Investment up over 30%, imports down 25%?
A year ago I marveled at the sheer size of China’s reserve growth. China was adding to its stockpile of foreign exchange at rates that seemed almost unbelievable. That is no longer the case. But in other ways China continues to churn out the kind of data that I never expected to see.
I never, for example, though a country where investment is growing by more than 30% — Andrew Batson reports “Fixed-asset investment, China’s main measure of capital spending, rose 38.7% in May and is up 32.9% for the year so far” — would be spending 25% less on imports. Batson again:
“Merchandise exports in May fell 26.4% from a year earlier, China’s Customs agency said Thursday, accelerating from April’s 22.6% decline as global demand remained weak. China’s imports also extended their fall, dropping 25.2% in May from a year earlier after shrinking 23% in April.”
Investment booms fueled by a surge in domestic lending usually lead to import booms. That was the case with the Asian tigers in the 1990s, the US at the peak of its dot home bubble and the real estate boom in the oil exporters just prior to the crisis. It was also the case in 2003, when a surge in bank lending triggered a surge in investment in China (just as Chinese exports were also surging). But it isn’t the case, at least so far, in China today.
As both Macroman and Edward Hugh have observed, the rebound in Chinese import demand has been rather anemic. May imports were actually a bit lower than April imports.
Obviously the data has been shaped by the large fall in commodity prices, which pushes the value of China’s imports down in any y/y comparison. Real exports are certainly down more year over year than real imports.
On the other hand, real imports seem to have been pushed up by a decision to build up stockpiles of key commodities. Look at Macroman’s impressive charts — or the details of the trade data (see Danske). Batson reports that China bought 38% more iron than in May last year. Citi reports than aluminum and copper imports are also way up. All are up more than can be explained by even the very strong reported rise in investment. That is why ships loaded with iron are idling off China’s coast.
Seasonality — according to Danske Bank — may explain why China imported a bit less in May than in April. Their seasonally adjusted real import series shows a bit of growth in May — though they are still down a bit y/y in real terms.*
There is no doubt that imports are a bit higher than they were this spring (the January fall in imports was huge), especialyl of commodities. But a chart showing the y/y growth in the 3m moving average of China’s imports and exports doesn’t show much difference. Both are now down close to 25% — and the improvement in the import data on this measure stalled in May.
The y/y change in monthly exports and imports is more volatile. If January’s extremely large fall (influenced by the timing of the new year) is set aside, the underlying trend on nominal imports is still down — though that reflects in part the upward move in commodity prices and thus the dollar value of commodity imports last spring.
And I fully realize that nominal data will be shaped by the fall in commodity import prices — I’ll try to get some disaggregated data that isn’t shaped as much by this. But the y/y changes still give some indication of the trend. And nominal imports aren’t moving in the same way as fixed investment. And imports from places like Korea (through May) and the US (through April) aren’t really showing much of a rebound.
One last chart: the y/y change in a 3 month rolling sum of Chinese imports and exports, in $ billion. I like this chart because it clearly shows the sustained nature — and the scale — of the boom in China’s exports over the past eight years, as well as the magnitude of the current fall.
The sharp fall is over. But there isn’t yet much sign of recovery. Not in Chinese demand for the world’s products. Or in Chinese exports to the world.
To me, though, the biggest puzzle is on the import side. A strong, growing economy driven by a surge in fixed investment would normally be expected to generate strong demand for the rest of the world’s goods, especially if China is growing far faster than the rest of the world.
UPDATE: A correspondent notes that — per Citibank — the purchase of land is included in the fixed income investment data, and thus large land purchases could explain why soaring investment hasn’t produced stronger import growth. Citi:
““The value of land and used facilities and equipment are included in fixed asset investment (FAI). These values take a significant share of the total investment (as much as one third for some projects), and are generally accounted for in a lump sum at the beginning of a project. In January-April, the number of new projects totaled over 86,000, worth Rmb3.7trillion, up 45% and 91% yoy, respectively. These projects would take several years to finish, but the land involved is already accounted for and naturally frontloads growth…””
* I am a bit suspicious of the upturn in real imports in Danske’s 3m/3m change chart. The challenge here is that seasonality normally drives a pick up in import demand as China’s economy rebounds from its normally slow New Year start. Picking out the additional impact of the stimulus from this normal rebound is a challenge. The seasonal adjustment ends up driving a lot of the data. Plus the import data likely has been distorted a bit by stockpiling. Above all though I just haven’t seen a comparable upturn in exports from places like Korea and the US to China.
Are you saying the Chinese are not being completely honest with their numbers?
Data Shows China Relies More on Growth at Home
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/global/11yuan.html?ref=business
HONG KONG — In the seven years since China entered the World Trade Organization in November 2001, a rising tide of exports, combined with a torrent of investment, has lifted the country’s economy ever higher, while consumer spending has lagged.
But now, the Chinese economy relies increasingly on growth at home, as data released Thursday made clear. A decline in exports has become a serious drag on economic growth, while government spending has led domestic investments higher at a remarkable pace and consumer spending appears to have been fairly strong as well.
Chinese exports plunged by a record 26.4 percent in May from a year earlier, the Chinese customs agency announced Thursday, as buyers in industrialized countries remained cautious about placing orders.
But investments in fixed assets like roads, factories and apartment buildings set a record in the opposite direction.
Chinese investment expenditures rose 32.9 percent in the first five months of this year, compared with the investments in same period last year, the National Bureau of Statistics announced in Beijing.
Yu Song, a Goldman Sachs economist, calculated that after adjusting for inflation, Chinese investment spending had grown in May at its fastest pace, rising close to 50 percent from May of last year.
The government’s stimulus program is powering much of that increase, with spending on railroads soaring 110.9 percent in the first five months of 2009, compared with the same period last year.
“To me, though, the biggest puzzle is on the import side. A strong, growing economy driven by a surge in fixed investment would normally be expected to generate strong demand for the rest of the world’s goods, especially if China is growing far faster than the rest of the world.”
In view of the investment made and such limited imports, I feel some kind of industrial “Great Leap Forward”. I’d be glad to be fully wrong of course. But please explain how you can so massively invest into infrastructures and indutries when, at the very same time, the “export model” stalls so fast.
This is certainly not ad hominem critic targetted at any one. But all this is becoming extremely difficult to reconcile +30% in investments synchronously made whilst exports drop as such a rate.
Where is the debate taking place. Apart from this blog and a few others?
Brad, “the biggest puzzle is on the import side. A strong, growing economy driven by a surge in fixed investment would normally be expected to generate strong demand for the rest of the world’s goods”
This puzzle is mostly answered by the fact that China is the “world factory”. From imported iron ore to an iron bridge, Chinese companies offer every parts of the whole supply change. Most Chinese can only afford the product of china-factory. And the major part of the import of this factory is raw materials like iron ore.
Yes, I was considering what jye and the NY Times article that DJC linked had to say – it makes sense that China imports big as far as raw materials go and makes a very large percentage of what it needs in the way of finished goods right at home. So no need for real noticeable surge in imports of goods. Where’s the mystery here?
You’ve got China transitioning away from an excessively export-dependent model toward a more balanced one that includes domestic demand/consumption, and it’s happening much more quickly than the experts imagined – it wouldn’t be the first time China fooled the experts. China’s had this pent-up domestic demand and it’s letting it loose now. The massive reserves are being used to work this transition as China uses dollars to buy resources and uses dollars to fund domestic stimulus. All the hype about what a “curse” the big reserves are is a bit over-blown. That’s too narrow a view – China’s able to think and act outside that box, and people are surprised. Hmmmm.
Brad Setser: A strong, growing economy driven by a surge in fixed investment would normally be expected to generate strong demand for the rest of the world’s goods, especially if China is growing far faster than the rest of the world.
DJC: China is a large continental power with a broad industrial base producing everything from regional jet aircraft, bullet trains, gas turbines, satellites, to nuclear attack submaines. While Chinese technology may not be the most advanced in every industrial sector, China nevertheless retains a more comprehensive industrial base than even Japan or the United States from light labor intensive industry, heavy state-owned industry, to advanced technology sectors. In fact, Chinese industry probably lags Western and Asian counterparts no more than a few years in technology. What does the United States produce that isn’t prohibited by national security regulations that can legally be exported to China? Except for Boeing commercial jets, there isn’t very much.
Brad, is it possible that part of the strategic stockpiling of metals is being accounted as “investment”? For example, state-controled companies buying stocks of copper and this being added to the investment stats. I wonder if the surge in “investment” is not in fact masking the first stages of a Chinese move out of dollar reserves and into metals. Thank you
Spend it quickly.
from Ultimi Barbarorum by Baruch
Did you know they will be spending $146 billion over 3 years on their 3G wireless rollout? But I don’t know what proportion is imported.
Don’t fall for the phony Chinese statistics. The world is in a depression caused by overcapacity in manufacturing. Investment is shrinking worldwide. Here’s a quote from the latest US trade figures report:
“The April 2008 to April 2009 decrease in [US] exports of goods reflected decreases in … capital goods ($8.3 billion)…”
As the investment binge is led by state-spending and SoE-spending, and SoEs are known to buy as much as they can from other SoEs (and frequently favor products from their own province over superior products from other provinces), I’d say it’s natural that they don’t import all that much.
But I still don’t really understand what exactly it is that they are spending all this investment money on. According to the NBoS statistics, manufacturing investments in just about everything are skyrocketing:
The press likes to quote railroad infrastructure investment because of the large percentage increase, but in fact it only accounts for a mere 3 % of the total.
Industries like “machinery makers”, “transport equipment” (i.e. cars), “manufacture of mineral products” and “chemical products” are doing the heavy lifting as far as investment volumes are concerned. Real estate investment is lagging far behind (”only” +10 %).
Chinese data is about as good as Ken Lewis testimony…Both suspect!
Investment in China is for the future, not current demand. When the world economy is ready to buy more, China will be ready to produce it.
If the U.S. wants to survive as a strong country in a Chinese dominated world, we are going to have to learn from Germany rather than insisting that what we are doing is working.
I find it difficult to accept that China simply makes all it needs and is more like a separate planet with trade ties to earth.
A very interesting post.
FollowTheMoney said, “Chinese data is about as good as Ken Lewis testimony…Both suspect!”
U.S. data is likewise deeply suspect, from the unemployment numbers to the CPI to a whole lot else. Cooking the books is not confined to potentially the Chinese data. Unless you can find something along these lines to pin such “cooking” on China’s numbers, then I think that accusation is just a distraction from the real issues here.
“To me, though, the biggest puzzle is on the import side. A strong, growing economy driven by a surge in fixed investment would normally be expected to generate strong demand for the rest of the world’s goods, especially if China is growing far faster than the rest of the world.”
Isn’t the answer to this puzzle in the macro man charts? There has been very strong Chinese demand for the world goods, or at least their raw materials but as the price of these commodities has fallen even faster than the increase then the price has fallen.
There’s also an issue around the composition of the FAI, in construction, railways, infrastructure etc. away from the export sector and possibily I’m assuming not so dependent on imports of machines, foreign technology and all that flummery necessary for the Western consumer.
China makes its own bullet trains doesn’t it?
Wstroupe~
I agree, but if we didn’t have the green shoots bonanza who else would the banks re-capitalize? You think banks and reits could sell shares if the Dow was below 7K? In my view we had to prop the market since the banks weren’t going to get the money through congress.
As far as what happens to the global economy in the Fall…”WATCH OUT”.
Funny that: Even though fixed asset investment is going through the roof, China’s cement producers are reporting a “supply glut”, with prices dropping fast, and various producers shutting down production:
http://en.ce.cn/Industries/Basic-industries/200906/11/t20090611_19296758.shtml
The bubble in China dwarfs what happened in the U.S.
And this article says that the authorities are asking steel producers to cut back output due to a horrible supply glut, and they are also asking lenders to give less money to expanding steel makers:
http://en.ce.cn/Industries/Basic-industries/200906/01/t20090601_19216167.shtml
and i only say “Watch out” because in my opinion there’s still Toxic assets sitting on the books, and we also have high oil prices putting downward pressure on an already strained consumer. This isn’t going to be easy.
I expect China to have further problems with exports ahead. I don’t think Russia nor Brazil can save this one.
jonathan said, “I find it difficult to accept that China simply makes all it needs and is more like a separate planet with trade ties to earth.”
That’s quite an exaggeration I don’t think anyone here is promoting. But the idea promoted by some of us here is that China and some other emerging economies can’t always be judged and evaluated accurately by all the standards and guidelines we in the West have come to accept as “normal”. Remember, we’re dealing with a strange brew of kicked-up capitalism that’s also managed carefully by the communist state. That’s not always easy to evaluate by “normal” standards and guidelines because in many instances it can move much, much faster and adapt much faster to radically changing circumstances than a conventional democratic capitalistic economy can. And in other important ways it is much slower. But in this crisis I think we’re witnessing the speed with which it can adapt. Beware of too rigid thinking when it comes to sorting out China’s path.
Here’s another thought on China’s imports:
Places such as Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong are currently showing much weaker GDP growth than the inland provinces. But these are exactly the places that are most outward-looking and most developed, i.e. they are most likely to import stuff both for consumption and for cutting-edge investment.
Whereas the inland provinces – where most of the current action seems to take place – are much poorer and much more likely to opt for domestic products, both in terms of consumption and in terms of investment.
Thomas, “inland provinces … are much poorer and much more likely to opt for domestic products”
This is great point.
Lots of good points in the comments; I suspect — see the update above — that counting land purchases as part of fixed investment is part of the explanation plus perhaps there is some overreporting of actual investment by provinces as they want to show quick results and thus report their borrowing as investment.
I also suspect there is some import substitution going on (not good for the world)– and with spare capacity inside China, the supply constraints that led china to import more when FAI boomed in 03 aren’t there (good for the world).
And finally, i suspect output in china is rebounding from a somewhat sharper fall than the authorities have let on at a somewhat slower pace than is implied by some recent data.
stockpiling pushes up imports even as commodity price falls push them down, so it cannot explain ongoing weakness in the import data. if anything the scale of the stockpiling should be pushing nominal and real imports up a bit (all other things equal).
The comment about the land purchases makes a lot of sense. In particular, it explains why fixed asset growth and the growth of “investments / capital formation” (as part of national accounts GDP calculation)frequently diverge in historical data.
(Just discussed this with my – Chinese – wife. She confirmed that land purchases are indeed part of “investments”. In fact, she scolded me for knowing very little about China’s statistics, as this is apparently a “basic fact” known by everyone in PRC with some interest in this kind of stuff…)
remove stock piling of commodities and what would import numbers look like in China?
That should give a real picture of just how great the “Chinese recovery of the year story” maintains it’s view.
By the way when is Zhou Xiaochuan coming to give a speech @ Yale? We got a large audience ready to laugh at him as he gets grilled by Shiller…
how does one import land/property?
one does not. one inflates.
Fixed investment does not include land purchase? How do you treat the land purchase in U.S.?
I dont buy the land purchase argument. It is natural that land bought for an investment is among the investment’s costs, but it cannot account for sustained 30%dynamics in FAI.
I have an alternate hypothesis. Basically the raw figures are in 2008:
FAI 17.2 trn
Household savings 4.5 trn
Loan growth 4.8trn
Corporate savings (!!!) 2 trn.
Budget income 6 trn.
Corporate profits around 3 trn.
So with a net borrowing of only 2.8 trn yuan and profits 3 trn, corporates make 17.2 trn FAI. Even if the government jumps into financing that cannot be more than 6 trn…
This means there might be a lot of hidden profits for companies that they dont show as profits for example because taxatin gives them incentives to invest the profits and write it down as costs…
From a macro perspective in the US, corporate profits are about 15% of GDP.
If the above hypothesis is true, in China corporate profits are much higher, maybe 30-40% of GDP.
This makes sense, because labour is abundant in China, but capital is sparse. So earnings must be realized at the holder of the sparse input: the corporates. And what would a good company do with 30%+ margins if not reinvest it?
Especially if profit taxes are way to high and investments can be written down as costs.
I dont know if that is a case – its just a hypothesis.
Even I know that all government purchases in China count towards GDP.
Ok I think I got it.
Let chinese companies have 80 trn fixed asset stock, have a yearly depreciation of 8 trn in 2008.
That makes 17,2 trn FAI financed from 3 trn profits, 2.8 trn net borrowing, 3 trn govt spending, the rest is depreciation.
So chinese companies have an insane margin of 11 trn on 40 trn revenue, that is over 25% margin.
Which makes it sensible why they invest so much. The opportunity costs are 4-5% (deposit rates).
Bottomline is Chinese capital investment is extremely profitable, so all margins are reinvested!
BULL MARKET for EQUITY and BOND market today!! I bet Ben has something to do with sharp drop in 10/30 yrs yield. Dont fight the Fed.
WStroupe,
American and Chinese economic statistics are calculated through different methods. The United States uses the after-the-fact method. The Chinese use the before-the-fact method.
In America, the statistician’s job is to determine the statistic. In China, the statistician’s job is to prove that the government’s preset “target” was met.
For example, despite widespread rioting over unemployment all up and down the Chinese coast last fall, China met its targeted unemployment rate of 4.5% last year.
The only numbers you can truly count on coming out of China are the export and import numbers, since they can be verified through foreign statistics.
Howard Richman said, “The United States uses the after-the-fact method. The Chinese use the before-the-fact method.”
Basically, that means the Chinese data is assembled from pre-cooked pieces and placed on the plate for us to eat, while the U.S. data is assembled raw and then many of its key pieces are taken, cooked, and then put back on the plate for us to eat. So the only difference is when they’re cooked, not if they’re cooked. Both methods involve arrogant asses in government who think they know what they’re doing and who don’t trust the little people to know the full and stark truth about what’s really going on.
Supposedly, the stockpiling is nothing like seasonal adjustments. What if the stockpiling stops on one day for whatever the reason, this will be huge for the stock market and resource market, right?
I mean, it is possible, right. Assuming one day at the end of this year, US economy is not recoverying that much, and the world trade stay low for sustainable periods. Chinese companies will find themselves to be in a really awkward position.
If China were providing good demand side national account data in a timely manner, and conducting periodic (and credible) revisions, we would probably see a strong Q-2. After all, import prices are collapsing along with volumes.
= = = = =
But, let’s not lose perspective.
China’s exports in May fell $31.8 billion from a year earlier. And, they were DOUBLE the 2004 same-month level. Exports in the past five months ($426.2 bn, down $118.9 bn) are still larger than in 12 months of 2003.
In the first quarter of 2008, China’s exports were 45.3% of total exports by the 10 largest East Asian traders (Japan, China, NICs and ASEAN 5). Imports were 49.9%. This year: 54.0% of exports and 49.5% of imports. (Two-way trade in East Asia fell $525.9 billion in Q-1 2009.)
The land was the missing piece for me, which makes me wonder about the other key accounting differences I don’t know. I’m relatively up on key Euro players.
If there’s really a lot of over-reporting, meaning the money is somehow “committed,” we may see that work out because that kind of reporting often requires revision – or cover-up. But if they’re over-reporting, that assumes they weren’t in the past, which means there’s a reason to over-report now that didn’t exist in the past.
All economies import substitute when conditions mandate. In the absence of figures, I’d guess it’s less import substitution than internal demand suppression – a more unpleasant form of import substitution.
Howard Richman: For example, despite widespread rioting over unemployment all up and down the Chinese coast last fall, China met its targeted unemployment rate of 4.5% last year.
That unemployment rate is the urban unemployment rate. The supposedly 20 million migrant workers who have lost their jobs since the economic crisis are not counted in the official unemployment rate. This is because they don’t have the urban residential status and, officially, they’re farmers and are entitled a piece of land in their home town.
@Gabor
Where did you get those numbers from? 2tr RMB “corporate savings” sounds way too low to me, that’d be less than 10 % of GDP.
Hi Thomas,
I post as Lemiwinks on the Pettis blog. I use the same statistics as there NBOS 26-2-2009 statistical communique.
As a matter of fact, here I refer to savings growth, which is a “flow” measure.
I calculate corporate net borrowing as loan growth – savings growth and that is way too low.
Savings and borrowing “stock” figures are much higher of course.
@Gabor
ah, that’s why the numbers sounded familiar.
Some thoughts:
- As mentioned previously, you are not taking into account depreciation.
- Based on your source, I’d say you are also missing equity capital raising (0.3 tr) and corporate bond issuance (2.1 tr).
- A big chunk of fixed asset investments is real estate. Some of that is probably financed directly from private households (which pay for the apartments they are buying).
- Finally, fixed asset investments probably includes stuff that is directly owned by the government, or provinces, or municipalities. No idea how much that is, but surely it’s not insignificant.
Hi Thomas,
corporate bond issuance at 2.1 trn sounds too high for me. I found this link which states:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/05/content_11132918.htm
2008 corporate bond issuance at 0.23 trn. (maybe the chinese style separators tricked one of the sources?)
Good point on the real estate investment. I will try to estimate it next.
Also my government investment spending estimate is just a wild guess, do you have any sources on it? But total budget spending at 6 trn it cannot be very high.
What do you mean by not taking into account depreciation? My theory is that balance sheet depreciation of previous years FAI are masking corporate profits big time.
Actually I think balance sheet depreciation is 3-4 times bigger than balance sheet profit.
Are you talking about rebuilding to replace real world depreciated investments? That should be accounted into GDP everywhere as far as I know.
So what I say is that Chinese companies have a very strong cash flow, because depreciation dominates their cost structure.
From a macro perspective this make sense, since labour is abundant, so labour costs must be low compared to capital costs.
This very strong corporate cash flow is the main driver of the Chinese investment boom, I believe.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601009&sid=aEtmT9TQxbzw
japan, like China, scared of their steady-bleeding treasury holdings. I doubt they be able to add more treasury to their holding during their shrinking trade surplus and Fed’s Quantitative Easying. more pain come to treasury holders.
http://stockcharts.com/charts/gallery.html?mbb
consequence of Fed operation, not just killing treasury, but also MBS fixed rate bond, with climbing long-date yield. more world of hurt come to mortgage and housing?
Brad,
Could the fact that imports and exports are down be due to China is lending it’s way through this, and as a result, is building overcapacity into it’s system ? I doubt that whatever they are investing in is being consumed internally. You can’t waive a magic wand and go from exporting 25% of your GDP to consuming it. I believe that ultimately, the loans they are making now will become nonperforming. However, it will be a while before China allows this to come to the surface.
I believe this is an artificial recovery, manufactured by excessive lending from their government, which ultimately will cause a severe crash.
[...] are Brad Setser’s thoughts: Investment booms fueled by a surge in domestic lending usually lead to import [...]
[...] are Brad Setser’s thoughts: Investment booms fueled by a surge in domestic lending usually lead to import booms. That [...]
Greg wrote: “That [4.5%] unemployment rate is the urban unemployment rate. The supposedly 20 million migrant workers who have lost their jobs since the economic crisis are not counted in the official unemployment rate. This is because they don’t have the urban residential status and, officially, they’re farmers and are entitled a piece of land in their home to.”
You really have to admire the creativity of China’s statisticians. They met the 4.5% target.
@Gabor
Depreciation doesn’t necessarily mean “hidden profits”: Chinese companies have invested lots and lots for many years, and there is lots of “normal” depreciation taking place. It’s not like Chinese machines and buildings are built to last for many decades…
But no matter if it’s “real depreciation” or “hidden profits”, in any case it provides them with cash flows to make more investments.
As for corporate bond issues: I agree the number sounds high. I quoted it from the source you yourself had used (the NBoS press release).
Yes, you are right. In fact it seems like the conclusion is quite the opposite to what I said.
Chinese companies have very low return on their assets (commpared to their fast depreciation), and it can only be made profitable by low wages. Wages are low, because labour is abundant.
That makes it possible for companies to invest so much. If labour costs were higher they should use loans to finance investment, which would pose a higher profitability threshold.
I checked the bond number, the 2 trn figure was bond outstanding the growth was around 300 bn according to the source.
And this also explains why it will be damn hard if not impossible for China to change for the consumption led model.
If wages grow, or redistribution grows, corporate profits will disappear, and the investment boom goes into bust, which can potentially cause a sharper fall in GDP, then consumption induced growth .
Catch 22.
[...] inwestycji w sektorze nieruchomości oraz początkowa faza boomu inwestycyjnego wyjasnia paradoks wzrostu inwestycji kapitałowych o ponad 30% przy jednoczesnym spadku importu o 25% (swoje dołożyły ceny surowców). Wzrost konsumpcji indywidualnej tłumaczy wzrost produkcji [...]
[...] inwestycji w sektorze nieruchomości oraz początkowa faza boomu inwestycyjnego wyjasnia paradoks wzrostu inwestycji kapitałowych o ponad 30% przy jednoczesnym spadku importu o 25% (swoje dołożyły ceny surowców). Wzrost konsumpcji indywidualnej tłumaczy wzrost produkcji [...]
During a fixed asset inventory while using fixed asset software, a company can validate assets and maintenance equipment to make sure that assets are working in top conditions at all times.
Communism is all about properganda, Chinese proverb: “Warning to the east, but attack the west”……..Disinformation and deciet is the name of the communist game…WAKE UP WORLD!!!!!!