Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?“ International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7–48.

Why, then, does it matter whether PRC diplomacy as a whole in 2010 can or cannot be characterized as “newly assertive”? It may matter because language can affect internal and public foreign policy debates. There is a long-standing and rich literature on the role of the media in agenda setting. What does agenda setting mean in concrete terms? It means focusing attention on particular narratives, excluding others, and narrowing discourse. In the agenda setting literature, it refers to the power of information entrepreneurs to tell people “what to think about” and “how to think about it.” It can make or take away spaces for alternative descriptive and causal arguments, and thus the space for debates about effective policy. The prevailing description of the problem narrows acceptable options.

The conventional description of Chinese diplomacy in 2010 seems to point to a new, but poorly understood, factor in international relations—namely, the speed with which new conventional wisdoms are created, at least within the public sphere, by the interaction of the internet-based traditional media and the blogosphere. One study has found, for instance, that on some U.S. public policy issues, the blogosphere and the traditional media interact in setting the agenda for coverage for each other. Moreover, on issues where this interaction occurs, much of the effect happens within four days. Other research suggests that political bloggers, for the most part, do not engage in original reporting and instead rely heavily on the mainstream media for the reproduction of alleged facts. The media, meanwhile, increasingly refers to blogs as source material. The result is, as one study put it, “a news source cycle, in which news content can be passed back and forth from media to media.” Additional research suggests that the thematic agendas for political campaigns and politicians themselves are increasingly influenced by blogosphere-media interaction.

Together, this research suggests that the prevailing framework for characterizing Chinese foreign policy in recent years may be relevant for the further development (and possible narrowing) of the policy discourse among media, think tank, and policy elites. As the agenda-setting literature suggests, this is not a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is the speed with which these narratives are created and spread—a discursive tidal wave, if you will. This gives first movers with strong policy preferences advantages in producing and circulating memes and narratives in the electronic media or in high-profile blogs, or both. This, in turn, further reduces the time and incentives for participants in policy debates to conduct rigorous comparative analysis prior to participation. This is ironic, of course, given the proliferation of easier-to-access data and original information sources on the internet with which to conduct such rigorous comparative analysis.

James Kitfield, “A Hollow Military Again?” National Journal, June 12, 2013.

“The way President Obama put it to me is, ‘Give me fewer Iraqi Freedoms and more Desert Storms,’ said Adm.  James Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who coordinated the new defense strategic guidance.

Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on “Preparing for and Responding to the Enduring Threat,” June 12, 2013.

Sen. Mary Landrieu: “I hope that in the classified hearing that more of this can be brought to light. And I most certainly am going to be explaining this to my constituents in an appropriate, balanced way.”

(3PA: This quote summed up the congressional oversight process.  Only behind closed doors can controversial surveillance programs be brought to light, and which, constituents must rely upon the judgments of their elected members.)

Ruth Marcus, “James Clapper’s ‘least truthful’ answer,” Washington Post, June 13, 2013.

Ron Wyden doesn’t want to call the director of national intelligence a liar. The Oregon Democrat is too seasoned a politician for that — and James Clapper’s self-assessment, that he answered in the “least untruthful manner” when the senator asked whether the National Security Agency was collecting data about millions of Americans, speaks for itself. “No, sir . . . not wittingly,” Clapper said, when the answer was clearly — and is now demonstrably — yes.

“When I heard his response, I said, ‘I’ve got more follow-up work to do,’ ” Wyden said with studied mildness when we spoke Thursday.

Did Clapper lie? “I want to leave it at that,” Wyden demurred. Then he added, pointedly: “You cannot have strong oversight if intelligence officials don’t give you straight answers.”

And that is the paradox — the fallacy, even — of congressional oversight in the post-9/11 environment.

Brigid Schulte, “Many women in CIA still encounter glass ceiling, agency report says,” Washington Post, June 13, 2013.

In many ways, the dearth of women at the top levels of leadership at the CIA is not unlike the dearth of women at the top of any federal agency. Women make up 31 percent of the CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service and 33 percent of the entire federal government’s Senior Executive Service.

In public remarks to staff members, CIA Director John O. Brennan said he fully supports the recommendations and has named a senior female officer in the clandestine service to oversee their implementation. Changing the agency culture may take years, Brennan said, but doing so would “ensure all employees have the opportunity to reach their full professional potential” and enable the agency to better meet its mission.

“The countries that figure out how to crack this code,” she said, “will be tremendously advantaged in the future.”

Read the full report: “Director’s Advisory Group on Women in Leadership.”

Statement issued by the White House on behalf of Benjamin Rhodes, deputy national security adviser, New York Times, June 13, 2013.

The President has been clear that the use of chemical weapons – or the transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups – is a red line for the United States, as there has long been an established norm within the international community against the use of chemical weapons.  Our intelligence community now has a high confidence assessment that chemical weapons have been used on a small scale by the Assad regime in Syria.  The President has said that the use of chemical weapons would change his calculus, and it has.

Put simply, the Assad regime should know that its actions have led us to increase the scope and scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition, including direct support to the SMC. These efforts will increase going forward.

(3PA: Sending arms to support Syrian rebels will not change the outcome, let alone topple Assad. For more see: “The No-Plan Zone.”)

Tom Vanden Brook, “Marines, Army form quick-strike forces in Africa,” USA Today, June 14, 2013.

The Marines will base 500 troops at Moron Air Force Base in Spain, about 35 miles southeast of Seville, said Capt. Eric Flanagan, a Marine Corps spokesman. They can be flown on short notice to African crises aboard six Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.

The unit is known as the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force for Crisis Response. It will act as a first responder to U.S. embassies in the region on behalf of U.S. Africa Command, Flanagan said. It will be on standby to help evacuate Americans from hot spots and to provide disaster relief and humanitarian missions.

Two weeks ago, CFR’s Center for Preventive Action and International Institutions and Global Governance program convened a workshop on “Illicit Networks, Political Instability, and Criminal Violence.” The workshop intended to analyze trends in transnational criminal networks, examine the latest developments in the field, and identify gaps and challenges in U.S. and multilateral responses to criminal violence. In an off-the-record setting, we brought together government, academic, nonprofit, and private sector experts in the field of transnational crime from across the United States.

Participants discussed the evolution of transnational criminal networks in recent years and revealed that the relationship between the state and criminal organizations is far more complex than previously understood. Criminal organizations are moving from the periphery of society to the core, where they play an active role in domestic politics and international relations. Currently, two models exist to explain the relationship between states and criminal organizations, and it is essential that policymakers differentiate between them. The first is a state penetrated by transnational criminal organizations that benefit from particular areas of government. The relationship has traditionally been viewed through this model. The second is a “criminalized state” in which criminal organizations become instruments of state policy, which is rapidly becoming more prevalent.

Over time, illicit networks have evolved to incorporate characteristics once unique to the state and begun to comingle licit and illicit activities. To achieve this, criminal organizations sometimes seek sponsorship from a foreign government that will protect them from the local government; form their own sovereign principalities to gain control of a territory; or adopt a warlord strategy. Criminal organizations are gaining increased geopolitical importance and, at times, taking on sovereign characteristics and capabilities, including through land acquisition.

Participants identified three major gaps in the U.S. strategies to combat transnational organized crime. First, inflated threats, such as terrorism, and misunderstood realities of transnational crime pose a barrier to deeper understanding of the relationship between criminal organizations and states, a necessary component to combating newly emerging trends in illicit networks. Second, there is (unsurprisingly) a lack of interagency collaboration and information sharing within government that inhibits effectiveness, efficacy, and the establishment of best practices. Finally, there is a failure to engage with external actors including the nonprofit community, media, and the private sector, as well as regional and multilateral organizations.

To learn more about transnational organized crime and the workshop, read the full rapporteur note and the keynote address from Organization of American States Assistant Secretary General, Ambassador Albert Ramdin, and view a presentation from the office of the director of national intelligence.

While the Army’s primary mission remains its ability to fight and win the nation’s wars, this new model places greater emphasis on those areas “left of the bang.” Training will enable soldiers to prevent and shape so they don’t have to fight and win, especially if that fight may become a large-scale conflict a cash-strapped Army is not equipped to fight. In the words of one commander, the “battle is to prevent battle.”

“Americans on Foreign Policy, Obama’s Efficacy, and Same-Sex Marriage,” New York Times, June 6, 2013.

The results of a recent New York Times/CBS News poll show that a majority of Americans believe that the federal government should extend benefits to gay couples who are legally wed, and many people continue to oppose military intervention in Syria.

Do you think the United States should or should not take the leading role among all other countries in the world in trying to solve international conflicts?

Do you think the United States has a responsibility to do something about the fighting in Syria between government forces and anti-government groups, or doesn’t the United States have this responsibility?

“Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski Holds a Hearing on Department of Justice Budget,” Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Science, and Related Agencies, June 6, 2013.

COLLINS: Mr. Attorney General, it troubles me that the president has virtually unreviewable, unfettered authority to order the killing of any American citizen overseas who is suspected of terrorist activity without any kind of charge, or trial, or judicial review. We’ve all read this morning of the controversy over the NSA having access to phone records of American citizens. It seems to me that an American currently receives a greater degree of due process protections from the judicial branch of the government is seeking to listen in on his phone conversations, or get information about his phone conversations, than if the president is seeking to take his life?

That just doesn’t make sense to me. Why hasn’t the administration proposed to congress, a process that would provide some degree of independent judicial review for a targeted lethal strike against a U.S. person overseas? Something — either an expansion of the FISA Court, or a different kind of classified proceeding before a court to ensure that there’s some kind of judicial review, rather than vesting that authority to take a life, and American life I’m talking about overseas, only in the president?

HOLDER: With all due respect, I would say that it’s incorrect to say that the president has unlimited authority in this regard. With regard to the use of drones. And we are talking about being more transparent. I sent a letter to Chairman Leahy, the president gave a speech to make more transparent our efforts in this regard. But we operate under the statute that Congress passed, the authorization for the use of military force. And we also, when we are dealing with these matters, try to focus on capture where possible. We focus on whether or not the threat is eminent.

We also operate under the rules of law. And as the president said I think in his speech, people cannot plot against the United States. People cannot kill American citizens and then use as a shield their American citizenship. These are steps that we take with great care. They are the most difficult of decisions that we have to make. They are the things that keep me up at night, as I think about my role as part of the national security team in discussing these matters. The concerns your raise, I understand. They are legitimate ones. But we are working within the administration to make sure that when we take these ultimate measures, they are done in appropriate ways, that they are done in legal ways, and that they’re also done in a way that’s consistent with our values.

COLLINS: …Let me turn to a second point that you just made about a preference for capture. I haven’t seen a preference for capture. If you compare the number of terror suspects that are captured in the previous administration versus this administration, there’s a huge difference, as there is in the number of lethal strikes with drones that were undertaken. Is the reason for the exceedingly low number of captures due to the change in the Obama administration’s position on detention? And the fact that the administration does not want to send captives to Guantanamo? Isn’t that really the reason? I mean here we have a case of the terrorist, Warsame, who ultimately was convicted, but who was driven around on a Navy ship for two months because there really was no place to put him?

HOLDER: No, it is not a function of not trying to take people to Guantanamo. As you indicated, Warsame was captured, Abu Ghaith was captured and brought to face justice in an Article 3 court. The desire to capture is something that is something that we take seriously because we gain intelligence.

Doyle McManus, “McManus: Where’s the enemies list?” LA Times, June 5, 2013.

Nevertheless, both the Bush and Obama administrations decided that the 2001 authorization (the AUMF, for short) covered any group affiliated with Al Qaeda that plans operations against the United States or U.S. interests abroad.

In many cases, that’s a reasonably clear standard. When Al Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate put a terrorist with explosives in his underwear on a flight to Detroit, the target was plainly the U.S.

But other cases are more ambiguous. Does the Shabab militia in Somalia qualify? They are Islamic terrorists and a danger to East Africa, but they pose little threat to the United States. Does Ansar al Sharia, the group that attacked a U.S. mission in Libya last year but has loose ties to Al Qaeda, fit in? What about Al Nusra Front in Syria, a group born as part of the uprising against Bashar Assad?

Donna Miles, “SOCOM Officials Work on Plan for Global Network,” American Forces Press Service, June 3, 2013.

McRaven’s Socom 2020 vision calls for a globally networked force of special operations forces, interagency representatives, allies and partners, with aligned structures processes and authorities to enable its operations. Globally networked forces, he said, will provide geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission with an unprecedented unity of effort and an enhance ability to respond to regional contingencies and threats to stability.

“Pentagon, Regional Staffs Growing Despite Orders to Trim Personnel,” Defense News, June 2, 2013.

Data Show 15% Increase From 2010 to 2012

Overall, staff sizes of major US military commands grew by 15 percent from 2010 to 2012, despite then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ call to reduce staff sizes as a way of cutting redundancy and saving money.

OSD — 2010: 2,433; 2012: 2,665 (+232, 9.5%)
Joint Staff — 2010: 1,286; 2012: 4,244 (+2,958, 230%)
AFRICOM — 2010: 1,661; 2012: 1,919 (+285, 15.5%)
CENTCOM — 2010: 2,686; 2012: 3,207 (+521, 19.4%)
EUCOM — 2010: 2,494; 2012: 2,286 (-208, -8.3%)
NORTHCOM — 2010: 1,585; 2012: 1,687 (+102, 6.4%)
PACOM — 2010: 3,825; 2012: 4,147 (+322, 8.4%)
SOUTHCOM — 2010: 1,795; 2012 — 1,797 (+2, 0.1%)

“Report of the Subcommittee on Military Justice in Combat Zones,”  Defense Legal Policy Board, Department of Defense, May 30, 2013.

The evidence considered by the Subcommittee and presented in the Commission on Wartime Contracting report was persuasive that commanders do not have the ability to effectively control contractor misconduct, or sanction misconduct. Commanders must have control of their battlespace and the necessary tools to apply consistently both the rules of engagement and battlefield ethics. Presently, commanders do not have sufficient authority to adequately handle alleged contractor misconduct relating to civilian casualties. Commanders have some authority over contractors who are serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field, but that authority is effectively withheld at SecDef level.

The Subcommittee concludes that presently, commanders do not have adequate control over all contractors acting within their battlespace. The UCMJ provides jurisdiction over “persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands,” subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law.

It also provides jurisdiction over “persons serving with or accompanying an armed forces in the field” in time of declared war or contingency operations. These provisions provide some jurisdiction over contractors, but limit it to instances where contractors are serving with, employed by, or accompanying armed forces. Many contractors in today’s battlespace may have an agreement with the United States to operate in the operational environment, but are not serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces. These contractors currently fall outside of the purview of the military justice system. To the extent that they may come within the jurisdiction of DOJ under MEJA, jurisdiction is limited to felonies and its exercise can be cumbersome. Accordingly, the Subcommittee recommends that Article 2, UCMJ, should be amended to allow for jurisdiction over all U.S. government contractors on the battlefield, regardless of U.S. government departmental affiliation.

Last night, NBC News ran an extremely rare story that aptly challenged the veracity of U.S. government claims about the precision of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. Part of the title used by NBC was misleading: “Exclusive: CIA Didn’t Always Know Who it Was Killing in Drone Strikes, Classified Documents Show.”

Two months earlier, McClatchy reporter Jonathan Landay wrote two pieces on drone-strikes in Pakistan based upon internal, top-secret U.S. intelligence reports. Landay’s unprecedented investigative reporting was essential because, as I wrote at the time, it “demonstrates that the claim repeatedly made by President Obama and his senior aides–that targeted killings are limited only to officials, members, and affiliates of al Qaeda who pose an imminent threat of attack on the U.S. homeland–is false.” Reversing his administration’s claims over the previous fifteen months, President Obama essentially acknowledged two weeks ago what Landay’s reporting had proven: CIA drone strikes in Pakistan are intended as “force protection” for U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan, not solely to protect the U.S. homeland.

NBC News’ reporting was apparently based on some, not all, of the same documents. What was new in last night’s story was that NBC showed the actual classified assessments of who was killed in 114 strikes—I skimmed these before I was interviewed. (See my two-minute interview here.) The documents bolster Landay’s findings that most of those killed are not members of “Al Qaeda,” with a quarter described generically as “other militants.”

Subsequently, the documents acknowledged just one civilian casualty, plausible only under the signature strikes categorization used by the Obama administration, which “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants.” As Richard Engel stated on last night’s broadcast: “Several former senior officials told us they had concerns about signature strikes. One told us, the U.S. sometimes executes people based on circumstantial evidence.” The U.S. government has never acknowledged that it conducts signature strikes, provided information upon which to judge how the CIA assesses such evidence, or what procedures are in place to prevent harm to civilians.

NBC News also interviewed twenty-seven year old Senior Airman Brandon Bryant (ret.), who was a drone operator from 2006 to 2011. He is described as having guided drones over Iraq and Afghanistan. Bryant told Engel that when he left, he was given a sheet of paper (they showed this actual piece of paper on this morning’s Today Show broadcast). According to Bryant, the paper said there were “1,626 total people killed on every mission that I had ever been on.” When asked how that made him feel, Bryan replied: “disgusted with myself, actually.”

STAFF: We’re here to talk to you today about the speech the president’s about to give at 2 o’clock at National Defense University on counterterrorism. This call is on background, attributable to senior administration officials. So that you know who’s talking to you, we have (inaudible) again, this is on background to senior administration officials. This call is embargoed until 2 p.m., when the president speaks. We actually don’t have a lot of time, so we’ll go ahead and get started. We’ll have (inaudible) run through what’s in the speech, and then we’ll take your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’ll just run through some of the elements of the speech, and then we’ll take your questions.

The purpose of this speech is to take a step back and take a broad look at our counterterrorism efforts. And I think you will see the president cover a significant amount of ground in this speech. He’ll review what has taken place since 9/11 in the war against Al Qaida and its associated forces and he will discuss how the threat has changed substantially over the course of the last decade.

We now face a situation in which the core of Al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on a path to defeat. They have been greatly damaged by our relentless pursuit of Al Qaida’s senior leadership and the threat of 9/11-style attacks, mass casualty attacks in the United States, has been greatly reduced.

At the same time, however, we have seen the threat change significantly, and new threats have emerged. And for instance, we face a threat from Al Qaida affiliates, notably AQAP, who continue to plot against the homeland. We face a threat from the unrest in the Arab world, which has allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries that are undergoing significant change. These groups are often more locally focused, in terms of the types of attacks that they carry out, and we are vigilant, of course, for any ambitions that they may demonstrate towards transnational plotting. But a lot of these groups do not focus on attacks beyond their borders.

We also face a threat from homegrown violent extremism, as we recently saw in Boston. So you face a situation where threats like those from AQAP, like those of the attacks on our diplomatic facility in Benghazi, and like those of the attacks in Boston represent the future of the types of threats we’re facing from terrorism, rather than the type of threat we faced on 9/11.

The president will discuss a broad strategy for how we deal with that threat. I’ll just talk through several of the elements that he’ll discuss. One is, he will discuss how we take direct action, including lethal action, against Al Qaida and its associated forces. We have a preference for working with partners and strengthening their capacity to take action against terrorist networks. And we see that in Pakistan, where the Pakistanis have taken action against extremists, in Yemen, where we’re strengthening security forces, in Somalia, for instance, where we’re working with other nations to combat Al-Shabaab.

However, it is the case that the United States does take direct lethal action against Al Qaida and its associated forces, including beyond the active warzone of Afghanistan, and we do so with unmanned aerial vehicles, drones. And the president will be discussing the presidential policy guidance that he signed this week that codifies the high and rigorous standards that we’ve applied for the use of direct lethal action.

I’ll just mention a few of the types of standards that he will be discussing today. So, for instance, again, let me preface this by saying he’ll make clear both the policy and legal rationale for our actions and the fact that our actions are lawful under both domestic and international law, as well as, again, our preference for working with partners to combat terrorist networks.

At the same time, he’ll make clear that beyond the Afghan theater, we only target Al Qaida and its associated forces, and we place constraints on our actions. America does not take drone strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists. We have a preference to detain, interrogate and prosecute terrorists.

America acts with respect for state sovereignty, so we do not claim the right to take strikes wherever we choose. We do so respectful of state sovereignty. America does not take strikes to punish individuals. We only take action against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat.

And importantly, before any strike is taken, there must be a near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured in the strike, which is the highest standard that we can set for avoiding civilian casualties. Those are the types of standards that he’ll be addressing.

He’ll also discuss at length the various tradeoffs and questions that he wrestles with and that our government has wrestled with in using lethal force abroad as it relates to efforts to prevent civilian casualties, and I think you will hear him make a very strong case that the use of targeted action is preferable to large-scale military deployments, to other types of more indiscriminate air power, and, of course, to permitting terrorist attacks that could be prevented to take place.

As a part of his discussion, he will address the declassification that he authorized this week of the four instances in which U.S. citizens have been killed in U.S. lethal action — or, sorry, U.S. counterterrorism operations abroad. He will make clear that, in the instance in which a U.S. citizen was targeted, Anwar Awlaki, there was a very careful review both by the Department of Justice and across the administration about the decision to take that strike, while also making clear that Congress was fully briefed on that action before it took place.

He will also make clear in that context that the standards that we apply for taking lethal action abroad are uniform for all people, American citizens and other terrorist targets. He will discuss the importance of oversight, including how we’ve been committed to congressional oversight. He will also indicate that he is open to and has asked his administration to review the possibility of additional oversight of legal actions outside of warzones that goes beyond Congress. And he will discuss some of the tradeoffs associated with, for instance, a potential special court that could evaluate and authorize lethal action or an independent body within the executive branch that could do so. And he will indicate that he is open to working with Congress to review those types of options going forward.

At the same time, he’ll make clear that the use of force is not the totality of our strategy against terrorism, nor should it be. It must be seen as part of a broader counterterrorism strategy, because, frankly, the use of force alone cannot defeat the violent extremism that leads to terrorist attacks, and the perpetual use of force would alter our country in a fundamental way.

He will discuss strategies, again, for promoting democratic governance in the context of the transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. He will discuss, again, the importance of the United States being engaged around the world to resolve conflict and to help promote development. And in that context, he will discuss the tradeoffs of needing to be present in dangerous parts of the world, but also needing to secure our diplomats, and he’ll reiterate his call for Congress to fully fund our efforts to bolster security at our diplomatic posts abroad, even as we wrestle with the tradeoffs of needing to be present in dangerous places and facing risks in those places.

He will also discuss the threats of homegrown extremism, making clear that we have faced the threat of violent extremism from within our borders throughout our history and need to take action, though, given the fact that in today’s world, particularly given the Internet, individuals can be radicalized and commit themselves to a violent agenda and learn how to kill without leaving their homes. And he’ll discuss the efforts we have underway to work with law enforcement and to work with the Muslim American community, again, to identify signs of radicalization, when individuals are drifting toward violence, and to prevent these types of acts of homegrown terrorism here in the United States.

He will also discuss some of the other tradeoffs associated with our efforts to both combat terrorism and protect our open society. One of those issues is the ongoing discussion of leak investigations. And the president will indicate that he believes that, again, we must protect the right of a free press, even as we must prosecute those who violate the law and their commitment to protect classified information.

He’ll reiterate his personal concern about any potential chilling effect on investigative reporting that results from these types of leak investigations. And to prevent that effect, he’ll reiterate his call on Congress to pass a media shield law, and he’ll also indicate additional steps that he is taking, along with the attorney general, to make sure that we are reviewing the guidelines under which there are investigations of potential leaks.

He will also discuss his effort to engage Congress going forward about the authorization to use military force that has been in force for nearly 12 years, and he will discuss the need to refine that authorization going forward, consistent with his commitment, again, to make sure that we have a sustainable approach to fighting terrorism.

With the Afghan war ending, with Al Qaida core being significantly degraded, it is the president’s belief that we need to discipline our thinking as it relates to terrorism, and we need to ensure that this war that we’re engaged in, like all American wars, must come to an end.

And that relates to the subject of detention, which he’ll discuss. He will reiterate his call for the closure of Gitmo. I think you’ll hear him make the case for why Gitmo should be closed at length, given its cost to our reputation, its cost in terms of budgetary expenditure, as well as the constraints it places on our ability to work with other countries and to bring certain terrorists to justice.

He will announce a number of specific steps that he can take related to the closure of Gitmo. He’ll call on Congress to lift restrictions on detainee transfers from Gitmo. He will indicate that he’s asking the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions. He’ll indicate that he is appointing a new senior envoy at the State Department, as well as a new senior official at the Defense Department who will be responsible for achieving the transfers of detainees to other countries.

He will announce that he is lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen, so that we can review those on a case-by-case basis, and to the greatest extent possible, indicate that we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries. And he will indicate, again, his commitment to bringing terrorists to justice in our courts, in the military justice system, as well as his commitment to insist that judicial review is available for every detainee at Gitmo.

Obviously, he covers a lot of ground in this speech. The purpose generally is to put in context for the American people where we are in the fight against terrorism, to address the fact that the threat has changed and to try to take all of these elements of our counterterrorism strategy and put them on a more sustainable footing, a footing that, again, envisions the day when we no longer need to be on the type of war footing that we have been in for the last nearly 12 years.

I will say that the president believes that this type of transparency is essential in our democracy. He indicated that he wanted to give a speech like this in the State of the Union, and we have been working on this speech since then, and the presidential policy guidance that he finalized today we’ve actually been working on for many, many months, back into last year, and they reflect, again, the rigorous approach we’ve applied to this over the course of the last four years.

With that, we’ll be happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: Is the president’s decision to make these changes at Guantanamo Bay spurred by the ongoing hunger strike? And if not because of the hunger strike, why take action now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, the president has always been committed to closing Gitmo. And we pursued a number of transfers of detainees in pursuit of that goal in the first term. What happened then is Congress placed extraordinary restrictions on our ability to transfer individuals either to the United States or to other countries and essentially slowed down this process.

Now, given that this is the beginning or near the beginning of his second term, and given the importance he places on closing Gitmo, he feels the need to indicate every action that he can take as president to accomplish this goal of closing Gitmo and to bring Congress into that effort, because ultimately we do need congressional support.

With respect to the hunger strike, I think it’s certainly true that you’ll hear him reference that as an indication of the type of situation we have, where you have 166 detainees many of whom have been cleared for transfer to other countries who are resorting to that tactic, given the inability to move forward with a number of the mechanisms that we have for resolving their cases and closing Gitmo.

The fundamental point is that this is part of his commitment to closing Gitmo because it’s in our national security interest and it’s consistent with our commitment to the rule of law. The timing is driven both again by the president indicating his agenda on this issue in his second term, but part of the context of that is people taking drastic steps of hunger strikes in Gitmo.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The other thing I would say is what you’ll the president will indicate his intention to lift the moratorium on transfers to Yemen that had previously been in place. And I think what that also reflects is a recognition that in President Hadi the United States has a willing and increasingly able partner who is presiding over a political transition in Yemen. And the president’s decision to lift the moratorium on transfers to Yemen and address those transfers on a case-by-case basis, consistent with our national security, also reflects those changed circumstances.

QUESTION: Will the president address what he would like to be done with Gitmo detainees who can’t be tried for various reasons and who are deemed too dangerous to be released? Does he have any power on his own to address this system? Or is it completely in the hands of Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will address that topic. First of all, as a general matter, he will make clear that we have been acting entirely consistent with the law of war in how we end conflicts abroad.

For instance, in Iraq, we transferred thousands of detainees to the Iraqi government as a part of ending the war. In Afghanistan, we’re in the process of transitioning detention facilities to the Afghan government. The point being, that beyond the population in Gitmo, we have not engaged in preventive detention without subjecting all of our actions to the laws of war.

Even at Gitmo, that is the legal authority under which individuals are being held. But he will acknowledge that this is the most difficult piece of the puzzle in terms of resolving all of the cases at Gitmo, in part because, in some instances you have individuals who’ve had the evidence against them compromised or have evidence against them that is not admissible in a court.

But at the same time, he will make clear that if we commit ourselves to a process of closing Gitmo, that includes not just transfers to other countries, but prosecutions here in military and criminal justice systems, that he believes we can resolve that issue and we can do so consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.

I think what the president will be indicating is, if we make a concerted effort to close Gitmo, to resolve all these cases, and to use all available tools within our justice system, he believes we can resolve that issue and we can act with the Gitmo population as we have across the board, completely in line with the laws of war and our own commitment to the rule of law. We’ll take the next question.

QUESTION: The new order the president signed in the past week on drones, how many of these criteria are new? In other words, did not apply to previous drone strikes before this order was signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This has been an evolving process. And basically, I think you’ve heard and John mentioned in his speech and other places that we’ve been continually refining and strengthening the process by which we deal with this. And when you look at the public fact sheet that will be released on these procedures, what you’ll see is a lot of interagency process, some of which is –basically all of which over time evolves– and then you’ll also see that there are criteria listed, and some of them will be slightly different than the criteria, for example, that John Brennan noted in his Wilson Center speech.

And it’s sort of an evolving process. One of the differences is, we were looking at significant threats in the Wilson Center speech, and now we’re looking at continuing and imminent threats. That is, in a sense, one of the standards that has evolved.

And in addition, you’ll see a lot of stress on making every reasonable effort to address whatever the threat is through our markets, through the host nation, through other mechanisms. But otherwise, you’ll see also a lot of continuity in the way in which we approach these things that are basically being codified in the guidance that’s been issued.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only thing I’d add to that is, as (inaudible) indicates, we have sought to refine these practices over time. The president believed that, given the grave issues at stake here, it was necessary to codify these guidelines so they were clear to all agencies of our government and to the American people and the world, as well.

And in some instances, as (inaudible) indicated, that involves strengthened standards, like only taking action against continued and imminent threats to the United States, for instance. And you’ll also see the president indicating here that he insists that near certainty that civilians won’t be killed or injured is a part of the standards under which the United States takes action.

In some respects, this does indicate the codification of the highest standards that we have pursued in the course of the last several years, and that is meant as a baseline to guide us going forward.

I’ll also note that, without getting into every operation here, that we do indicate in the PPG that the United States military is the appropriate agency to use force outside of active warzones, given their traditional role and given the transparency that can be associated with actions by the United States military.

Again, that’s not to say that the United States does not pursue a range of counterterrorism operations around the world, but there is an expressed preference indicated for the United States military to have the lead for the use of forces around the world. With that, we’ll take the next question.

QUESTION: When Anwar al-Awlaki was targeted in Yemen and the 16-year-old son who was killed was also an American citizen, I’m just wondering, how do you see this? Do you see it as collateral damage or guilt by association? Where does he fall, in terms of being just the son of Anwar al-Awlaki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, as was made clear in the letter yesterday, Anwar al-Awlaki was the one U.S. citizen who was targeted for direct lethal action by the United States. And the purpose of that decision was rooted in the fact that Anwar al-Awlaki posed a continuing and imminent threat to the United States as the chief of external operations for AQAP, as somebody who had played a role in plots like the Christmas Day attack, like the effort to blow up cargo planes headed for the United States, and in ongoing plotting against the United States.

In those other instances, I don’t want to get into the details of each of those instances. What I will say generally is that there are times when there are individuals who are present at Al Qaida and associated forces’ facilities, and in that regard, they are subject to the lethal action that we take.

There are other instances when there are tragic cases of civilian casualties and people that the United States do not in any way intend to target, because, again, as in any war, there are tragic consequences that come with the decisions to use force, including civilian casualties.

Again, what the president will discuss in the speech is the tradeoffs involved and the fact that, frankly, we believe that there would be far greater civilian casualties if the United States were to use its military abroad in the way in which we did in Iraq or even Afghanistan to go after terrorists. There would be greater civilian casualties were we to use more indiscriminate air power that is not as able to be precise, like some of our drone strikes are.

At the same time, there are greater civilian casualties that would result from a failure to prevent terrorist attacks not just in the United States, but in places like Yemen, where you’ve seen far more Yemenis killed by AQAP than you have seen Americans.

That’s the type of discussion you’ll see from the president today, one that acknowledges that we do take targeted action against individuals who pose a continuing imminent threat. At the same time, we acknowledge and wrestle with the need to avoid any civilian casualties, and we view any civilian casualty as a tragic consequence of this ongoing war.

QUESTION: I was hoping that you could talk in more detail about either in the speech or, if he’s not getting into it in the speech, how what he’s doing will work in terms of the shifting of more of the drone responsibilities from the CIA to the military. What countries? What schedule? Will it go to JSOC or will it be more transparent? And also, will signature strikes explicitly be prohibited now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to which agency is responsible, I’ll repeat a bit of what I said to (inaudible) in the sense that, we’re not going to be able to discuss every counterterrorism operation that we undertake around the world. I think what we do express in the PPG, though, is the preference that the United States military have the lead for the use of force, not just in warzones like Afghanistan, but beyond Afghanistan, where we are fighting against Al Qaida and its associated forces. There’s an indication of a preference for the Department of Defense to engage in the use of force outside of warzones. What I’d say on the signature strike question that you asked, again, I don’t want to get into the details of any, of a specific strike. What I’d say is, first of all, we indicate a preference to work with partners, first and foremost, to deal with the threat of terrorism. Any action that we do take in terms of direct lethal action is subject to that standard of a continuing and imminent threat to the United States.

The context for this is generally our war against Al Qaida and associated forces, but, of course, in the Afghan war theater, there is a slightly different context, in the sense that we take action against high-value Al Qaida targets, but we also take action against forces that are massing to support attacks on our troops and on coalition forces in Afghanistan.

By the end of 2014, as we wind down the war in Afghanistan, we will not have the same need for force protection and those types of strikes that are designed to protect our forces in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we believe that the core of Al Qaida has been greatly diminished, therefore, that will reduce the need for unmanned strikes against the core of Al Qaida, as well.

I think you can take from that the context for which we view these strikes, particularly in the Afghan war theater, where there have been these dual needs in the past for both action against Al Qaida core and action to protect our forces in Afghanistan.

Given the two principal changing circumstances in our effort against terrorism — the winding down of the war in Afghanistan and the demise of Al Qaida core — the need for the types of strikes that we’ve taken generally over the core of the last several years will be reduced over time.

QUESTION: Can you tell me if the president believes the U.S. is still in a war on terror? Or is that a phrase that he doesn’t embrace?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The president has indicated and will indicate again today that he rejects the notion of a global war on terrorism, which is an amorphous definition that applies to a tactic. Rather than fighting a global war on terrorism, which is open-ended and expansive in nature and is not precise, in terms of who we are fighting, the president I think will make clear that what we are engaged in is a focused effort against a very specific network of violent extremists that threaten the United States and pose a direct and credible threat to the United States.

In other words, we are defining this more narrowly than a global war on terrorism. This is an effort to dismantle a specific group of networks that pose a threat to the United States.

I think you’ll see the president also indicate that even that effort we have to acknowledge will come to an end at some point, that the purpose of this effort is not to sustain a war footing in perpetuity, but it’s rather to defeat Al Qaida and their associated forces and reduce the threat to the United States.

I think the president will also indicate that ultimately our resilience is our strongest weapon in this effort. You cannot eliminate risk. You cannot eliminate terrorism. And I think the president will discuss in the speech the fact that the types of threats that we face today are of a similar scale to the threat that we face from terrorism in the past, when we had attacks on our embassies and we had attacks on planes and transit systems.

Again, the notion that you can eliminate terrorism altogether is not something that is realistic. What is necessary is to dismantle groups like Al Qaida and their associated forces who have posed such an elevated threat to the United States, to reduce the threat to our diplomats serving overseas, but ultimately to have a sustainable and resilient approach that focuses our efforts on the groups that are most dangerous to us, but does not get drawn into wars with groups that do not pose a credible threat to the United States.

QUESTION: How specific will the president be? And will you actually present to Congress language or, if not language, ideas about this concept of a separate evidentiary review for targeted drone strikes? You mentioned that the president’s open to that. I’m just curious, how open? And is he so open he’s going to present some language to Congress?

And (inaudible) said that the policy has been evolving. Clearly, the number of drone strikes are down in Pakistan, they’re down in Yemen. They haven’t occurred in Somalia. To what degree does that reduction in numbers reflect the ongoing evolution of this policy and if something’s been essentially not done that would have been done, say, a year-and-a-half or two years ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On your second question, I’d say it’s both. It’s both the fact that we have reduced the threat of terrorism and removed a lot of the senior leadership of Al Qaida and some other affiliates and also our effort to ensure that there are high standards and constraints on our use of lethal force.

On your first question, there are two areas I think where the president will indicate a desire to engage Congress. One is this question of independent review. I think we’re not proposing language at this point. What we’re indicating is their ideas, for instance, to have a special court, like a FISA-type court, to review lethal action or to have an independent body within the executive branch. We’re open to those ideas.

But Congress should be a part of the discussion and the American people should be a part of the discussion. We have done our part with this presidential policy guidance to constrain ourselves and to set standards on the use of direct action, but at the same time, we need to bring Congress into that discussion, and that’s something we’ll be doing going forward.

Similarly, the AUMF is an area where the president will indicate a desire to work with Congress, but he’ll make clear that, as a part of that effort, he’s not seeking to broaden presidential authorities. He’s seeking to refine this so that we have a more disciplined and sustainable approach to fighting terrorism.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On your question about independent review, as (inaudible) said, what I think what you’ll hear from the president is there is an openness, and he certainly understands the concerns that have been raised, and this whole PPG effort is an effort to recognize the need to have these types of checks. And you’ll hear him discuss those different ideas and also the tradeoffs and the difficulties that are associated with some of them.

QUESTION: Question about Guantanamo. The president could have moved independent of Congress, despite their restrictions before. Is he now prepared to assert that there is, under the current guidelines, no chance that these particular detainees that go back to Yemen will rejoin jihad? Is that something you feel comfortable with, despite the improvements that you’ve cited in the governance there?

And separately, on the subject of media investigations, are you completely comfortable with the assertion yesterday from the prosecutor that every attempt was made to narrow the scope and limit these inquiries, to the extent that the president is going to say today that he believes in press freedoms and wants a shield law, when the broad impression — and feel free to correct it — is that this has been the most aggressive investigation into leaks involving media freedoms of any administration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’m not going to comment on any specific case as it relates to leak investigations. You know we can’t do that.

What I’ll say generally is, first of all, the president has a responsibility as commander-in-chief to prevent the release of sensitive information. Frankly, a lot of the public discussion has been focused on certain instances where these are investigations that were called for by Congress, as well.

But I think what the president will indicate today in his speech is that the target of these investigations should be those individuals who break the law and could violate their commitment to protect classified information, should not be reporters, and reporters have a right to be tough, aggressive, investigative journalists, and that’s a fundamental part of our democracy. That’s, I think, the way in which you’ll hear him frame it.

On Gitmo, (inaudible) wanted to discuss this. I’d just reinforce that, again, we have a national security interest in closing the facility, first of all, and we have a changed circumstance in Yemen, with respect to the moratorium, but…

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the Gitmo piece, the moratorium was something that the president imposed, and that was an action he took before the congressional restrictions. What he will say is he now wants to be able to consider those transfers on a case-by-case basis, consistent with national security.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I’d just add one more thing, because it’s important. The president is announcing today all the steps that he can take to move this forward. There is a responsibility on Congress here. And he will call on Congress to lift these restrictions.

What you’re hearing from him today on Gitmo is, here’s what I can do as commander-in-chief and president of the United States to close this facility that is harmful to our national interests and that costs us nearly $1 million to detain an individual for one year. We need to get this done. But Congress has a responsibility, as well, and that’s what we’re going to be looking for going forward.

The men and women who hack for the NSA belong to a secretive unit known as Tailored Access Operations. It gathers vast amounts of intelligence on terrorist financial networks, international money-laundering and drug operations, the readiness of foreign militaries, even the internal political squabbles of potential adversaries, according to two former U.S. government security officials, who asked not to be named when discussing foreign intelligence gathering. For years, the NSA wouldn’t acknowledge TAO’s existence. A Pentagon official who also asked not to be named confirmed that TAO conducts cyber espionage, or what the Department of Defense calls “computer network exploitation,” but emphasized that it doesn’t target technology, trade, or financial secrets. The official says the number of people who work for TAO is classified. NSA spokeswoman Vaneé Vines would not answer questions about the unit.

Adam Entous, Drew Hinshaw, and David Gauthier-Villars, “Militants, Chased from Mali, Pose New Threats,” The Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2013.

In the last four months of fighting in Mali, the French government says its warplanes and commandos have killed an estimated 800 militants linked to al Qaeda and its allies, helping the West African country to recover control over its territory and setting the stage for free elections.

(3PA: The French killed more suspected militants in Mali in four months, than all suspected militants and civilians killed in all U.S. drone strikes in 2012 and 2013 (644 total), according to The Long War Journal)

Ray Takeyh, “In Syria, Go Big or Go Home,” New York Times, May 27, 2013.

The sort of intervention needed to bring about a decisive rebel victory would require more than no-fly zones and arms. It would mean disabling Mr. Assad’s air power and putting boots on the ground. America would have to take the lead in organizing a regional military force blessed by the Arab League and supported by its own intelligence assets and Special Forces. After that would come the task of reconstituting Syria and mediating its sectarian conflicts. As the war in Iraq painfully demonstrated, refashioning national institutions from the debris of a civil war can be more taxing than the original military intervention.

Because it would take all of this to oust Mr. Assad and end the violence, America must accept the need for a robust intervention…

Paradoxically, an intervention intended to persuade Iran’s leaders of the viability of American red lines could instead convince them that their nuclear program is safe from American retaliation.

(3PA: Intervening massively in a state neighboring Iran in order to demonstrate U.S. credibility is an absurd and wasteful objective. Also, as the U.S.-led Afghanistan and Iraq military campaigns have proven, this does not in any way threaten Iran. For more see: “Hawking Something.”)

Jay Carney, “Press Briefing by Secretary Jay Carney 5/29/13,” The White House, May 29, 2013.

Q: Last week, the President spoke about greater transparency in its drone program.  And in that spirit, I want to ask whether you can confirm reports of a drone attack that killed a Pakistani Taliban leader today in Pakistan?

MR. CARNEY:  While we are not in the position to confirm the reports of Waliur Rehman’s death, if those reports were true or prove to be true, it’s worth noting that his demise would deprive the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan of its second in command and chief military strategist.  Waliur Rehman has participated in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan against U.S. and NATO personnel and horrific attacks against Pakistani civilians and soldiers.  And he is wanted in connection to the murder of seven American citizens on December 30, 2009, at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan. So while I am not in a position to confirm the reports of his death, it’s important to note who this individual is…

Q: Would you in the future then, if you have knowledge, would you be releasing this kind of information as part of this strategy that the President –

MR. CARNEY:   I think it’s important to note that as part of this commitment to transparency, the President’s speech at NDU laid out the legal and policy standards that guide our actions at great length, against whom and under what circumstances we take direct action.  Those standards are now there for the American public and the world to see.  That does not mean that we would be able to discuss the details of every counterterrorism operation, but it does mean that there are standards in place that are public and available for every American to review.

We will continue to take strikes against high-value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces.  By the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection and the progress we have made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.

(3PA: Carney claims that the legal and policy standards for U.S. targeted killings are found in Obama’s speech. If you actually read the speech (or the presidential policy guidance white paper), they are not. Those standards were only made available through leaks to journalists (See: Confront and Confused for more on this). Moreover, Carney implies that after 2014, the need for “force protection” drone strikes in Pakistan will be reduced. However, the current U.S.-Afghanistan partnership agreement is reported to extend through 2024, and will include U.S. access to nine military bases, according to the last draft proposal presented by the Americans.  Thus, according to the White House’s own standards, there could be U.S. drone strikes into Pakistan for another decade, to protect whatever U.S. forces remain beyond the end of 2014.)

“UN Human Rights Expert Calls for a Moratorium on Lethal Autonomous Robots,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 30, 2013.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, today called for a global pause in the development and deployment of lethal autonomous robots (LARs), to allow “serious and meaningful international engagement on this issue before we proceed to a world where machines are given the power to kill humans.”

“This may make it easier for States to go to war; and raises the question whether they can be programmed to comply with the requirements of international humanitarian law, especially the distinction between combatant and civilians and collateral damage,” he explained.

Karen Parrish, “Cyber May Be Biggest Threat, Hagel Tells Troops,” American Forces Press Service, May 31, 2013.

“Cyber is one of those quiet, deadly, insidious unknowns you can’t see,” Hagel added. “It’s in the ether -it’s not one big navy sailing into a port, or one big army crossing a border, or squadrons of fighter planes. … This is a very difficult, but real and dangerous, threat. There is no higher priority for our country than this issue.”

“Not Always With Us,” The Economist, June 1, 2013.

In 1990, 43% of the population of developing countries lived in extreme poverty (then defined as subsisting on $1 a day); the absolute number was 1.9 billion people. By 2000 the proportion was down to a third. By 2010 it was 21% (or 1.2 billion; the poverty line was then $1.25, the average of the 15 poorest countries’ own poverty lines in 2005 prices, adjusted for differences in purchasing power). The global poverty rate had been cut in half in 20 years.

Adam Roston, “Update: SOUTHCOM ISR Helped Kill 32 ‘Narco-Terrorists’,” Defense News, May 30, 2013.

Earlier this year, leaders of U.S. Southern Command told Congress that ISR support provided to nations south of Mexico had led to more than “32 high-value narco-terrorists killed in action.” Just who were these individuals killed with U.S. help? SOUTHCOM’s posture statement didn’t say. So we asked. It turns out they were members of Colombia’s FARC and ELN rebel groups or of Peru’s Shining Path, according to an emailed response from SOUTHCOM spokesman Jose Ruiz.

(3PA: This is an example of the trend of “Outsourcing Lethality.”)

I had a column published at Foreign Policy today that analyzes the divergence between what President Obama said about drone strikes in his counterterrorism speech last week, and what his senior aides selectively leaked to journalists. Subsequently, many columnists and journalists have mistakenly characterized Obama’s speech as placing tight restrictions on who can be targeted with drone strikes. Others listened to the speech and believed, as National Public Radio stated: “Obama Pledges To Be More Transparent About Drone Program.”

The actual speech neither presented new restrictions, nor offered much in the way of transparency. The president highlighted his decision to authorize attorney general Eric Holder to provide a letter to the senate judiciary committee that acknowledges that four U.S. citizens died in drone strikes, three of whom were not the intended target. Given that all but one of the citizen’s names was reported in the press, this was an example of belated transparency through the acknowledgment of already public information.

Unfortunately, this low bar for transparency about drone strikes is becoming the norm for the Obama administration. Two weeks ago, the Senate Armed Services Committee invited four Pentagon officials to testify at a hearing, “The Law of Armed Conflict, and the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.” Although the media did not report it, the Pentagon’s joint statement for the record contained this remarkable passage:

We have also made significant efforts to increase transparency regarding whom the U.S. military targets in the current conflict…Last year, for example, we declassified information about the U.S. military’s counterterrorism activities in Yemen and Somalia in a June 2012 War Powers report to Congress. This type of transparency helps preserve public confidence, dispel misconceptions that the U.S. military targets low-level terrorists who pose no threat to the United States, and address questions raised by our allies and partners abroad.

In March, the former chief Pentagon lawyer Jeh Johnson admitted that agreeing to even that basic of language required “a long and difficult deliberative process to get there.” So what far-reaching and specific revelations were contained in the June 2012 War Powers report?

In a limited number of cases, the U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qa’ida…engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests.

The U.S. military has also been working closely with the Yemeni government to operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)…Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests.

That’s all. Here again, the White House acknowledged (albeit with no specificity) to Congress what was public information, which the Pentagon touted as a “type of transparency.” Nothing contained in the White House War Powers report to Congress preserved public confidence, dispelled any misconceptions, or certainly addressed the many problems that U.S. allies and partners have with America’s interpretation of the scope of who can be lawfully killed by drone strikes. The White House communications strategy of repeating over and over again that it is committed to greater transparency and public debate regarding targeted killings does not make it so.

Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Director of the CFR Program on Energy Security and Climate Change. Michael is the author of the new book The Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America’s Future (Oxford University Press, 2013). He holds a Bachelors of Science in mathematical physics from Queen’s University, an MA in physics from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London. 

1. What is the most interesting project you are currently working on?

I’m finishing a book with a colleague of mine, Elizabeth Economy, on China’s natural resource quest and what it means for economies, international relationships, the environment, and security. I see it, along with the work I’ve been doing in energy and security, as another way to explore the broader interaction of international economics and international security. I think that is one of the most interesting areas to explore right now, both for policy and international relations, and I’ve been trying to get at it from a variety of angles.

2. What got you started in your career?

I grew up very interested in politics and policy but it never occurred to me that you could make that into a career until I went to graduate school at Princeton in physics and was surrounded by students at the Woodrow Wilson School who were actually involved in policy and making it a career. I audited a couple of courses in science and policy and eventually moved to Washington, DC. When I reflect on the critical juncture as an undergraduate in physics, where I decided to stay in physics despite being skeptical, I recall a conference I attended where someone made a presentation on how they were using plutonium from old Soviet weapons to produce nuclear power. I thought that was really cool.  But it took me another five years to figure out that was actually the sort of thing I wanted to be involved in as a career.

3. What person, book or article has been most influential to your thinking?

Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. It is the best blend of theory and the application of that theory across specific cases. Not as a way to test the theory, but to help flesh it out.

4. What kind of advice would you give to young people in your field?

The first piece of advice I would give is to take your time. It’s easy to think you need to establish yourself quickly and rush ahead as fast as you can, but you almost always have more time than you think you do and you will regret not taking advantage of opportunities to learn broadly so that you can draw on a breadth of knowledge later in your career. The other advice I would give is learn well beyond your field. The most interesting research, the most creative ideas in the policy world tend to come when people are able to bridge different areas and link different issues, and you can’t do that if you are purely focused in one narrow area.

5. What was the last book you finished reading?

The last book I finished all the way through was Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead by Sheryl Sandberg. I thought it was a great book. I expected the clips that I read in the media to be the most interesting things, but I got through those in the first chapter, and the rest had all sorts of interesting things, both for understanding how to collaborate and how to make a work place function better but also advice for almost anyone who works with people on a day-to-day basis.

The last book that I almost finished was To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism by Evgeny Morozov, which was brilliantly written. I can only wish I was so sharp in making my points, but it got a  bit repetitive after a while, which is why I didn’t get through the whole thing. I liked it though because it had a theme that is close to my heart, which is that people expect too much from technology as a substitute for politics in society and deliberate action.

6. What is the most overlooked threat to U.S. national interests?

I don’t know if it’s overlooked, but political dysfunction is certainly overlooked by people who are trying to make us more capable of addressing threats to American national interest. We can pour enormous amounts of efforts and money into coming up with smart ideas in different areas, but if Washington is a mess, it’s not clear how you actually pursue them. People in my world, for good reasons, try to keep our hands out of politics, but ultimately politics is a prime factor in determining what we do.

7. What do you believe is the most inflated threat to U.S. national interests?

I’m a bit blinkered because I’m going to focus on something that I’ve spent time thinking about. But the threat that a country would deliberately pass a nuclear bomb to a terrorist group is extraordinarily inflated. It’s not something you should write off entirely but there are so many reasons why even Iranian leaders, if they got the bomb, would not want to hand one to a terrorist group.

For more information they should read a Council Special Report, “Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism,” that I wrote several years ago on how to deter state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism.

8. What is the most significant emerging global challenge?

Broadly the rise of China brings forth a whole complex of global challenges, whether they are environmental, economic, or more traditional security challenges. I think it’s important not to think about this in the abstract, but in terms of concrete challenges. So whether it’s climate change, resource insecurity, or military competition, the rise of China transforms each of these big issues.

9. What would you research given two years and unlimited resources?

Energy poverty: roughly 2 billion people in the world don’t have access to modern energy and an even larger number can’t get jobs because industry can’t grow because they don’t have access to reliable energy supplies. This isn’t something that you can figure out by just going to interview a couple of people or sitting up your desk staring out the window and coming up with fancy new ideas for how to do things. You actually have to try different solutions on the ground and see what works and what doesn’t. Since energy is expensive, the unlimited resources would be very valuable in pursuing that. My only hesitance would be that two years is a short time to figure out decent solutions to these sorts of problems.

10. Why should someone who is not an energy specialist read your book?

There are a lot of books out there about the energy industry. What I tried to write was a book about how energy affects the things that people much more broadly care about- the economy, international relations, international security, climate change, the environment. Energy is affecting almost every sphere that we care about and understanding those connections is extraordinarily important- not because energy is the one thing that matters, but because it is a big thing that matters and the amount of hyped misinformation out there is enormous. We’re in a period of extraordinary rapid change in the energy world and they haven’t done much to update our way of thinking about energy, particular as it affects international security since the aftermath of the first oil crisis in 1973. What I hope I’ve done in this book is update this and I think it’s important for people to understand that.

Learn more about or order a copy of Michael Levi’s book, The Power Surge.

MR. TAYLOR:  A group is an associated force if, first, it is an organized armed group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaida, and second, it is a co- belligerent with al-Qaida in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. Individuals who are part of this recognized enemy may be lawful military targets.

…

We take extraordinary care to ensure that all military operations, not just the exceptional cases of those against U.S. citizens, are conducted in a manner consistent with well-established Law of Armed Conflict principles, including humanity, which forbids the unnecessary infliction of suffering, injury or destruction, distinction, which requires that only lawful targets, such as combatants and other military objectives, may be intentionally targeted, military necessity, which requires that the use of military force, including all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible, which are not themselves forbidden by the law of war, be directed at accomplishing a valid military purpose, and proportionality, which requires that the anticipated collateral damage of an attack not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage from the attack. These well-established rules that govern the use of force in armed conflict apply regardless of the type of weapon system used.

From a legal standpoint, the use of remotely piloted aircraft for lethal operations against identified individuals presents the same issues as similar operations using manned aircraft. However, advance precision technology gives us a greater ability to observe and wait until the enemy is away from innocent civilians before launching a strike, and thus minimizes the risk to innocent civilians. Before military force is used against members of al-Qaida, the Taliban and associated forces, there is a robust review process which includes rigorous safeguards to protect innocent civilians.

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MR. SHEEHAN: At this point, we’re comfortable with the AUMF as it is currently structured. Right now it does not inhibit us from prosecuting the war against al-Qaida and its affiliates.  If we were to find a group or organization that was imminent — that was targeting the U.S., first of all, we would have other authorities to deal with that situation.

I was in the government prior to 9/11 when we conducted strikes against groups before we had the AUMF specific post-9/11 authority. So we could use other authorities to take on those types of organizations. But for right now, for our war against al-Qaida, the Taliban and other — their affiliates, the AUMF serves its purpose.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, under the definition of enemy, do you agree that mere sympathy with al-Qaida is not sufficient to be associated — to be an associated force for purposes of the AUMF?

MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, Senator. Sympathy is not enough as Jeh Johnson and others have mentioned in public. It has to be an organized group and that group has to be in co-belligerent status with al-Qaida operating against the U.S.

SEN. LEVIN: Is there any good reason why both Congress and the public should not be informed of which organizations and entities the administration has determined to be co-belligerents of al-Qaida and to promptly be informed of any additions or deletions from that list?

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, I think that the appropriate role for the Congress is in its oversight regarding the designation of groups. A lot of these groups, as you know, Senator, have very murky membership and they also have very murky alliances and shifting alliances and they change their name and they lie and obfuscate their activities. So I think it would be difficult for the Congress to get involved in trying to track the designation of which are the affiliate forces.

We know when we evaluate these forces what they’re up to. And we make that determination based on their co-belligerent status with al- Qaida and make our targeting decisions based on that criteria rather than on the shifting nature of different groups and their affiliations.

SEN. LEVIN: Is there a list now, is there an existing list of groups that are affiliated with al-Qaida?

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, I’m not sure there is a list per se. I’m very familiar with the organizations that we do consider right now are an affiliate of al-Qaida and I could provide you that list.

SEN. LEVIN: Would you give us that list?

MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, sir, we can do that.

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SENATOR MCCAIN:   What this hearing is about is about a resolution that was passed now coming up on 12 years ago. And I think it’s important for all of my colleagues to read that again, which says the president is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorizes, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations or organizations.

This authorization was about those who planned and orchestrated the attacks of 2011. Here we are 12 years later and you and the secretary come before us and tell us that you don’t think it needs to be updated. Well, clearly, it does.

And I would refer to you this morning’s Washington Post editorial, revising the terms of war, the authorization to use force against al-Qaida should be updated, not discarded.

And because it’s been so long and because of the changing nature, which I think, General Nagata, you would agree the nature of this conflict has changed dramatically, spread throughout Northern Africa, throughout the Maghreb, it’s penetrating into other nations, all throughout the Middle East, the situation is dramatically changed. So free to come here and say, well, we don’t need to change it, I think, or revise or update it, I think, is, well, disturbing.

And that’s why we have people like Senator Dick Durbin last month, one of the highly respected individuals, I quote Senator Durbin, “None of us, not one who voted for the AUMF could have envisioned we are about to give future presidents the authority to fight terrorism as far-flung as Yemen and Somalia.”

Mr. Taylor, in your legal opinion, could the 2001 AUMF be read to authorize lethal force against al-Qaida’s associated forces in additional countries where they’re now present, such as Somalia, Libya and Syria?

MR. TAYLOR: As I indicated, there are — we must comply with domestic law –

SEN. MCCAIN: I think it’s a pretty straightforward question, Mr. Taylor. Do you want me to repeat it?

MR. TAYLOR: On the domestic law side, yes, sir.

SEN. MCCAIN: You believe that the 2001 AUMF authorizes lethal force against al-Qaida associated forces in Somalia, Libya and Syria, so we can expect drone strikes into Syria if we find al-Qaida there?

MR. TAYLOR: On the domestic law side, sir, I said if — you know, I hate to speculate on a hypothetical, but –

SEN. MCCAIN: Well, the president, in your view, the president has the authority to do that.

MR. TAYLOR: In my view, we are — the AUMF authorizes us to be at war with al-Qaida, the organization behind the 2001 September 11 attacks, and that organization continues and it has associated forces, forces that have joined with that organization. And yes, sir, we are authorized to attack associated — those who have chosen to associate with that organization.

SEN. MCCAIN: You rightly say in your statement that the 2012 NDAA reaffirmed the AUMF with respect to the authority to detain al- Qaida and Taliban and associated forces. Is the authority to detain the same as the authority to kill, because that was not in the defense bill?

MR. TAYLOR: It’s related; it is not the same.

SEN. MCCAIN: Wouldn’t it be helpful to the Department of Defense and the American people if we updated the AUMF to make if more explicitly consistent with the realities today, which are dramatically different than they were on that fateful day in New York and Washington?

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, I think there’s a good case to be made that we should review this as the war goes on, and we have reviewed it. And as of right now, I believe it suits us very well. And if there comes an opportunity where we need other authorities, we should come forward for those.  I would like to add, though, the al-Qaida that attacked us on September 11th, 2001 was an al-Qaida that previously attacked us from East Africa, from Yemen –

….

SEN. MCCAIN: We are now killing people in the Haqqani Network, right? Is that correct, Mr. Secretary?  The reason why I bring that up, we didn’t even designate the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization until 2012. And there are published reports which are not as a result of classified briefings that I have had, that we have killed people that their association or direct association with al-Qaida is tenuous. In fact, there’s one story that we killed somebody in return for the Pakistanis to kill somebody.

So as you stated, Congress is briefed from time to time, and I appreciate that. But the fact is that this authority, which I just read to you, has grown way out of proportions and is no longer applicable to the conditions that prevailed that motivated the United States Congress to pass the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that we did in 2001.

So I guess I must say I don’t blame you, because basically you’ve carte blanche as to what you are doing throughout the world. And we believe that it needs to be — it doesn’t need to be repealed, but it’s hard for me to understand why you would oppose a revision of the Authorization to Use Military Force in light of the dramatically changed landscape that we have in this war on Muslim extremism and al-Qaida and others. And it needs to be done, and I hope that this committee will address it, either in a separate fashion or as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act.

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GEN. NAGATA: As I track the orders and direction the secretary has given his combatant commanders, I’ve never encountered a moment where they didn’t have sufficient legal authority to implement those orders.

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GEN. GROSS: I would agree with General Nagata. I mean, from what I’ve seen in my military practice, the current AUMF has been adequate to meet the enemy we’ve seen to date so far.

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SEN. UDALL: If the negotiated settlement between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban were to be signed, would the AUMF still apply to the Taliban? In other words, could we be in a situation in which Afghanistan is no longer at war against Mullah Omar’s Taliban, but we still are? Or if we also accept such a negotiated settlement, could we be in a situation in which we are at war with al-Qaida, but not the Taliban?

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, again, hypothetical, but I would envision — if the question you asked, could that be the case, and the answer would be yes, it could be the case.

…

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, I think the AUMF currently structured works very well for us. So I guess we would be concerned that any change might restrict our combatant commanders from conducting their operations they have in the past. So right now we’re comfortable. And I think Senator Inhofe said if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. I would subscribe to that policy.

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SEN. GRAHAM: Do you agree with me the war against radical Islam or terror, or whatever description you like to provide, will go on after the second term of President Obama?

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, in my judgment, this is going to go on for quite a while, and yes, beyond the second term of the president.

SEN. GRAHAM: And beyond this term of Congress?

MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, sir. I think it’s at least 10 to 20 years.

…

SEN. GRAHAM: OK. Could we send military members into Yemen to strike against one of these organizations? Does the president have that authority to put boots on the ground in Yemen?

MR. TAYLOR: As I mentioned before, there’s domestic authority and international law authority. At the moment, the basis for putting boots on the ground in Yemen, we respect the sovereignty of Yemen and it would –

SEN. GRAHAM: I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about does he have the legal authority under our law to do that.

MR. TAYLOR: Under domestic authority, he would have that authority.

SEN. GRAHAM: I hope the Congress is OK with that. I’m OK with that. Does he have authority to put boots on the ground in the Congo?

MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, sir, he does.

SEN. GRAHAM: OK. Do you agree with me that when it comes to international terrorism, we’re talking about a worldwide struggle?

MR. SHEEHAN: Absolutely, sir.

SEN. GRAHAM: Would you agree with me the battlefield is wherever the enemy chooses to make it?

MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, sir, from Boston to the FATA.

SEN. GRAHAM: I couldn’t agree with you more. We’re in a — and do you agree with that, General?

GEN. GROSS: Yes, sir, I agree that the enemy decides where the battlefield is.

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SEN. DONNELLY: Do we feel today that al-Nusra is threatening our security?

MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, I believe that I don’t want to get in, in this setting, the decision-making we have for how and we target different groups and organizations around the world.

SEN. DONNELLY: OK. If a terrorist group is AQ-affiliated, does that inherently mean that they are threatening the United States?

MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, sir, although it’s a bit murky, I hate to say, because there are groups that have openly professed their affiliations with al-Qaida, yet, in fact, as a government, we haven’t completely grappled with that as of now. And so — but generally speaking, if — as for AUMF, as we mentioned, it has to be an organized force, first, and secondly, that that organized force has to be co-belligerently joined to al-Qaida to threaten us. So when both of those factors are in place, then we have the — we can move forward on AUMF.

SEN. DONNELLY: If that AQ-affiliated terrorist group is operating wholly within another country and their actions to date have involved only that country, does the AUMF still apply to them?

MR. TAYLOR: Senator, as we indicated, we would do a fact- intensive careful consideration. And as Secretary Sheehan mentioned, one of the conditions is that they become co-belligerent with al-Qaida in its hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, and that’s –

SEN. DONNELLY: Is that a call that you make as you see it?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, after a very intensive, careful review, careful consideration of the intelligence and threat assessments.

MR. SHEEHAN: And Senator, you ask a good question because when a group aligns itself with al-Qaida and al-Qaida has an express intent to attack Americans, home and abroad, but then do not take the next step to be involved in that co-belligerency then we have a judgment to make.

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SENATOR KING: I’ve only been here five months, but this is the most astounding and the most astoundingly disturbing hearing that I’ve been to since I’ve been here. You guys have essentially rewritten the Constitution here today. The Constitution Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 clearly says that the Congress has the power to declare war. This authorization, the AUMF, is very limited.

And you keep using the term associated forces. You use it 13 times in your statement. That is not in the AUMF. And you said at one point, it suits us very well. I assume it does suit you very well because you’re reading it to cover everything and anything. And then you said at another point, so even if the AUMF doesn’t apply, the general law of war applies and we can take these actions.

So my question is how do you possibly square this with the requirement of the Constitution that the Congress has the power to declare war?

…

MR. SHEEHAN: I’m not a constitutional lawyer or a lawyer of any kind, but let me talk to you a little — take a brief statement about al-Qaida and the organization that attacked us on September 11, 2001. In the two years prior to that, Senator King, that organization attacked us in East Africa and killed 17 Americans at our embassy in Nairobi with loosely-affiliated groups of people in East Africa. A year prior to 9/11, that same organization, with its affiliates in Yemen, almost sunk a U.S. ship, the U.S.S Cole, a $1 billion warship, killed 17 sailors in the port of Aden.

The organization that attacked us on 9/11 already had its tentacles around the world with associated groups. That was the nature of the organization then. It is the nature of the organization now. In order to attack that organization, we have to attack it with those affiliates that are its operational arm that have previously attacked and killed Americans and high-level interests and continue to try to do that.

SEN. KING: That’s fine, but that’s not what the AUMF says. You can — what I’m saying is we may need new authority but don’t — if you expand this to the extent that you have, it’s meaningless and the limitation and the war power is meaningless. I’m not disagreeing that we need to attack terrorism wherever it comes from and whoever’s doing it, but what I’m saying is let’s do it in a constitutional way, not by putting a gloss on a document that clearly won’t support it. It just doesn’t — it just doesn’t work.

I’m just reading the words. It’s all focused on September 11th and who was involved and you guys have invented this term associated forces that’s nowhere in this document. As I mentioned, in your written statement, you use that — that’s the key term, you use it 13 times. It’s the justification for everything and it renders the whole war powers of the Congress null and void.

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MR. TAYLOR: Wee are a sovereign state in a system of sovereign states. We benefit greatly by respect for each nation’s sovereignty. We are bound by treaty to — that is the U.N charter, to respect the sovereignty of other states. And there are, as recognized in the U.N. treaty, there is the inherent right of self-defense, but that’s one basis for overcoming a state’s sovereignty, if it’s necessary for us to exercise our inherent right of self-defense. Another basis is the consent of the host country and that is a very important basis for our operations outside of Afghanistan.

SEN. LEVIN: The issue has been raised about other entities using — than the DOD — using remotely piloted aircraft strikes. And my question is should the use of these drones be limited to the Department of Defense or should other government agencies be allowed to use such force as well, for instance, the CIA? Now let me, I think, ask either one of you, Secretary or Mr. Taylor.

MR. SHEEHAN: Mr. Chairman, the president has indicated that he has a preference for those activities to be conducted under Title 10. We’re reviewing that right now but I think we also recognize that that type of transition may take quite a while, depending on the theater of operation.

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MR. SHEEHAN: Senator, just one clarification. When I was asked whether the president had authority to put boots on the ground, which by the way is not a legal term, boots on the ground, and when I said they did — he did have authority to put boots on the ground in Yemen or in the Congo, I was not necessarily referring to that under the AUMF. Certainly, the president has military personnel deployed all over the world today, in probably over 70 or 80 countries and that authority is not always under AUMF. So I just want to clarify for the record that we weren’t talking about all of that authority — subject to AUMF.

For U.S. diplomats and military officials who were involved in training a Congolese army unit, a troubling question loomed: Would the 391st Commando Battalion serve as protectors of the population or would they revert to acts of sexual violence once on the battlefield?

A United Nations report released this week indicates that their worst fears have been realized and that efforts at building up a Congolese unit of benevolent soldiers has failed. The report, issued Wednesday by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, accused members of the 391st Commando Battalion — which was trained by special forces troops assigned to U.S. Africa Command — and other Democratic Republic of Congo troops of engaging in a range of atrocities, including the mass rape of women and young girls in eastern Congo.

(3PA: Read the UN joint report.)

John Bennett, “‘Fragile’ Pursuit of a Grand Bargain,” Defense News, May 12, 2013.

Yet another reason the Senate — and even senior House members say a grand bargain will have to originate in the upper chamber — has so far failed to begin work on the big long-term budget measure is the institution’s inability to multitask.

“The attention span around here is about that of a 4-year-old,” McCain told Defense News. “I think that’s why there hasn’t been as much attention on a grand bargain as you might have suspected.”

Aram Roston, “Targeted Killing: CIA’s Fleet of 80+ UAVs Unlikely to be Transferred to Military,” Defense News, May 15, 2013.

The Obama administration has floated the idea of putting the CIA’s controversial targeted killing operations under the control of uniformed armed service. But sources familiar with the still-classified program, which uses unmanned aircraft to kill suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen, say the shift would be difficult to implement and would make little difference…

People familiar with the UAV program say that when it comes time to pull the trigger on a weapon aimed at a suspected terrorist, no matter whether the mission is run by the CIA or the Air Force, the action is always conducted by military officers. It is U.S. government policy that only uniformed personnel can be the “trigger pullers,” the sources said.

One former intelligence officer points out that the most important part of the entire program isn’t the UAVs at all. It’s the intelligence that officials use to pick their targets. And that’s the part the Air Force would have the most difficult time getting, if it were not for the CIA.

(3PA: Why transferring CIA drone strikes to the military is a good idea.)

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” May 15, 2013.

Sen. John McCain: On the [Iran arms shipments to Syria] overflights that were mentioned, I think we should be frank with the American people and the Congress. We’re not stopping those overflights, and we are not getting inspections. And those that are inspected are preplanned so that the inspection shows that there are no weapons being delivered from Iran to Syria. The fact is we know — absolutely know — that roughly one flight a way is going into Damascus filled with arms and weapons for the use of Bashar Assad…

Wendy Sherman [Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs]: We currently assess that it would take Iran a minimum period of approximately one year if it made a decision today to acquire a nuclear weapon. And we assess that they have not yet made that decision, and it would be made by the supreme leader.

That effort to acquire a nuclear weapon would involve both the production of a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon and the completion of various weaponization activities needed to fashion a working nuclear device that could be fitted into a ballistic missile…

Sen. Christopher Murphy:  What are the things that would change that decision? And amongst those, what are the things that may be outside of our control that relate to the internal political dynamics of an upcoming election and a very fluid political situation on the ground within Iran?

Sherman:… I don’t think the supreme leader has made the strategic decision to, in fact, deal on their nuclear program. I believe it is all part of a broader projection of power and assertion of Iranian authority and point of view, not only in Iran but in the region, and ultimately in the world.

I think that we do believe that the imposition of sanctions and the pain that is being put on the Iranian regime is having an effect, perhaps not yet enough of an effect to change the calculus of the supreme leader, but on its way potentially to doing so…

I certainly think that the fall of the Assad regime will have a profound impact. It will either make them feel more or less secure. I think that you are quite right that they will look for a way to maintain a presence even after Assad falls, because Assad will most decidedly fall at some point in this process. And they will look for a way to recover, because they need that position in the region.

I think there are other actions that could be taken and other agreements made. If there is an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority for peace in the Middle East, it may change the calculus of many players in the world; where we are in Afghanistan. What happens to DPRK’s program is watched by Iran.

So there are any number of factors that I think probably affect their calculus. But at the end of the day, my own experience is that this is ultimately about regime survival and survival of the choices they have made about how their country is governed, ones that we find extraordinarily repressive to their people. And it will be that regime’s survival that will affect their calculus.

Karen DeYoung, “Policy on Drone Strike Authorization Doesn’t Need to Change, Defense Official Says,” Washington Post, May 17, 2013.

A senior Defense Department official said Thursday that the Pentagon sees no need to change the broad congressional authorization under which the military conducts lethal drone strikes against terrorist targets and estimated that the war with al-Qaeda could continue for up to two decades.

“At this point we’re comfortable with the AUMF as it is currently structured,” Assistant Defense Secretary Michael Sheehan said of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force passed by Congress in 2001. “Right now . . . it serves its purpose,” he said.

Craig Whitlock, “Obama Deplores Sex Crimes in the Military, Says There’s ‘No Silver Bullet’,” Washington Post, May 16, 2013.

“The Army is failing in its efforts to combat sexual assault and sexual harassment,” Gen. Ray Odierno, the Army’s chief of staff, said in a blog post addressed to his 540,000 soldiers. “It is time we take on the fight as our primary mission.”

“Yemen Police ‘Dismantle’ al-Qaeda Cell,” Al-Arabiya, May 12, 2013.

Yemeni police Sunday raided a house in the southern city of Aden, killing one suspected Al-Qaeda militant and arresting three, an official said, adding that the cell was plotting attacks on vital installations.
“We have dismantled a terror cell in one of the houses near Mansura district” in Aden, the security official said.
“Security forces managed to kill one of its members who tried to blow himself up using two explosive-laden belts.”
Three other suspected members of the cell were arrested and police seized dozens of explosive belts, he said, adding that the cell had been planning attacks on strategic installations in Aden.

(3PA: Apparently, members of Al Qaeda can be captured in Yemen.)