes faster when it has been delayed for so long.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It s hard for me to be surprised when everything is happening as it has in the past and as it should.<br />
All this was expected, it may be happening a bit faster then expected, but hey &#8230; We ve been waiting so long for imbalances to be fixed for market to come back to reality &#8230; It s no surprise adjustment goes faster when it has been delayed for so long.</p>
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		<title>By: Judy Yeo</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116148</link>
		<dc:creator>Judy Yeo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Oct 2008 10:53:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116148</guid>
		<description>ttnk and Gregor Neumann

as far as emerging economies go, the bets (and earliest profits) are always on &quot;potential&quot;- what is already fully developed isn&#039;t potential anymore, it&#039;s part of profits reported which ultimately attract the later investors/bettors. Iguess the easiest way to see this is the very &quot;industry&quot; of venture capitalism - if it works out, it&#039;s profitable. if it doesn&#039;t work out, it&#039;s a loss.

mind you, not saying that India doesn&#039;t have problems; it has a huge array of problems, not least social, economic and political . Then again, so does China, to different extents of course. the question is can India emerge stronger from this crisis the way China had from 97/98. Will they take the opportunity to create a miracle?

2fish
nice invective against foreign loans and capital but does it ever work ? how much organic growth has there really been in China? The biggest question re: Korea is why? particularly after its horrendous experience in 97/98?


BTW, that korea and india comment and question in earlier posts werev made before the collapse yesterday, maybe that answered questions and vindicated answers - I&#039;m still as dumb as ever unfortunately and not afraid to admit my dumbness!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>ttnk and Gregor Neumann</p>
<p>as far as emerging economies go, the bets (and earliest profits) are always on &#8220;potential&#8221;- what is already fully developed isn&#8217;t potential anymore, it&#8217;s part of profits reported which ultimately attract the later investors/bettors. Iguess the easiest way to see this is the very &#8220;industry&#8221; of venture capitalism &#8211; if it works out, it&#8217;s profitable. if it doesn&#8217;t work out, it&#8217;s a loss.</p>
<p>mind you, not saying that India doesn&#8217;t have problems; it has a huge array of problems, not least social, economic and political . Then again, so does China, to different extents of course. the question is can India emerge stronger from this crisis the way China had from 97/98. Will they take the opportunity to create a miracle?</p>
<p>2fish<br />
nice invective against foreign loans and capital but does it ever work ? how much organic growth has there really been in China? The biggest question re: Korea is why? particularly after its horrendous experience in 97/98?</p>
<p>BTW, that korea and india comment and question in earlier posts werev made before the collapse yesterday, maybe that answered questions and vindicated answers &#8211; I&#8217;m still as dumb as ever unfortunately and not afraid to admit my dumbness!</p>
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		<title>By: Soxfan</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116111</link>
		<dc:creator>Soxfan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Oct 2008 00:25:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116111</guid>
		<description>I&#039;m in FX sales at a top 5 fx bank, and I cover a number of institutional clients who are heavily involved in emerging markets.  On the whole, the investment community has not sold a FRACTION of its holding of EM paper.  That process is in its infancy.  

To date, the carnage in EMFX is largely the result of the global liquidity squeeze, as the world&#039;s ability to fund Dollar assets and service Dollar debts has gone to zero.  

Note what happened in Brazil yesterday.  USDBRL opened limit up on the local futures, trading around 2.52.  The Brazilian central bank then announced the initiation of a $50bn (25% of their outstanding reserves) program of providing fx swaps to locals.  The mechanism is a simple fx swa,p whereby the BCB will sell USD for spot settlement to locals, buying BRL, and simultaneously buy back those dollars for settlement at some future date.  Nobody&#039;s actual FX exposure has changed in this trade, but the locals have use of the Dollars for the term of the swap.  USDBRL fell over 10% from the highs on the news, which to me is pretty good evidence these moves are not about FX exposure at all, but are instead rooted in teh global dearth of Dollar liquidity.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m in FX sales at a top 5 fx bank, and I cover a number of institutional clients who are heavily involved in emerging markets.  On the whole, the investment community has not sold a FRACTION of its holding of EM paper.  That process is in its infancy.  </p>
<p>To date, the carnage in EMFX is largely the result of the global liquidity squeeze, as the world&#8217;s ability to fund Dollar assets and service Dollar debts has gone to zero.  </p>
<p>Note what happened in Brazil yesterday.  USDBRL opened limit up on the local futures, trading around 2.52.  The Brazilian central bank then announced the initiation of a $50bn (25% of their outstanding reserves) program of providing fx swaps to locals.  The mechanism is a simple fx swa,p whereby the BCB will sell USD for spot settlement to locals, buying BRL, and simultaneously buy back those dollars for settlement at some future date.  Nobody&#8217;s actual FX exposure has changed in this trade, but the locals have use of the Dollars for the term of the swap.  USDBRL fell over 10% from the highs on the news, which to me is pretty good evidence these moves are not about FX exposure at all, but are instead rooted in teh global dearth of Dollar liquidity.</p>
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		<title>By: RebelEconomist</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116065</link>
		<dc:creator>RebelEconomist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 16:07:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116065</guid>
		<description>jkh,

I believe you are correct, but that is not how I think about it.  The objective of my schemes is for the US government to accommodate foreign countries’ use of the dollar in the way that is most advantageous for the US, rather than to accumulate US reserves per se.  In China’s case, their declared objective is also not to accumulate reserves, it is to maintain a currency peg.  Both of my suggestions (tax or extra debt sales) work partly by directly reducing import demand and hence the trade deficit with China (and thereby reduce their reserves accumulation), and partly by spending the extra government revenue on convertible foreign currency (and subsequently on foreign assets) to give the US a trade surplus (or at least a smaller deficit) with those countries.  If China’s real objective was to accumulate a certain amount of reserves or maintain a trade surplus of a certain value, they would presumably respond by targeting a weaker renminbi/dollar exchange rate, and the US in turn would need to buy more non-renminbi reserves to accommodate them.

Anyway, I hope you agree that both schemes would work (economically if not politically).

In passing, note that another option which I did not mention on this occasion is that the US could import more durable goods from overseas (eg German trains) rather than financial assets, in which case its current account deficit would not fall as much, but it would have more domestic assets to produce resources to service its debt held by foreign central banks.

I think the TARP is easier to understand, because in that case it is not necessary to consider different currencies and countries.  Here I think the source of confusion is that, as TARP has been regarded as a bailout, it is assumed that the assets are practically worthless so that the headline figure will indeed end up as expenditure rather than investment.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>jkh,</p>
<p>I believe you are correct, but that is not how I think about it.  The objective of my schemes is for the US government to accommodate foreign countries’ use of the dollar in the way that is most advantageous for the US, rather than to accumulate US reserves per se.  In China’s case, their declared objective is also not to accumulate reserves, it is to maintain a currency peg.  Both of my suggestions (tax or extra debt sales) work partly by directly reducing import demand and hence the trade deficit with China (and thereby reduce their reserves accumulation), and partly by spending the extra government revenue on convertible foreign currency (and subsequently on foreign assets) to give the US a trade surplus (or at least a smaller deficit) with those countries.  If China’s real objective was to accumulate a certain amount of reserves or maintain a trade surplus of a certain value, they would presumably respond by targeting a weaker renminbi/dollar exchange rate, and the US in turn would need to buy more non-renminbi reserves to accommodate them.</p>
<p>Anyway, I hope you agree that both schemes would work (economically if not politically).</p>
<p>In passing, note that another option which I did not mention on this occasion is that the US could import more durable goods from overseas (eg German trains) rather than financial assets, in which case its current account deficit would not fall as much, but it would have more domestic assets to produce resources to service its debt held by foreign central banks.</p>
<p>I think the TARP is easier to understand, because in that case it is not necessary to consider different currencies and countries.  Here I think the source of confusion is that, as TARP has been regarded as a bailout, it is assumed that the assets are practically worthless so that the headline figure will indeed end up as expenditure rather than investment.</p>
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		<title>By: LB</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116057</link>
		<dc:creator>LB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 14:31:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116057</guid>
		<description>2fish -- anyway to know the amount of new CDS contracts on various underlying instruments initiated in the last month?

if not, harbor a guess?

do you think there has been any CDS market in Agencies and/or Treasuries?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2fish &#8212; anyway to know the amount of new CDS contracts on various underlying instruments initiated in the last month?</p>
<p>if not, harbor a guess?</p>
<p>do you think there has been any CDS market in Agencies and/or Treasuries?</p>
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		<title>By: LB</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116055</link>
		<dc:creator>LB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 14:17:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116055</guid>
		<description>satish:  &quot;...because imf has only 200bn but the rescue requires atleast 300bn dollars for the rescue.&quot;

since moldbug&#039;s not here, thought i&#039;d throw this out.

is the only way to fund the IMF at this point is through selling their a chunk of their gold reserves?

would china be a likely and/or willing buyer?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>satish:  &#8220;&#8230;because imf has only 200bn but the rescue requires atleast 300bn dollars for the rescue.&#8221;</p>
<p>since moldbug&#8217;s not here, thought i&#8217;d throw this out.</p>
<p>is the only way to fund the IMF at this point is through selling their a chunk of their gold reserves?</p>
<p>would china be a likely and/or willing buyer?</p>
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		<title>By: Chidambaram</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116052</link>
		<dc:creator>Chidambaram</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 14:10:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116052</guid>
		<description>Twofish:
I agree with you that &#039;there&#039;s little chance of X&#039; is not a ‘good enough’ investment strategy.
The total ‘brick and mortar’ loss, coming from a bank’s loss due to a foreclosed home, can’t possibly be more than around $ 200 b so far.  Treasury is already sitting on a $700 b bailout. 
The reason financial institutions are suffering much bigger losses is because the notional principal on a credit default swap (CDS) is not tied to that on the underlying loan, or ‘referenced liability’. 
The ‘credit crisis’ is a result of FIs not having adequate capital to meet their CDS settlement related obligations, which are mostly obligations amongst themselves.
This ‘notional crisis’ is already thawing, and soon markets will be back to normal.
I believe in simple examples which can make points very clear, so let&#039;s embark on one.
Bank A lends $300,000/= to ‘Risky Borrower’ B on a house. 
Then Bank A goes and buys protection for $300,000/= from Hedge Fund F by going long in a CDS. 
Hedge Fund F then trades the CDS out to Investment Bank I. I trades it out to Bank C, and so on and so forth.
Many people get to know about this transaction and many new CDS contracts come into the market, referencing the same loan, and get traded around. 
Soon what you have is a situation where the loan principal o/s is the same $300,000 whereas the notional principal o/s on CDS contracts related to the same loan is closer to around, say, $5 million. 
Borrower B defaults, and the original Bank A recovers 20% less than the loan, so that Bank A&#039;s loss is $60,000. 
But because other institutions are short in CDS contracts on the same loan, the losses to them will be 20% of $ 5 million, which is $1 m.
They can&#039;t honor this obligation because they never had capital adequacy to go short in the CDS to begin with. 
In the melee, everyone starts mistrusting everyone else, among the FIs, and stops normal lending to one another to see how this situation gets sorted out. They also tighten their norms in lending to customers.
The amplification of ‘brick and mortar’ losses of only $60,000 through CDS o/s in this example throws the financial system into losses of $1,000,000. 
But we have to remember that the $60,000 in brick and mortar losses is now sitting in the pockets of real world traders of goods and services;
whereas the $1,000,000 CDS loss is also an immediate CDS gain for another financial institution.
The total o/s CDS principal is more than $40 trillion. It’s difficult to estimate the loss to FIs from CDS settlements, but however large this is, it’s going to reflect immediately as a gain in another FI’s books.
Going forward:
OFHEO data shows that the monthly percentage decrease in home prices is already decreasing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Twofish:<br />
I agree with you that &#8216;there&#8217;s little chance of X&#8217; is not a ‘good enough’ investment strategy.<br />
The total ‘brick and mortar’ loss, coming from a bank’s loss due to a foreclosed home, can’t possibly be more than around $ 200 b so far.  Treasury is already sitting on a $700 b bailout.<br />
The reason financial institutions are suffering much bigger losses is because the notional principal on a credit default swap (CDS) is not tied to that on the underlying loan, or ‘referenced liability’.<br />
The ‘credit crisis’ is a result of FIs not having adequate capital to meet their CDS settlement related obligations, which are mostly obligations amongst themselves.<br />
This ‘notional crisis’ is already thawing, and soon markets will be back to normal.<br />
I believe in simple examples which can make points very clear, so let&#8217;s embark on one.<br />
Bank A lends $300,000/= to ‘Risky Borrower’ B on a house.<br />
Then Bank A goes and buys protection for $300,000/= from Hedge Fund F by going long in a CDS.<br />
Hedge Fund F then trades the CDS out to Investment Bank I. I trades it out to Bank C, and so on and so forth.<br />
Many people get to know about this transaction and many new CDS contracts come into the market, referencing the same loan, and get traded around.<br />
Soon what you have is a situation where the loan principal o/s is the same $300,000 whereas the notional principal o/s on CDS contracts related to the same loan is closer to around, say, $5 million.<br />
Borrower B defaults, and the original Bank A recovers 20% less than the loan, so that Bank A&#8217;s loss is $60,000.<br />
But because other institutions are short in CDS contracts on the same loan, the losses to them will be 20% of $ 5 million, which is $1 m.<br />
They can&#8217;t honor this obligation because they never had capital adequacy to go short in the CDS to begin with.<br />
In the melee, everyone starts mistrusting everyone else, among the FIs, and stops normal lending to one another to see how this situation gets sorted out. They also tighten their norms in lending to customers.<br />
The amplification of ‘brick and mortar’ losses of only $60,000 through CDS o/s in this example throws the financial system into losses of $1,000,000.<br />
But we have to remember that the $60,000 in brick and mortar losses is now sitting in the pockets of real world traders of goods and services;<br />
whereas the $1,000,000 CDS loss is also an immediate CDS gain for another financial institution.<br />
The total o/s CDS principal is more than $40 trillion. It’s difficult to estimate the loss to FIs from CDS settlements, but however large this is, it’s going to reflect immediately as a gain in another FI’s books.<br />
Going forward:<br />
OFHEO data shows that the monthly percentage decrease in home prices is already decreasing.</p>
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		<title>By: ttnk</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116051</link>
		<dc:creator>ttnk</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 14:08:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116051</guid>
		<description>To summarize this particular (detachment’s phase in progress) “fractal dimension”; 
1. SDRs aren’t that special anymore;
2. Thank you doves for understanding and 
3. Thanks, fairies, for the ride. For now.

Guess who’s going to be importing a lot? How’s that for “architecture”?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To summarize this particular (detachment’s phase in progress) “fractal dimension”;<br />
1. SDRs aren’t that special anymore;<br />
2. Thank you doves for understanding and<br />
3. Thanks, fairies, for the ride. For now.</p>
<p>Guess who’s going to be importing a lot? How’s that for “architecture”?</p>
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		<title>By: DJC</title>
		<link>http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/23/very-true/#comment-116048</link>
		<dc:creator>DJC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 13:42:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/?p=3925#comment-116048</guid>
		<description>East Asia to establish 80-bln-dlr fund to cope with the financial crisis 
 
http://www.sinodaily.com/2006/081024095652.8d53hio1.html 
 
China, Japan and 11 other Asian nations agreed Friday on an 80-billion-dollar war chest to save beleaguered currencies in the most ambitious regional plan yet to cope with the financial crisis. 
&quot;We plan with our East Asia dialogue partners to launch (the fund) as soon as possible,&quot; said Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, one of the 13 nations planning to take part in the fund. 
 
Earlier in the day, Chinese and Japanese leaders reached consensus on the plan with their counterparts from South Korea and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>East Asia to establish 80-bln-dlr fund to cope with the financial crisis </p>
<p><a href="http://www.sinodaily.com/2006/081024095652.8d53hio1.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.sinodaily.com/2006/081024095652.8d53hio1.html</a> </p>
<p>China, Japan and 11 other Asian nations agreed Friday on an 80-billion-dollar war chest to save beleaguered currencies in the most ambitious regional plan yet to cope with the financial crisis.<br />
&#8220;We plan with our East Asia dialogue partners to launch (the fund) as soon as possible,&#8221; said Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, one of the 13 nations planning to take part in the fund. </p>
<p>Earlier in the day, Chinese and Japanese leaders reached consensus on the plan with their counterparts from South Korea and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).</p>
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