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Secrets from the Treasury’s Survey: It looks like China bought a lot of equities just before the stock market tumbled

by Brad Setser
March 1, 2009

Late on Friday, the US Treasury released the preliminary results of its annual survey of foreign portfolio investment in the US. That always makes for an interesting weekend.

The survey offers the best picture of the impact large central banks and sovereign funds have had on global financial markets. It just comes out with a long lag. And as I will argue later, it is, for all its virtues, it still paints an incomplete picture of the activities of official investors.

But it still reveals a few secrets, not the least about China.

It turns out that China bought significantly fewer Treasuries from the middle of 2007 to the middle of 2008 than I had projected – and a lot more equities. China also was – as expected – a very large buyer of Agencies (particularly mortgage backed securities with an Agency guarantee, often called “Agency pass-throughs”) from mid-2007 to mid-2008.

China consequently entered the “Lehman” crisis with a somewhat riskier portfolio than I thought. The bulk of China’s portfolio, to be sure, was in Treasuries, Agencies and comparable European bonds. But it now looks like well over 10% of SAFE’s portfolio was invested in “risk” assets of various kinds — equities and corporate bonds.

That likely explains why China reversed course and fled to safety this fall. China got burned. SAFE (not-so-SAFE?) especially.

The survey data indicates that China had $521.91 billion of long-term Treasuries at the end of June 2008 (up $53.4 billion from June 2007) and $527.05 billion of long-term Agencies at the end of June 2008 (up $150.73 b from June 2007). China consequently entered into the crisis with more exposure to the Agencies than to the Treasury.

My estimates for China’s Agency portfolio weren’t far off. In the summer of 2008, I argued China’s Agency holdings topped $500b. As Arpana Pandey and I suspected, China was buying more Agencies than showed up in the monthly TIC data. However, our estimates over-stated China’s Treasury purchases. The June 2007 survey re-attributed about 60% of the UK’s Treasury purchases to China. The June 2008 survey only re-attributed about 15% of the UK’s Treasury purchases to China.

The survey indicates China held $26.3b of US corporate bonds at the end of June 2008, down $1.3b from June 2007. Throw that number out. The TIC data indicates that China bought about $45b of corporate bonds from June 2007 to June 2008. There is a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy: China isn’t using a US custodian for its corporate bonds. And it hasn’t been using a US custodian since June 2006. Since June 2006, the survey data suggests that China has sold about $32b of long-term corporate bonds while the monthly TIC data implies about $77b of purchases …

Finally, the survey indicates that China held $99.5b of US equities at the end of June 2008, up over $70b from the end of June 2007.

That confirms a rumor I heard in the spring of 2008: China (and specifically SAFE) was a large, visible buyer of US equities. The rise in China’s equity holdings from June 07 to June 08 cannot be explained by valuation gains on China’s $30b (end-June 07) portfolio. It was new purchases.

Nor is it a direct result of the formation of the CIC. The CIC bought $3b of Blackstone (bad call; Blackstone is now down 88%) and $5b of Morgan Stanley. But that is only about $8b in total purchases. $8b isn’t $70 billion. And the CIC is now bragging that its external portfolio was mostly in cash – as it didn’t invest most of the $90 billion or so of foreign exchange that it bought off SAFE (I am setting aside the CIC’s domestic equity portfolio). Moreover, it is hard to square the CIC’s reported returns with large investments in global equities.

The big jump in China’s equity holdings in the survey therefore likely implies that SAFE bought a lot of equities from mid-2007 to mid-2008. SAFE wanted to show that it could manage a portfolio of “risk” assets, and thus there was no need to hand over more funds to the CIC. If SAFE had $80-90b of US equities in June 2008, it easily could have had about $150 billion of global equities then …

SAFE may have gotten authorization to have put more than 5% of its portfolio in equities. Given the size of SAFE’s portfolio, that meant that SAFE was one of the largest sovereign investors in US equities even thought it wasn’t formally a sovereign wealth fund. Only ADIA obviously has larger holdings of US equities.

And, well, it is quite likely that China’s $90b of equities aren’t still worth $90 billion now. In aggregate, SAFE likely took larger mark-to-market losses on its equity portfolio than the CIC took on Blackstone and Morgan Stanley.

I suspect that SAFE is still carrying its equity portfolio on its books at their purchase prices, which implies that it is sitting on a quite large loss. But I don’t have total confidence on this. SAFE supposedly reports the book not the market value of its bond portfolio, but I am not sure how it accounts for its equities. It is possible that the rise in the value of SAFE’s Treasuries helped offset the fall in the value of SAFE’s equities.

The attached chart shows the evolution of China’s portfolio over time. I have used my adjusted data series for the Treasury and agency holdings. The adjustment smooths the increase in China’s Treasury and Agency holdings associated with the survey over the course of the year so there isn’t a jump when the survey comes out. I used the sum of flows rather that the survey data to estimate China’s holdings of corporate bonds. But I haven’t smoothed China’s equity purchases (that is a project for next week … ). The “Survey” jump stands out.

The survey also tells us something about total official purchases. Official holdings of Treasuries — as expected – jumped by about $160.4b as a result of the revisions, while the UK’s holdings were revised down by $224b. Official holdings of Agencies were also revised up, with offsetting falls in the holdings of Hong Kong and the UK.

Three points here:

China’s holdings of Treasuries were revised up by a comparatively modest $32b. China consequently accounted for a relatively small share of the downward revision in the UK’s holdings. The survey also reduced the Gulf’s Treasury holdings. The Treasury portfolio of Russia was revised up by $30b or so. That is the Bank of Russia. India was revised up by $10b or so. That is the Reserve Bank of India. Japanese Treasury holdings also got revised up by close to $50b, but it isn’t clear if that is the MoF or Japanese carry traders.

— The upward revision in the official sector’s Treasury holdings was smaller than the downward revision in the UK’s holdings – or, to put it a bit differently, the survey shows an increase in private holdings of Treasuries abroad ($675b at the end of June 08 v $579b in June 07). That is quite different from 2006 and 2007. In both 2006 and 2007, official investors accounted for all the increase in the stock of Treasuries held abroad. In 2007, for example, the UK’s holdings fell $142b and official holdings rose $170b. My models, which assumed a similar pattern of revisions, consequently overestimated official purchases of Treasuries from mid-2007 to mid-2008.

— I don’t believe that there were quite as many private purchases as implied by the TIC data either. Some private holdings are likely an indirect reflection of central bank demand. I suspect that some oil exporters do not manage their entire Treasury portfolio in house. Here is one hint. The last survey that showed a lot of “private” purchases of Treasuries by foreign investors was the June 2005 survey. And during the period from June 2004 to June 2005 oil prices surged unexpectedly, delivering a large windfall to a host of oil-exporting economies. The period from June 2007 to June 2008 was also marked by an unexpected surge in oil prices. I cannot prove this, but I suspect that some of the “private” purchases of Treasuries by foreign investors implied by the June 2008 survey are an indirect reflection of the rise in the reserves of a host of oil exporting economies (Saudi Arabia, Algeria, etc)

Indeed, there is a broader puzzle in the survey data. It doesn’t seem to be capturing as high a fraction of official flows as it did in 2006 or 2007.

Some data. I apologize, but it is important for the argument. And I haven’t had time to put it into a simple graph.

From mid 2005 to mid 2006, the survey showed a $308 billion increase in official holdings of long-term bonds. The COFER data (adjusted for SAMA’s non-reserve foreign assets and the PBoC’s other foreign assets) suggests a $686b (valuation-adjusted) increase in the world’s reserves over this period. About 45% of the increase in reserves showed up in the survey.

From mid 2006 to mid 2007, the survey showed a $517 billion increase in official holdings of long-term bonds. The adjusted COFER data suggests a $1141b (valuation-adjusted) increase in the world’s reserves over this period. Again, about 45% of the increase in reserves showed up in the survey.

From mid 2007 to mid 2008, the survey showed a $449 billion increase in official holdings of long-term bonds. The adjusted COFER data suggests a $1328b (valuation-adjusted) increase in the world’s reserves over this period. About 34% of the increase in reserves showed up in the survey. (The ratio of the survey to reserve growth from mid-04 to mid 05 was 34%).

Throw in the growth in the foreign assets of the world’s sovereign funds during this period and there is a gap of over $1 trillion dollars between the growth in the world’s official assets from mid-June 2007 to mid-June 2008 and the increase in official assets in the US survey. That is a large gap.

Or to put it a bit differently, my efforts to follow the growth in sovereign money hit a dead-end in the latest survey data.

So what might be going on?

Part of the story is that some central banks, notably SAFE, bought more equities. And part of the story may well be that those central banks were diversifying out of the dollar into other currencies, whether pounds, Australian dollars or euros (another bet that hasn’t paid off in the crisis).

But even if China’s equity purchases are factored in, the increase in China’s holdings in the survey is far smaller than one would expect based on the growth in China’s foreign assets. China’s long-term holdings rose by $276b in the survey. Its short-term holdings (including bank deposits) rose by $10.5b. The roughly $286-287b rise is still small relative to China’s $726b in (estimated) foreign asset growth over this period. And that $726b estimate isn’t subject to much doubt. We know that the China’s reserves and the PBoC’s other foreign assets rose by $681b over this period, and this is also the period when funds were shifted over to the CIC.

Even if China’s $45 b for corporate debt purchases are added to the total, implied China’s purchases are in the $330-335b range – or only about 45% of the estimated growth in the foreign assets of China’s government. That either implies a lot of diversification away from the dollar from June 2007 to June 2008 – or it implies that the survey isn’t picking up all of China’s holdings.

I would bet on a bit of both. The period from June 2007 to June 2008 was marked by huge institutional changes in the way China manages its foreign assets. The state banks dollar reserve requirement (and the associated rise in China’s other foreign assets) and the formation of the CIC meant that around $300b of the total increase in China’s foreign assets didn’t come from the increase in the PBoC’s formal reserves. A plot showing the 12m change in China’s holdings (using my adjusted Treasury and Agency data, with the data updated to reflect the results of the last survey) suggests that recorded purchases have tracked the growth in China’s formal reserves more closely than the growth in China’s total foreign assets.

This is just a hunch though.

And well the same basic story applies to the Gulf and the oil exporters.

Here is one way of looking at it.

The Saudis held $354.4b of foreign securities as part of SAMA’s non-reserve foreign assets at the end of June 2008 (I am leaving out the SAMA’s $60b reported non-reserve foreign deposits and its $28b in formal reserves). Other GCC central banks reported an additional $101b in reserves – for a total of $455b of foreign assets. The survey shows the gulf held $204b of US Treasuries and Agencies ($139.6b of Treasuries and $64.6b of Agencies). That seems low for a region that pegs to the dollar – especially as the region’s central banks are widely thought to have a high dollar share of their reserves.

Just compare the Gulf central banks to Russia’s central bank. Russia’s central bank has about 45% of its reserves in dollars (see Danske bank; the stabilization funds has a lower dollar share than the rest of Russia’s reserves but the central bank manages the whole lot). It has said as much. Russia had $554.1b of reserves at the end of June 2008 (the world has changed since then!), with $359b in securities, $100.6 in deposits and $94.5b in reverse repos. This is all disclosed on the IMF’s web site. The survey shows $222.6b in Russian holdings of US debt, with $95.1b in Treasuries and $127.2b in Agencies. It all more or less lines up, unlike the data on the Gulf. $222b is a little under 50% of Russia’s securities and reverse repos.

The December TIC data incidentally suggests that Russia now holds very few Agencies. It has redeemed almost all of its $65.1b of short-term Agencies (at the end of June), and it likely sold some of its $62b in long-term Agency bonds as well. Unlike China, Russia held the bonds the Agencies issued to finance their retained portfolio, not pass-throughs.

This is a lot of detail for a blog post, especially a weekend blog post.

The big picture is relatively simple:

From mid-2007 to mid 2008, the survey shows a large increase in the assets of official investors — but not as large as the increase from mid-2006 to mid-2007. That is somewhat surprising, since we know that inflows into central banks and sovereign funds increased in late 2007 and the first part of 2008. Consequently, the increase in the assets of official investors in the survey seems small relative to the growth in their foreign portfolio. By implication, there is a huge gap between estimated inflows into central banks and sovereign funds (and this estimate if quite robust) and the growth in official holdings of US assets. That gap is around $1 trillion.

We also know that from mid-2007 to mid-2008, China and the oil exporters account for most of the overall growth in official assets. They generally aren’t very transparent. They don’t report the currency composition of their reserves to the IMF for example. So it is possible that a shift in the currency composition of their reserves (one not echoed in the data from the countries that do report data to the IMF) away from the dollar explains the relatively small share of the total increase in their assets that show up in the survey.

Such a shift would also be consistent with a general shift toward riskier assets on the part of central banks. China at least continued to increase its risk profile after the August 2007 subprime crisis. It then reversed course in a big way after Lehman. SAFE could have gotten authorization to take more currency risk as well as more equity market risk. At the end of June 2008, less than 60% of China’s total foreign holdings (counting the PBoC’s other foreign assets, the CIC and the state banks) shows up in the US data.

But the comparatively small increase in official assets in the survey is also consistent with a world where the survey doesn’t pick up all of China’s holdings. Over the past several years, China has started to manage its foreign assets a bit more like the Gulf — and a large chunk of the Gulf’s assets don’t show up in the survey. The fall in China’s dollar share consequently may reflect the difficulties capturing all of China’s activities as more of China’s foreign assets were being held outside of SAFE’s formal reserves. We just don’t know.

And I am quite sure that the surge in China’s recorded holdings since June — along with the surge in its Treasury holdings — reflects a decision to reverse course and take less risk in China’s reserve portfolio.

SAFE is acting more like a traditional reserve manager once again, and less like a sovereign wealth fund. The CIC’s isn’t growing. And the PBoC’s non-reserve foreign assets are falling …

74 Comments

  • Posted by Cedric Regula

    K T Cat
    “You’ve made my point. Economic growth is at best third on the priority list. They do not care about jobs or the economy.

    The best outcome we can hope for is that the Fed won’t have to monetize hundreds of billions of debt.”

    Sounds about right. Except in the near term I think they are still in triage mode trying to head off debt deflation. And if they really did try to get economic growth compared to 2005-2007 we would have to re-flate the FIRE economy, the credit bubble, housing bubble, and Chinese imports back to where it was plus some for growth. That’s really scary.

    Duke:”I think all portfolio managers should be required to spend time in California..”

    Been there done that. The State of California government is really scary. Sounds like they were even able to assimilate “The Terminator”.

  • Posted by Rachel

    SAFE has definitely been buying equities. FT tracked its purchases of UK equities last year.

    Also – and I might be mistaken – not only did the QDII funds not live up to hopes, but the US was only approved as a destination towards the end of the 07/08 period the Treasury data covers.

  • Posted by K T Cat

    Cedric,

    From today’s WSJ – “The government is providing up to $30 billion more to battered insurer AIG, as the company posted a record $61.66 billion loss.”

    We’re gonna stop at borrowing only $1.7T, eh? Good luck with that.

    Once we’ve decided that the Money Fairy is real and we blow $800B in one day on a Stimulus Porkgasm, paltry things like $30B for AIG and probably twice as much for GM simply fall out of the sky.

  • Posted by Cedric Regula

    K T Cut”We’re gonna stop at borrowing only $1.7T, eh? Good luck with that.”

    That’s the government estimate, not mine.

    We might even try and see if QE is “sustainable”, much like we decided fiscal and current accounts are “sustainable”.

    Needless to say that would put a even more exponential bend in the national debt curve.

    I already know that won’t work for long, so I think I’ll put all my money in glass beads as soon as I see them try it.

  • Posted by Twofish

    bsetser: I heard from a very credible source that SAFE was buying US equities in its own name last spring.

    I’m sure that they were, but the question is whether they are doing it at the $1 billion, $10 billion level, or the $100 billion level.

    If you are investing $100 billion level over the course of a few months, you are going to start issuing tender offers, and you aren’t going go through a broker-dealer, since the there isn’t enough market liquidity to absorb this amount of cash quickly. Also managing $100 billion is distinctly non trivial. You need an army of people just to make sure that you’ve filled out all of the right forms.

    bsetser: I would be stunned if SAFE only has $10b in US equities.

    One of us is going to be very surprised.

    There is no way that I can see that you can go from zero to $100 billion with passive index investing. Think elephant in a kiddie pool Tight fit, and someone is going to notice.

    bsetser: . I’ll grant $90b seems high (@ 5% of total portfolio) but a lot of banks were pushing for all CBs to put 5-10% of their portfolio in equities a while back.

    True, but the banks had in mind working as investment advisors with very steep fees. Banks make huge fees from strategic investments. Putting an order on the market is a high volume, low margin business, and not the type of investment that banks want central banks (or anyone else) to do.

    Also, if the banks did convince SAFE to invest 5% of its money in equities, you’d have press releases and press conferences left and right. One reason banks and hedge funds tend to be extremely loud with China investing is that getting your picture taken with the head of SAFE gets you new business.

    85% of the difficulty in finance is to get people to return your calls, and if you are doing business with SAFE, then you really want everyone to know.

  • Posted by Twofish

    bsetser: Any back of the envelope calculation for the size of the bank based QDII outflows/ total from mutual funds?

    The numbers I’ve seen are US$30-40 billion. Yes it is the case that the QDII program of convincing Chinese stock market players to invest overseas was a fizzle, but having the ability to buy and sell securities overseas with RMB is such a useful thing that even if Chinese mutual funds aren’t using it, someone else is.

  • Posted by duke

    I don’t know how topical Brad wishes his blog to become, but as of 12 noon on 3/2, the S&P is down 3.5% to near 700, YET, Treasuries continue to rise as yields drop. Or, as explained below:

    “More and more investors are seeking the safety of U.S. government debt,” said Kevin Giddis, managing director of fixed income for Morgan Keegan & Co. “Why? Why not? I mean, what else are you going to do with your money?”

    It’s great to be king, but boy oh boy, when the market realizes there won’t be enough savings (foreign and/or domestic) to satisfy T funding requirements, and Ben has to step in with a big dose of QE, get out of the way.

  • Posted by Rollover

    Brad-

    For a game-teaser. Who’ll be the first to unload u.s. t-bills?

    I’m betting on an ‘un-named’ oil producer.
    When? Fall/winter2009-2010.
    Looks like China is trapped. dialing HELP!

    The snowball is gaining traction.

  • Posted by Twofish

    duke: It’s great to be king, but boy oh boy, when the market realizes there won’t be enough savings (foreign and/or domestic) to satisfy T funding requirements, and Ben has to step in with a big dose of QE, get out of the way.

    I think the market has already come to the conclusion that there will be enough savings to satisfy treasury funding. Also, there is the question, if you move out of Treasuries, what do you move in to?

  • Posted by duke

    @Twofish – “I think the market has already come to the conclusion that there will be enough savings to satisfy treasury funding. Also, there is the question, if you move out of Treasuries, what do you move in to?”

    I think if models were revised downward to incorporate a 6% contraction, not 3%, and then consider other possible negative influences on consumer demand, (not the least being huge inventories of surplus goods produced over the last 2-3 years), there may be some question as to sufficient foreign/domestic savings.

    As to your question regarding where can the money go? I’ve been noodling this around for awhile (always a dangerous thing), and my thought is that the first major, stable economy (at least from the standpoint of reserves/savings) that devalues & links to gold could possibly go hog on the entire pot. Say, a country like Japan and/or Germany?

    What we’re playing is high stakes chicken. I think it’s an unwise bet to assume the US will continue to get away with just the right combination of low interest rates & poor equity fundamentals that produce ever lasting inflows into Ts. Regardless of what models may suggest, reality is never that perfect.

  • Posted by gillies

    retail shops in california are ganging up on their landlords. unable to increase their overdrafts to pay the rent, they play hardball and make new deals.

    retail outlets in dublin, ireland, are putting it up to their landlords also. ‘reduce the rent or we go bust and you get none at all.’

    meanwhile they cut their prices with almost permanent ‘sales’, to hang on to market share. that adds up to a strong deflationary trend.

    there’s no conspiracy here – it is the logic of the present commercial environment.

    k t cat says of the fed : “it’s a sucker move because they are not telling you ahead of time that they’re going to start printing money by the hundreds of billions. It’s like buying stock in a company only to find out a month later that they’ve decided to create lots more shares, but they didn’t tell you about it.”

    firstly – they did tell us. hence all the ‘helicopter ben’ jibes at bernanke.

    secondly – there is a deflationary tide running the other way, so it is not certain that they could pull it off even if they tried. there is a possibility that the inflationary moves take effect more slowly than the deflationary ones, particularly if there is an element of the authorities reacting to events.

    thirdly – as the authorities did not foresee the present situation, they may in the near future be reacting to something else that they do not now foresee.

    fourthly, – deliberate debasement of the currency would only be a provocation to those who hold treasuries, and take all currencies down with it. the global financial health is so fragile, that new strategies are more likely to come by international agreement, than by stealth.

    and finally, it would be as well to consider, alongside global currency inflation, global debt default.

    irish retail shops can threaten to go out of business. what can japan do ? can you put up the shutters and close down japan ? i think that a point comes when the real economy reasserts itself. it is the illusory financial economy which has to yield.

    so it will be ‘cash on delivery’ or even oil for grain, steel for rice, timber for butter.

    the ordinary suckers are waking up. there is a global credulity crunch.

  • Posted by gillies

    maybe i am too pessimistic, and unable to add up ?

    but if a brown goose can cripple a jet engine –

    2 brown geese (simultaneously) = 1 black swan ?

    i can imagine a global financial equivalent . . .

  • Posted by K T Cat

    Twofish,

    Also, there is the question, if you move out of Treasuries, what do you move in to?

    Why move into anything at all? Why not just send a check for $500 to every citizen of China? If I were the Chinese, I’d be trusting my own people a lot more than I trust the US or Europe to invest my money wisely.

  • Posted by Twofish

    duke: There may be some question as to sufficient foreign/domestic savings.

    There still isn’t. Debt GDP ratio still ends up pretty low.

    duke: Devalues & links to gold could possibly go hog on the entire pot. Say, a country like Japan and/or Germany?

    Neither Japan or Germany has a big enough economy to absorb all of the savings that is currently going into Treasuries.

    duke: What we’re playing is high stakes chicken.

    I don’t think we are. No major power in the world wants to see the US go down, and no major power is going intentionally do anything that damages the United States. If the US needs $5 trillion dollars to recapitalize its economy, will get get $5 trillion.

    Four words: too big to fail.

    duke: I think it’s an unwise bet to assume the US will continue to get away with just the right combination of low interest rates & poor equity fundamentals that produce ever lasting inflows into Ts.

    If you aren’t going to bet on Treasuries, then what are you going to bet on? The trouble with the US economy or Treasuries is not that they are good investments, it’s that if they go, everything else will go worse.

  • Posted by rollover

    @2fish-

    you my friend are going to be in for a shock in the later half of 09´. i dont like to promise things but to think your views are ideal for the world…

    but the longer you prolong, the worse it´s going to be in the end. the world will take the pain in 09´, and move way for a new financial system. the current financial order is insolvent.

    @2fish, i disagree with your views, and believe they are 100% insanity. expanding global imbalances will prove this.

    a likely global monetary crash is to come. i wouldnt be holding t’bills throughout the remainder of 09´.

    Safe-haven? Be prepared my friend…

    ·note, all thoughts and opinions expressed are solely those of my opinion.

  • Posted by rollover

    i do leave note that the tbill bubble could run throughout 09 and into 2010, but when the run starts…the run starts…….

  • Posted by Twofish

    rollover: but the longer you prolong, the worse it´s going to be in the end.

    This is a common view. Sometimes its true. Often it isn’t. There are situations in which if you delay the problem, you improve the situation. There are situations where it doesn’t.

  • Posted by me

    Say, one thing I haven’t seen mentioned lately, but I recall being written about for years: didn’t North Korea supposedly have a very sophisticated operation printing their own United States paper currency?

    Maybe if the US just recalled all the paper currency, inspected it, and replaced it — if it’s real — with new bills, and voided the old ones after a couple of years, we’d get some of the air out of this gasbag.

    Why not?

  • Posted by Twofish

    me: Maybe if the US just recalled all the paper currency, inspected it, and replaced it — if it’s real — with new bills, and voided the old ones after a couple of years, we’d get some of the air out of this gasbag. Why not?

    Because the amount of paper currency makes up a small and pretty insignificant part of the economic system. There is about $900 billion in paper currency outstanding which is just not a huge amount in the grand scheme.

  • Posted by xyz

    “If the US needs $5 trillion dollars to recapitalize its economy, will get get $5 trillion.”

    Dream away.

    The U.S. will not, unless those 5 trillion dollars have been hyperinflated.

  • Posted by Judy Yeo

    Didn’t all of this appear in that Telegraph/ Times article? Everyone that’s lost money is now claiming to be eying the long term, whatever’s on the horizon doesn’t quite matter to them; now if only their fund management side were as efficient as their PR perhaps?!

  • Posted by Murph

    Brad,

    It sounds like SAFE got on the wrong side of big events from 2007-2008

    – starting into equities at the very top
    – diversifying out of USD before the global flight-to-(USD)safety

    Your thoughtful research is invaluable.

    Thank you.

  • Posted by yuer

    Sounds like we can use SAFE as a contrarian indicator: time to run away from US treasuries!

  • Posted by DrMommy

    Your analysis does not include large holdings of equity that is included in the DI flows and holdings.

  • Posted by lymnSleeste

    Great…

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