Sovereign loss funds …
Ok, my title is a more-than-a-bit unfair.
But sovereign wealth funds are fundamentally vehicles for investing central bank reserves — or Treasury reserves from surplus oil revenue — in equities and real estate rather than in classic reserve assets. And this year classic reserve assets have done rather well. Equities and real estate have not.
The likely result has been large losses. Most sovereign funds remain, despite the efforts of Ted Truman, the US Treasury and the IMF, remain rather secretive, so we don’t know for sure. But it is hard to see how a large sovereign fund could have done well this year.
Take a large fund oil fund, one that started 2007 with maybe $500 billion.
– Say 60% of the fund was invested in equities. The fund started the year with $300 billion in equities, and probably ended the year with $150-$180 billion. Equities globally are down between 40% and 50% in dollar terms.
– Say 20% of the fund was invested in real estate, hedge funds and private equities. The fund started the year with $100 billion in “alternatives” and probably ended the year with between $60 and $80 billion. It is hard to tell exactly, as many “alternative” assets aren’t traded in liquid markets, though the fact that some endowments are trying to sell their limited parnerships in private equity funds at large discounts suggests that if these assets were marked to market, they would be down.
– Say 20% of the fund was invested in government bonds. Setting aside exchange rate moves, they held their value. For simplicity’s stake, let’s say $100 billion remained $100 billion (say mark to market gains on long-term treasuries offset any slide the dollar value of euro-denominated bonds).
The fund would have ended the year with between $310 billion and $360 billion.
Even if the fund received $50 billion from high oil prices (and kept the entire $50 billion in cash, avoiding any losses over the course of the year), it would end the year with between $360 and $410 billion.
This fund, of course, is fictional. But it is meant to capture the dynamics of a fund like the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.
No one knows how much ADIA manages, though it clearly doesn’t have the $800 billion some claimed. Abu Dhabi’s ruling sheik has said as much. The IIF put ADIA’s assets at around $350 billion in June 2008 (before the sell off); SAMBA put ADIA at around $450 billion before the sell-off. Rachel Ziemba and I are working on a model that suggests that if ADIA had $150 billion at the end of $200, it would have risen to around $450 billion at the end of 2007. I have enough confidence in the model to think that if the starting number is right (a huge if), we probably aren’t off by more than $50-100 billion in either way — at least so long as ADIA has generated close to market returns on a portfolio that has a lot of equity market exposure.
The Setser/ Ziemba model (which we will be publishing soon as part of a broader paper on the Gulf’s funds) implies that if ADIA’s equity, real estate and private equity portfolio is marked to a (harsh) secondary market price, ADIA (really ADIA and ADIC, as ADIC was spun off from ADIA back when Abu Dhabi was flush) might have as little as $300 billion in foreign assets now. And probably no more than $350 billion.
Remember, ADIA is widely thought to have had between 55-70% of its portfolios in equities, with a substantial chuck in emerging market equities. Stanley Reed of Business Week reports:
While ADIA won’t disclose its total assets or precise allocations, officials at the fund, which is a sophisticated investor knowledgeable about the whole gamut of asset classes, earlier this year provided visiting BusinessWeek reporters with documents showing that the fund’s benchmarks called for having 55% to 71% of its portfolio invested in equities and a further 12% to 28% in so-called alternatives: real estate, hedge funds, and private equity.
The Kuwait Investment Authority had around $265b at the end of March 2008 — a total that includes some domestic investments. Its foreign portfolio is probably now down to $200-225 billion — though much depends on how aggressively the KIA moved to emulate ADIA’s portfolio over the past few years and thus the extent of its exposure to the fall in equities and real estate.
The Qatar Investment Authority has taken large losses on its portfolio — which is much less diversified than the portfolios of the KIA and ADIA. But Qatar has a tiny population and a lot of gas revenue from newly developed fields, so it generates lots of cash — and that cash inflow made up for most losses. It probably ended the year with $60 billion.
Sum that up and the big Gulf funds likely have a portfolio that is closer to $600 billion than to a $1 trillion now. I have left out Oman (whose fund is small) and Dubai (which will likely need to sell its external assets to raise cash to cover its external debts).
The Saudis –whose conservative portfolio did well this year — have about $500 billion in disclosed assets. $32 billion of reserves, $412 billion of non-reserve foreign assets and another $67 billion or so of foreign assets that the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency seems to manage for the government pension funds (see SAMA’s bulletin, table 8a, memorandum items, independent organizations). And then throw in $85 billion in central bank reserves in the other GCC countries (a total that is a bit dated, it is probably lower now)
All told, that leaves the GCC governments with a bit over a trillion dollars (say $1.1 to $1.2 trillion) in foreign assets by my count.
This is still a huge sum for a region with only 40 million or so native born inhabitants. But it is somewhat smaller than the numbers that were circulating not so long ago.
The “somewhat over $1 trillion” total leaves aside the no doubt substantial private assets of the region’s ruling families. It also leaving aside the now substantial debts of many of the region’s private (or quasi-private) firms, as well as their foreign assets.
This analysis has another corollary: the large sovereign wealth funds have a rather less than many estimate. Here is my (rough) math:
ADIA/ ADIC: $350 billion
KIA: $200 billion — we should know better in April.
QIA: $60-70 billion.
Norway’s government fund: $308 billion (end November data, down from $400 billion at its peak)
Temasek: around $70 in foreign assets before the market meltdown, no doubt much less now.
Singapore’s GIC: $200 billion, though I don’t have a great deal of confidence in this estimate. The GIC manages a substantial chunk of Singapore’s foreign exchange reserves ($165 billion) as well as Singapore’s accumulated fiscal surplus and some pension fund assets.
China Investment Corporation (CIC): $100 billion — counting only its foreign assets and ignoring any mark to market losses on Blackstone and Morgan Stanley. Or $200-300 billion if the CIC and the foreign assets China’s state banks (which the CIC owns) effectively manage for the CIC — as these are funds that the banks received as a result of their recapitalization — are aggregated together. But only a small fraction of that has been invested in equities and similar assets. The CIC claims to be 90% in cash — and China’s state banks mainly hold debt securities.
Korea Investment Corporation: $30 billion (The KIC’s web sitereports that it manages $17 billion in foreign exchange reserves and $3 billion from the Treasury — but the web site doesn’t look to have been updated for the additional $10 billion the KIC received earlier this year). That sets aside the losses on the KIC’s investment in Merrill. And that isn’t likely to grow soon — not when Korea need cash.
All told, I get a total in the $1.3 to $1.5 trillion range for the large funds with substantial foreign equity investments. That total leaves out a host of smaller funds with some external exposure — as well as a lot of funds that are managed by central banks that some count as sovereign funds (see Truman for a comprehensive list)
That’s down substantially for the year, as one would expect. And perhaps as importantly, it is down relative to the world’s traditional foreign exchange reserves, which now — counting SAMA’s non-reserve foreign assets as part of reserves — exceed $7 trillion.
So much for forecasts that sovereign funds would emerge as huge forces in global markets, and would provide permanent support for risks assets. If oil stays at its current level — and China doesn’t add to its sovereign fund — I have a hard time seeing how sovereign funds reach $2 trillion anytime soon, let alone a much larger number.
A lot though hinges on the definition of what constitutes a sovereign fund.
If SAMA and Russia’s stabilization and future fund are counted as sovereign funds even though their portfolios that are closer to classic central bank reserve portfolios, it is easy to push up the total assets of sovereign funds.
Conversely, some large central banks that invest primarily in bonds and other assets with limited credit risk have (or perhaps had) substantial equity portfolios.
It is possible, for example, that both SAMA had around $60 billion in foreign equity investments (if not more) and SAFE had about $100 billion invested in global equities before the market crashed. That would be about 20% of SAMA’s securities portfolio in July* and 5% of SAFE’s portfolio. Any assessment of the impact of sovereign investors on the market should take into the investments that some large central banks made in risk assets.
But it isn’t obvious that central banks will have as much appetite for these assets in the future as they had in 2007. If SAFE put $100 billion into global equities (5% of its portfolio) and if it marks that portion of its portfolio to market, it has a lot less than $100 billion now —
* SAMA was thought to have had about 20% of its portfolio in equities. At the end of June 2008, it had $297 billion in securities in its portfolio. If 20% of those had been in equities, it would have had about $60. Some thought it had a higher equity share. It is a little hard though, to reconcile a higher equity share with the subsequent strong growth in SAMA’s total assets. Since the end of June, SAMA’s deposits are up by $46b and its securities holdings are up $16b — a $62 billion increase through the end of October. Either the Saudis got even more money from high oil than I anticipated, offsetting equity market losses — or they had a smaller equity portfolio. There are still plenty of mysteries in the Gulf …
This is an eye opener. Obviously, I have a lot to learn. I was presuming that the SWFs were a relatively new phenomena and that they had only recently started tip toeing into more risky assets, and by risk assets I presumed agency securities. I was assuming that the equity holdings of SWFs would average 01-15% with a max of 25%.
Thanks for this important lesson.
tyaresun — you have described central banks rather than sovereign funds. most central banks that tip-toed into equities have less than 10% of their portfolio in equities.
a fairly conservative SWF like Norway used to have 40% of its portfolio in equities and 60% in bonds. it though is in the process of moving toward 60% equities/ 40% bonds — i think it is now around 50/50. More aggressive funds (ADIA, GIC supposedly) would long have been around 60% in equities, and recently have been increasingly their allocation toward alternatives. The KIA was fairly conservative before 2004, but it supposedly has increased its allocation toward riskier assets recently. I don’t have a good sense though of how far along in that process it got …
finally, there are fiscal stabilization funds that are often counted among sovereign funds that are very conservative, and effectively managed like central bank reserves.
bottom line: it is hard to generalize …
Brad,
Have you checked out what information the IRS has on Sovereign Wealth Funds? They could probably give a pretty accurate accounting since, as a fellow-government courtesy, the US exempts foreign governments from paying taxes on dividends and interest owned in the United States.
By the way, in a commentary about two years ago (It’s a Wonderful Life revisited: Morgan Stanley just sold out to Potter), we strongly recommended that the US end this foolish tax loophole since foreign central banks hold huge investments in the US while the Fed has almost no investments abroad.
By the way, when the Fed finally starts defending American industry from mercantilist attack, it will buy foreign government bonds whenever foreign central banks buy our assets. In the case of China, they will have to start their own Sovereign Wealth Fund since China does not let foreigners buy Chinese government bonds.
Howard Richman
http://www.tradeandtaxes.blogspot.com
Very interesting. Thank you.
The line about propping up an asset value jumped out at me. I think that’s an interesting discussion. We wonder about Keynesian stimulus and so the idea that SWF could change the game in bade times is striking. I’ve long felt that maintaing an asset’s value against the market for that class is like trying to stem the tide. (I’m excluding the easy cases where the market allows the usual efforts to prop up value.)
That said, are funds invested in great speculative ventures like Dubai? Not counting Dubai’s own money. I ask because the IMHO unfounded optimism from there means they may be marking high. Is anyone in Dubai working on something not connected to real estate related deals? (Other than the port, which doesn’t in any way support the overall activity.)
Thanks again.
Poyalis Bonds!
Although all Latin American bonds were
risky investments in the 1820s, European
investors’ interest was so high and information
so sketchy that even a fictitious
country, Poyais, managed to place bonds.
In 1823, a Scottish swindler, Gregor Mac-
Gregor, claiming to be the “Cazique” of
Poyais, described a thriving European colony
in Central America endowed with rich
gold mines. He managed to issue bonds,
exchange Poyaisian dollars for pounds sterling,
and even encourage immigration to the
alleged settlement.
Of course, the attempted colonists did
not find the capital city of “Saint Joseph” or
the rich gold mines while trekking through
a plague-infested, isolated tract of jungle.
MacGregor sold similar certificates and other
Poyaisian material in both Britain and France
during the 1820s and 1830s. Despite the evident
fraud, he was never convicted of any
crime and eventually retired to Venezuela.
Source: Scottish Executive News (2004).
Brad,
It is hard to fault your example. However it assumes that the people at ADIA (or similar funds) behaved like your run of the mill US or European Zombie pension fund, while there were fantastic opportunities to make money on the downside. No one knows (except people autorized to know, of course who will not comment) what ADIA or something similar (KIC, GIC, etc) did. But I do not expect that these people would have been as bureaucratically contstrained as well as brain dead as your average pension fund. Panic, crises and manias ( perhaps I got mr Kindleberger’s carefully selected order wrong here) are the moment par excellence to create exceptional returns, assuming one starts the down cycle with a substantial cash position. Where do you think these cash positions were 9 months ago?
I would not worry about the ADIAs of this world, save your ammunition for the experts at Calpers.. Well, of course, off limits for the CFR.
[...] Sovereign loss funds … (Setser) [...]
@ Brad
It’s worth pointing out that the diversification of sovereign reserves into equities and commodities was not intended to produce short run returns alone. The aim was to diversify from the concentration risk of holding large amounts of US dollar denominated debt at a time when the Fed’s monetary laxity saw M3 expanding by up to 18 percent annually and the US government debt doubling in just the eight years of the George W Bush administration. Equities and commodities will look damn good if the dollar collapses in hyperinflation or the US defaults/renegotiates its debt burden at a future date. I wouldn’t rule out either given the lawlessness, extravagance and arrogance of recent US administrations. I sure don’t blame anyone in Asia or the Middle East for being cautious and trying to diversify out of fiat currencies overseen by irresponsible monetary and fiscal authorities.
Good stuff.
You´ve exploded yet another economic thought bubble – the SWF version of Dow 35,000.
@ London Banker: There’s an interesting thought that there’s a group of people who work to balance power and keep sovereigns in check; with the objective being to establish peace. The only way to control a sovereign is:
1) get the sovereign into deep debts in return for monopolies and concessions. specifically a monopoly on money and credit.
2) balance the power of that sovereign by funding and expanding other sovereigns. If either of the sovereigns default or withdraw the concessions, the other one can be provoked into diplomatic threats or outright war.
brad-
can you do an article on where emerging markets have invested their reserves.
for eg india has 250 bn dollars but only 20bn in us treasuries. where are rest of reserves locked up.can you bring about detailed information on those stats so that we can find
what are the useful reserves available for defending the currencies.
“[The] Bank of the United States… is one of the most deadly hostility existing, against the principles and form of our Constitution… An institution like this, penetrating by its branches every part of the Union, acting by command and in phalanx, may, in a critical moment, upset the government. I deem no government safe which is under the vassalage of any self-constituted authorities, or any other authority than that of the nation, or its regular functionaries. What an obstruction could not this bank of the United States, with all its branch banks, be in time of war! It might dictate to us the peace we should accept, or withdraw its aids. Ought we then to give further growth to an institution so powerful, so hostile?” –Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 1803. ME 10:437
The sovreign wealth funds have smaller figures in their bottom lines, like most eveyone’s balance sheets(even Warren Bufffet has probably ‘lost’ something). However. it is quite possible that the sovreign wealth funds’ share of total world assets has actually increased. They probably had relatively light exposure to the most risky assets (Madoff apart).
So the SWFs feel poorer for the moment, but could actually be richer, on a longer term focus, following the crash.
Sovereign Wealth Funds duped by the Biggest Ponzi Scam in World History
http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/12/ponzi_nation.html
Wall Street trader Bernard Madoff allegedly defrauds the rich and famous out of tens of billions of dollars. Minnesota businessman Tom Petters allegedly fleeces hedge funds out of $3.5 billion. And socialite New York lawyer Marc Dreier may have duped some hedge funds into giving him hundreds of millions of dollars for an apparently bogus real estate scheme.
All of these scams are big and all appear to be some kind of Ponzi scheme, designed to take in money from new investors to pay-off earlier investors. A Ponzi scheme is one of the oldest financial frauds around. And many are referring to the Madoff caper as the biggest Wall Street Ponzi fraud ever.
But derivatives consultant Janet Tavakoli may be onto something. In a note to her clients, she says the biggest Ponzi scheme of all may be the one that brought the world financial markets to its knees. And that’s the scheme that united Wall Street bankers with mortgage lenders in a bid to funnel more and more money into the market for supbrime homes loans. She says the packaging of iffy home loans into securitized bonds that could be sold to insitutional investors—many of them relying on borrowed money—was a system born to fail.
“The largest Ponzi scheme in the history of the capital markets is the relationship between failed mortgage lenders and investment banks that securitized the risky overpriced loans and sold these packages to other investors—a Ponzi scheme by every definition applied to Madoff,” says Tavakoli. “These and other related deeds led to the largest global credit meltdown in the history of the world.”
One thing the credit crunch is unearthing are lots of long running scams. Just as money has dried up for legitimate businesses, there’s no money to keep the Ponzi machine going.
David Heigham — I would say your description of the relative shift applies more to central banks/ others with conservative portfolios than sov. funds, which tended to have a fairly significant exposure to risk assets.
Rien — my sense is that ADIA wasn’t all that liquid 9ms ago, at least not immediately after their investment in Citi. They likely built up liquidity over the summer (see Landon Thomas of the NYT). But since then demands on their liquidity have increased:
a) PE firms made capital calls
b) ADIA likely had to put funds into the domestic banking system to provide it with liquidity
c) ADIA anticipates providing cash for the dubai bailout next year/ perhaps helping to finance the new museums and the like.
Moreover, a decent chunk of Abu Dhabi’s oil revenue was going into the smaller more aggressive more leveraged more economically development minded Abu Dhabi funds. The net result is that I am not sure ADIA had a lot of cash to deploy opportunistically. It could sell some of its index funds, but well, that means realizing losses …
@ Brad:
Don’t you think that it makes sense from a public policy perspective for emerging markets to hold foreign claims?
The treasury holdings aren’t yielding much, and the high risk equity portfolios of the wealth funds can cause huge losses for what is ultimately a public asset. Holding foreign claims and also re badging the current SWF and SAFE personnel accordingly might help them contribute to preserving the value of the forex reserves. Also investments can be made by the depository institutions with a normal fee and this will help avoid bureaucratic negotiations in the FDI route for these investments. Foreign claims right now can yield much better returns for China and other emerging markets.
Secondly amending the FDI laws in emerging markets would be very useful in promoting higher employment through increased non debt creating capital flows to high growth sectors such as telecommunications.
Thirdly amending tax laws for charitable institutions can contribute to promoting social development goals for the interior in the emerging markets.
It would be useful to know your views on these.
[...] Loss Funds: Council of Foreign Relations blog tries to model Abu Dhabi and other SWF losses. “So much for forecasts that sovereign funds would emerge as a huge forces in global [...]
i approve of the quote from DJC above – in fact i would go a step further :
madoff’s ponzi scheme should be rescued by assistance from the bailout funds.
(a) it is too big to fail, and if allowed to collapse it will bring down others including several charities that have done nothing wrong.
(b) if this raises problems of ‘moral hazard’ these should take second place to rescuing the system. actions already taken by paulson show that moral considerations have to take a back seat when the amounts at risk are sufficiently large.
(c) illegality ? there is just time for bush to grant a presidential pardon to madoff before the changeover.
(off topic : i believe that for reasons of security any ex-presidential lecture tours will be delivered entirely in mosques . . . . where shoes are left at the door.)
Well, SWF are down 50%. But compared to other market players ?
My theory, is that SWF have relatively strengthened as a large and liquid
potential buyer.
Leveraged hedgies PE are
completely gone as a liquid buyers.
Private investors are on the floor and
racing for the exits.
Investment banks are deleveraging and
no longer securitizing.
Which leaves us with centeral banks, which
are busy playing with monopoly money.
Your thoughts ???
Brad,
No one knows what ADIA does or holds. But my point was simply that most likely, ADIA and its ilk had more opportunity (assuming the availability of funds of course) to mke money in the extraordinarily interesting bear market than typical pension funds.
Which does not say that I look at exceptional returns in reasonably efficient markets more as a matter of luck The statement is tautological of course). The point is to what extent were these markets efficient. The bigger the fund, the less chance to benefit, but the less able the manager as an information gatherer (in whatever way) the less able to benefit from extraordinary markets with lengthy unwinding processes laced with sensational, but not surprising news. In a macro world where the “good” news (whatever makes longs happy) is scarce and largely implausible, market efficiency suffers and opportunities arise, but, indeed, only for those with the means and ability to take positions. Bureaucrats (pension funds, western CB officials under any name) make poor gamblers so expect them to get skinned when the games they (must) play escape the zone of efficiency and probity that they rely on. That leaves a lot of money to be made by others. If not ADIA, then someone else.
Rien — I would guess that ADIA hasn’t been in a position to profit from all this, but it is just a guess.
Just a theory. Central banks are the ones sitting on cash — but the latest TIC data leaves no doubt that they are sitting on it, not taking risk. They too are bureaucratic players, and anyone who advocated taking risks recently is eating crow. China bought close to $50b in s-term treasuries and another $10-20b in long-term Treasuries (depending on how much of the UK flow is really a chinese flow) in October, and they have the most spare ammunition of anyone.
Right now though their flows are driven by past losses — including the CIC’s losses on the reserve primary fund. And you can imagine what would have happened if they had invested in Madoff’s funds ..
[...] Wealth Funds = Sovereign Loss Funds…For Now. Here’s an excellent post from Brad Sester’s blog “Follow the Money” from the Council on [...]
aww, brad, they probably did in some form, after all most of the “smart” banks did invest in madoff, this isn’t a comment on their “smarts” as the times has reminded its readers
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/daniel_finkelstein/article5348653.ece
in fact, didn’t spielberg have some exposure too? boy, in such times you really got to wonder if the old boys club atmosphere of banking has really taken on new aspects?
As someone who knows a little (not a lot) about how these SWF are invested, they are no better than the typical US public pension plan. Except for the Saudis, which have a Swiss mentality about investing, they have 50% or more in equity and had been upping their hedge fund and private equity allocations for several years. The Middle Eastern ones are headed by connected family members and, since these are shame and honor societies, the goal is to reach consensus and keep egregious mistakes hidden. Westerners are hired to make most of the investment decisions–there simply aren’t enough trained Middle Easterners to do the job. The European and Asian SWFs are more technocratic and have enough local talent to run them decently.
There is nothing special that they are doing. They are no different than any other large pot of money managed for or by a country or a US state–they have no special advantage. Size allows them to lower costs in terms of percentage of assets, but it also takes away any ability to be nimble. The end result is a lot spent on governance (which is very necessary–the worst thing that could happen would be if the money were stolen) with little to no alpha to show for it. They also have no special insight into the world.
Central banks funds are different.
Canned Heat,
Looks like you know a little more than most of us. Once again, some of these funds (ADIA used as a generic term for large money with some sovereign or ruling family flavor and managed far from the public eye) should be able to act more opportunistically than a very bureaucratic public pension fund, but of course the extent to which they do, is as unknown (except to people who know a little more). And, yes, honor and shame can be important components of their inventive structures. And of course the only visible evidence (visible from space by now) of less than conservative investment is the UAE construction site called Dubai. Anyway, I should not have brought it up..
Brad,
Point taken,(see also reply to Canned Heat)! Re Madoff, it appears that the losses (whatever they may turn out to be) are not so much losses by banks acting as principal, but as agent for their private banking clients. They may rsult from client claims and especially from loans made against Madoff collateral. Looks like the sort of money machines built out of CDO assets and money market liabilities the banks had on their own off-balancesheet balance sheets. Who knows what CIC’s subsidiaries (the state banks) my have done . Bright Sparks flying!
The following anecdote, I think, exemplifies the few years I spent having a signficant Middle-Eastern SWF as a client. Some details slightly amended to preserve the guilty.
The purchase of a high-profile leisure facility. The man we were dealing with on the transaction side admitted that, while he had not changed his job, he had been part of six different reporting lines in eighteen months. The closing meeting where the valuation professional brought in had looked at room occupancy rates, what the market would bear in terms of service charges, location of said facility, etc. and came up with a valuation in the range of, say, 50-75m. There was significant IP inherent in this facilities brand name. An IP expert at the same meeting reckoned that if every last drop of goodwill was wringed out of the worth of this name (something the current owners simply weren’t doing), this IP was worth, at most, 25m.
At the end of the meeting, the valuation expert actually had to stand up and point out, explicitly, to the SWF representatives that the price on the table was 100m. There was a polite, but conclusive, dismissal of this point. No matter how bad the investment looked (and the other side were reaming them on every single point in the transaction I was aware of), they were going to go ahead with it, come hell or high water.
fair point re: the funds of funds of some european/ swiss banks. they certainly could be managing some SWF money.
[...] brad setser says theres a good chance, if u got 500b of investment, u wld have lost 90-140 of it..hahaha..think temasek and gic! : http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/12/14/sovereign-loss-funds/ [...]
[...] политикой соответствующего суверенного фонда, но в среднем суверенные фонды инвестируют около половины…. Это объясняется тем, что несмотря на периодические [...]
I would not worry about the ADIAs of this world, save your ammunition for the experts at Calpers.. Well, of course, off limits for the CFR.